Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur

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THE PRESIDENT AT SEA

BY THE EDITOR

"Does this Administration mean business or is it only talking in its sleep?"

That is the pregnant question which we propounded in the January number of this REVIEW and which still awaits a decisive answer.

Garrison goes; Daniels stays.

Garrison was and is an earnest advocate of measures providing adequate National Defense; Daniels is not and never was.

Where stands the President?

Addressing the Congress fourteen months ago, four months after the beginning of the great war, the President said impatiently, sneeringly, sarcastically:

> The subject is not new. There is no new need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward it because some among us are nervous and excited. We shall easily and sensibly agree upon a policy of defense. The question has not changed its aspect because the times are not normal * * * Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defense.

One year later he urged the Congress to increase the Navy and, upon recommendation of the Secretary of War and the General Staff, to strengthen the regular army and to create a new National reserve force of no less than four hundred thousand men.

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Why this *volte-face?* The President himself explained in these words spoken in New York on January 27th:

Perhaps when you learned, as I dare say you did learn beforehand, that I was expecting to address you on the subject of preparedness you recalled the address which I made to Congress something more than a year ago, in which I said that this question of military preparedness was not a pressing question. But more than a year has gone by since then, and I would be ashamed if I had not learned something in fourteen months. The minute I stop changing my mind as President with the change of all the circumstances in the world I will be a back number.

While refraining from depicting the precise change of circumstances which had taken place, he presented the following illustration of reversal of opinion:

There is another thing about which I have changed my mind. A year ago I was not in favor of a tariff board. And I will tell you why: Because then the only purpose of a tariff board was to keep alive an unprofitable controversy. If you set up any board of inquiry whose purpose it is to keep business disturbed and to make it always an open question what you are going to do about the public policy of the Government I am opposed to it. And the very men who were dinning it into our ears that what business wanted was to be let alone were many of them men who were insisting that we should start up a controversy that meant that we could not let it alone. There is a great deal more opinion vocal in this world than is consistent with logic.

Whether or not the President meant to recall or to ignore his declaration at Indianapolis on January 8th, 1915, is not quite clear. He then said:

If by scientific treatment of the tariff they [the Republicans] mean adjustment to the actual trade conditions of America and the world, then I am with them.

And I want to call their attention, as they apparently have not noticed it, that the bill which creates the new Trade Commission does that very thing.

That commission is authorized and empowered to enter into and report to Congress not only upon the conditions of trade in this country but upon the conditions of trade, the cost of manufacture, the cost of transportation—all the things that enter into the question of the tariff—in foreign countries as well as the United States and into all those questions of varied combinations which affect international trade between Europe and the United States.

It has full powers which will guide Congress in the scientific treatment of questions of international trade.

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Being by profession a schoolmaster, I am glad to point that out to a class of uninstructed Republicans, though I have not always taught in the primary grades.

It was a good joke on the sleepy Republicans and everybody laughed, never dreaming, of course, that later, as now seems to be the case, the "opinion" then expressed might drop gently into the category of those that are "vocal rather than consistent with logic" or even with fact.

But this was by the way. Continuing before his New York audience, the President elucidated his programme of Preparedness with notable explicitness. He appreciated the National Guard and believed it should receive encouragement and aid, but he feared that, under the Constitution, there was "no way in which that force can be made a direct resource as a National reserve under National authority." Therefore, he continued:

What we need is a body of men trained in association with units of the army. A body of men organized under the immediate direction of the national authorities. A body of men subject to the immediate call to arms of the national authorities; and yet men not put into the ranks of the regular army; men left to their tasks of civil life; men supplied with equipment and training, but not drawn from the peaceful pursuits which have made America great and must keep her great.

He added most significantly:

I am not a partisan of any one plan. I have had too much experience to think that it is right to say that the plan which I proposed is the only plan that will work, because I have a shrewd suspicion that there may be other plans which will work. But what I am for, and what every American ought to insist upon, is a body of at least half a million trained citizens who will serve under conditions of danger as an immediate available national reserve.

Far be it from us, as between friends, to attempt to distinguish between hedging and maintaining an "open mind," but the fact seems to be that then and there, rightfully or wrongfully, wisely or foolishly, consistently or inconsistently, loyally or disloyally, the President served public notice upon the Secretary of War that he did not regard his committal to the plan which he had proposed to the Congress, upon the Secretary's recommendation, as either final or binding. This attitude, to the best of our information, he maintained scrupulously, by the nebulous process, while

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" taking counsel " with the toiling thinkers of the prairies.

Mr. Garrison resigned, of course; though not, as has been remarked, either impulsively or hurriedly. As early as January 14th, he had addressed to the President these pointed words:

> Those who are conscientiously convinced that nothing but national forces can properly be the basis of a policy of national defense, cannot possibly accept a policy based upon State forces. It not only does not in itself offer an acceptable solution, but acts to prevent any proper solution.
>
> If those who are thus convinced are faced with the necessity of declaring their position on the matter, they can only show their sincerity and good faith by declining to admit the possibility of compromise with respect to this essential fundamental principle.
>
> I am thus convinced.
>
> I feel that we are challenged by the existing situation to declare ourselves promptly, openly, and unequivocally, or be charged properly with lack of sincerity and good faith.

In a word, the judicial mind, unversed in the agilities of political ratiocination, given an admitted premise, could reach but one conclusion. Nevertheless, it was not until February 10th, when the President politely but firmly and formally enjoined him thereafter to " be kind enough to draw very carefully the distinction between your own individual views and the views of the Administration," that the Secretary felt impelled to appear no longer as the " seeming representative " of his chief. The propriety, even the necessity, of his action is beyond question. Convinced as he was that " forty-eight little armies " would be utterly helpless in a war such as the President had just been solemnly warning the country might be forced upon it over night, he could not have remained at the head of the War Department without becoming a virtual traitor to both his convictions and the Nation which he had sworn to serve and protect.

While deploring, in common with the entire Press and apparently all the people, the withdrawal from the Cabinet of its most competent and vigorous member, we cannot but feel that by clarifying the atmosphere it may make distinct an issue which might otherwise have been obscured. Now, as never before and as never could have been possible while Mr. Garrison and Mr. Breckinridge continued to hold the grateful sympathy of an apprehensive people, will President

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Wilson and the Democratic Congress be held to a strict accountability for real preparedness. As the President truly and somewhat sternly said in his speech in New York:

> There is only one way that parties and individuals win the confidence of this nation, and that is to do the things that ought to be done. Nobody is going to be deceived. Speeches are not going to win elections. The facts are going to speak for themselves, and speak louder than anybody who controverts them. No political party, no group of men can ever disappoint America. This is a year of political accounting and the Americans in politics are rather expert accountants. They know what the books contain and they are not going to be deceived by it. No man is going to hide behind any excuses. The goods must be delivered or the confidence will not be enjoyed, and for my part I hope every man in public life will get what is coming to him.

Words more fitly spoken or more timely as of the moment we cannot recall.

Parenthetically, we may remark that the retirement of Secretary Garrison was delicately foreshadowed in this REVIEW in October last when, after noting the sudden appearance at the White House of Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard in the capacity of unintimate adviser, we thoughtfully continued:

> We turn logically then from mere rumors to Mr. Villard's own self-authorized utterances over the signature "O. G. V." in the *Evening Post*. And the very first headline we chance upon is, of all things imaginable, "Rumors of Changes in Wilson's Cabinet." The member chiefly concerned is not, as some might hope, Josephus, but Mr. Garrison, who is coming to be known, somewhat to the rasping, we suspect, of Mr. Villard's tranquillizing sensibilities, as the "War Secretary." To the best of our information nobody, prior to the publication of this article, had suggested so much as a possibility of Mr. Garrison retiring from the Cabinet,—and Mr. Villard, of course, does not reveal the source of his inspiration. That some persons might be inquisitive along this line is readily imagined, but for ourselves we should regard undue insistence, in the delicate circumstances now existing and while the tension between Messrs. House and Villard continues unresolved, as the height of impropriety. Moreover, that which interests us most in O. G. V.'s speculation is the cleverness of its presentation and the subtlety of its suggestion. Mr. Villard's great and good friend, the Count von Bernstorff himself, could hardly have done better.
>
> After noting that "so far the Secretary has shown no disposition to look with favor upon the proposal [whose proposal?] that

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he run either for Governor or Senator," Mr. Villard shrewdly observes:

> But a man who has made a popular success like Secretary Garrison cannot always control his future. Politicians, too, have a way of devising ingenious snares. Thus, what will the Secretary say next year if it is represented to him that the President must carry his own State, that the Secretary only can carry it, and that it is the Secretary's loyal duty to the party which made him and gave him his great opportunity here to enter the lists?

The inaptness of an intimation that the President may not be able to carry his own State, even with the efficient aid, recently pledged, of the Honorable James Smith, Jr., is so obvious that an inference of underlying purpose is unescapable. And listen further:

> What would he say if there is held out to him, in addition, the bait of an appointment to the United States Supreme Court in case he is defeated and the opportunity offers? Will he be beyond the flattery of the suggestion that in 1920 the party will be looking for a new national leader; and that the easiest way to the Presidency is to be a successful Governor of New Jersey, as President Wilson showed?

It was ever thus. "Again, the devil taketh him up into an exceeding high mountain, and showeth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them; again, moreover, to no avail, since the Secretary promptly bade the Tempter through the public prints to get behind him. Nevertheless, the seed is sown and *we shall await the harvest of the coming session with more than casual interest.*

And by a circuitous route the reaper came.*

While understanding and sympathizing with the reluctance of the President to become a back number, we must not overlook other, though perhaps less important, reasons for changing his mind with respect to Preparedness. These appear and disappear with extraordinary rapidity in his speeches to his bucolic counsellors. It was a kind of running debate designed apparently to win the approval of both sides. Speaking on the affirmative at various times the President said:

> We are daily treading among the most intricate dangers.
>
> No man in the United States knows what a single week or a single day or a single hour may bring forth.
>
> New circumstances have arisen which make it necessary for America to defend herself.
>
> We have interests that are being slowly drawn into the maelstrom of this tremendous upheaval.

* By wireless via Sayville to His Excellency, Ambassador James W. Gerard, Berlin: Fail not to heed the words of the prophet to the [also] sick and sore Hezekiah: "Keep thine *House* in order!"

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There may at any moment come a time when I cannot preserve both the peace and honor of the United States.

Let me tell you very solemnly that you cannot afford to postpone this thing. I do not know what a single day may bring forth.

Apparently the law that governs the relations of nations with one another must at times fall silent and look on in dumb impotence.

Do you want the situation to be such that all that the President can do is to write messages, to utter words of protest? If these breaches of international law which are in daily danger of occurring should touch the very vital interests and honor of the United States, do you wish to do nothing about it? Do you wish to have all the world say that the flag of the United States which we love can be stained with impunity?

On the negative:

There is no sudden crisis. Nothing new has happened. I am not upon this errand because of any unexpected situation. I have come to confer with you upon a matter upon which it would in any circumstances be necessary for us to confer, when all the rest of the world is on fire and our own house is not fireproof.

Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United States need fear an invasion of its own territory.

I have not come here to tell you of any immediate threat of definite danger, because, by very great patience, by making our position perfectly clear, and then steadfastly maintaining the same attitude through our great controversies, we have so far held difficulty at arm's length.

America was born into the world to do mankind's service, and no man is an American in whom the desire to do mankind's service does not take precedence over the desire to serve himself. If I believe that the might of America was any threat to any free man in the world I would wish America to be weak. But I believe that the might of America is the might of righteous purpose and of a sincere love for the freedom of mankind.

There was more to the same effect, but upon the whole the ayes seem to have it. Although "nothing new has happened" and there is "no fear of invasion," nevertheless since "new circumstances have arisen" and "we are daily treading among the most intricate dangers," a careful weighing of the evidence seems convincing that the President thinks something ought to be done by way of National Defense.

But what? While steadfastly maintaining "an open mind as to details," the President was gratifyingly explicit

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on more than one occasion respecting the army. Again he declared, as in New York on January 27th:

> I want the Congress of the United States to do a great deal for the National Guard, but I do not see how the Congress of the United States can put the National Guard at the disposal of the nation; therefore, it seems absolutely necessary that in addition to the National Guard there should be a considerable body of men of some military training who are willing to pledge themselves to come at the call of the nation.
>
> What we wish is a definite citizen reserve of men trained to arms to a sufficient extent to make them quickly transformable into a fighting force organized under the immediate direction of the United States, subject to a definite pledge to serve the United States and pledged to obey immediately the call of the President when Congress authorizes him to call them to arms.
>
> The National Guard is a body of State troops and not a body of national reserves; because the Constitution makes them so, no matter whether we now think those are the best arrangements or not.
>
> We must lay down a programme and then steadfastly carry it out and complete it. There are no novelties about the programme, all the lines of it are the lines already established, only drawn out to their legitimate conclusion, and drawn out so that they will be completed within a calculable length of time.
>
> The plans now laid before the Congress of the United States are merely plans not to throw the life of American youth away. *Those plans are going to be adopted.*

Not at any time nor in any way, by tongue or pen, has Mr. Garrison himself set forth more succinctly that which he had come to regard as the "fundamental principle" of National Defense and which the President had "laid before the Congress of the United States" as his own, adding as "firmly" as when calling Germany to account for assassination, "So much by way of preparation for defense seems to me absolutely imperative now; we can do no less." True, he had already, on January 17th, as appears from the correspondence since published, in the course of "a delightfully frank conference" with Mr. Hay, expressed a willingness to consider the militia scheme and, on February 10th, reiterated that he felt "in duty bound" to keep his mind "open to conviction on that side," but again we are constrained to adjudge that, upon the evidences accurately balanced, the ayes have it and that the President still regards the Constitutional inhibition as fatal to the efficiency, as a National force, of the forty-eight little armies. Such, at any rate,

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despite the obvious guesswork involved in the conclusion, is our tentative vocal opinion.

As to the navy, we are not so sure. We are informed, to begin with, that its actual strength "ranks fourth, not second," as we had been led by Mr. Daniels to believe, and that consequently "everything should be done that it is possible for us to do to bring the navy up to an adequate standard of strength and efficiency." Herein the President differed from the Secretary of the Navy who, in his annual report for 1914, "coveted the honor of initiating for America a movement which will make possible a reduction of fighting craft," but so far has discovered no such difference in "fundamental principle" as seems likely to induce his resignation.

The past at least is secure. "You are told," said the President, "that there has been some sort of neglect about the navy. *There has not been any sort of neglect about the navy.*" Later, however, he added:

> The vessels we have are manned by experts; there is not a better service in the world than that of the American navy; but no matter how skilled and capable the officers or devoted the men, they must have ships enough, and we are going to give them ships enough. *We have been doing it slowly and leisurely and good naturedly,* as we are accustomed to do everything in times of peace, but now we must get down to business and do it systematically.
>
> What we are proposing now is not the sudden creation of a navy, for we have a splendid navy, but the definite working out of a programme by which, within five years, we will bring the navy to a fighting strength which otherwise might have taken eight or ten years along exactly the same lines of development that may have been followed and followed diligently and intelligently for at least a decade past.
>
> There is no sudden panic; there is no sudden change of plans. All that has happened is that we now see that we ought more rapidly and more thoroughly than ever before to do the things which have always been characteristic of America, for she has always been proud of her navy, and has been addicted to the principle that her citizenship must do the fighting on land.
>
> But, ladies and gentlemen, do not forget that that is not all there is to this problem. Suppose that I knew that, back of the insistence of the United States upon its rights, was a great navy that ranked first in the world and a body of men trained to arms adequate at any rate to fend off any initial disaster to the United States while we were making an army ready. That would be only the beginning.
>
> There is no other navy in the world that has to cover so great an

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area of defense as the American navy, and *it ought, in my judgment, to be incomparably the greatest navy in the world.*

Whether the President, in putting forth this amazing proposal, as the *World* apologetically intimates, was carried away by what Disraeli was wont to describe as "the exuberance of his own verbosity" or, as the *Sun* shrewdly observes, he was aiming to please German sympathizers by hinting at a purpose to wrest from England her sea power, we do not like to ask. We prefer to believe that he did not mean what he said,—and to let it go at that. The best we can make of it all is that the President blesses Josephus, very much as he blessed Mr. Bryan at the parting of their respective ways, and favors the building of more ships.

Whether or not we have succeeded in our patient endeavor to deduce from this mass of contradictions the President's actual attitude towards Preparedness will soon be determined beyond the possibility of doubt by his acts. The real question, bearing directly and powerfully upon both the forthcoming election and the pressing need of the Nation, is, we regret to say, one of sincerity. We gladly make generous allowance for the inconsistencies which so often characterize extemporaneous speaking. We recognize the difficulty of putting the most admirable of theories into practical operation. We appreciate the indispensability of compromise in building legislation. We have only contempt for that sheer obduracy which Emerson aptly designated as the hobgoblin of little minds. We rejoiced at the President's reversal of his position on National Defense.

But is his conversion complete? Is it permanent? Is it genuine? Is its genesis conviction or expediency? Those are questions which one would hesitate to raise in ordinary times, but these are not ordinary times. Mr. Wilson himself bears testimony from his own intimate knowledge that they are full of peril to the Nation. It was upon that assumption, we were told, that he went forth to arouse his countrymen to appreciation of their imminent danger. Over and over again he declared that his purpose was patriotic, not political. And yet no sooner is his tour completed than his partisans, headed by his chief newspaper organ, joyously acclaim his triumph—in what? In winning votes for Preparedness from recalcitrant members of Congress? Apparently not an additional one was secured. No; his success

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lay in achieving personal popularity for himself and his family, in "capturing the public," in "discounting Bryan," in "spiking Roosevelt's guns," etc., etc.

Meanwhile, his own Secretary of War was gravely warning him that desertion of their common cause, involving repudiation of a fundamental principle definitely espoused, would constitute a breach of "*good faith*" and "*sincerity*," —and when his suspicions were confirmed not only the Secretary himself but his equally high-minded associate refused to serve longer. Surely these are disquieting symptoms which, in the face of National peril and upon the eve of a National election held to fix National authority for the next four years, cannot be ignored.

Even more significant and disturbing to our mind is the retention as the head of the great Navy Department of a pottering country politician under whose administration the navy, according to the President himself, has fallen from second to fourth place, whose stupidity at this moment is delaying the mere *beginning* of the dreadnoughts authorized *two and a half years*, whose chief present boast is of his economy in reducing the allowance for *ammunition* $12,000,000, without even consulting the Board of Ordnance which had called for it as a necessity, whose suppression and mutilation of official reports have kept the truth from the people, whose treatment of competent and faithful officers is a reproach to the country, whose fad is *disarmament* and whose god is *Bryan*.

Garrison goes; Daniels stays.

What are we to think?

"A vote for Wilson, a vote for Daniels"—Daniels for four more years as guardian of our first line of defense!

What are we to do? What *can* we do if confronted by that dread proposition?

"I shall not discuss the navy tonight," said the President pleasantly in his New York speech, "because I don't want to go to sea."

But is he not "at sea"?

If he thinks not and would have others think not, we implore him, for the sake of all whom he would serve, himself, his party, his country and his God, to take his frost-bitten ear off the ground and stand up and *lead*, as Garrison begged, to trample his pride under foot and *fight*, if need be, like a man—like the man he used to be.

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ON REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES

THE preliminary campaign for the election of a President of the United States will be inaugurated on March 7th, when the partisan voters of Indiana will assemble at their respective primaries and choose delegates to the forthcoming National conventions. The Democrats will designate representatives favorable to the renomination of President Wilson and the Republicans will name advocates of the nomination of the Honorable Charles W. Fairbanks. New Hampshire will elect delegates on March 11th, Minnesota on March 14th and North Dakota on March 21st and eight more commonwealths, including the great States of New York and Illinois, will take like action during the month of April. The climax of the preliminary campaign will be reached on June 7th, the date fixed for both Republican and Progressive conventions in Chicago, two weeks precedent to the assured renomination by the Democratic party at St. Louis of President Wilson.

The ensuing struggle for ascendancy will not only involve issues of greater import to the Nation and the people than at any time since 1860 but also, we fear, may be characterized by bitterness and passion such as has not been witnessed since the days of Andrew Jackson. It is but natural and probably inevitable that the aroused temper of a warring world should be reflected in the course of an election more distinctively international in character and effect than any other ever held in the United States.

The most striking circumstance bearing upon the quite tentative situation now existing is the complete confidence of all most intimately concerned. Those charged by the President with responsibility for continuance of the Democratic party in power are firmly convinced in both mind and heart that nothing less than abrupt termination of the war can imperil Mr. Wilson's chance of re-election. Peace and Prosperity, supplemented by appropriated Preparedness, they regard as an irresistible slogan,—and there is much in history to justify their faith in the reluctance of the American people to swap horses or even donkeys while crossing a stream.

The leaders of the opposition, on the other hand, feel no less certain that only a fair measure of unity is requisite to success, while full amalgamation would effect an over-

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whelming triumph. This predication is based upon the fact that, if the votes cast for Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft in 1912 had been combined, Mr. Wilson would have lost at the polls by 1,311,544 and would have received in the Electoral College only 152 ballots against 379. This, too, may be regarded as reassuring by those who for one reason or another are dissatisfied with the conduct of the present Administration.

For ourselves, in view of the unprecedented condition of affairs now existing and of unforeseeable happenings that may take place, we perceive but little basis for confidence in either hypothesis. It is quite clear to our mind that neither the partisan " ins " nor the partisan " outs " have sufficient numerical strength to win beyond peradventure. And if, as we suspect, the result will be determined finally by the increasingly large body of patriotic citizens who, especially in a time like this, place their country far above party or prejudice, the fact is more than gratifying; it is alive with promise for democracy at the very instant when monarchism as a more efficient machine seems most threatening to what we of America have come to regard as civilization.

We may not forecast, then, at this early stage; but we may speculate, possibly to advantage, with respect at least to the preliminaries of the momentous contest which so soon is to absorb our minds, our energies and our patriotic fervor.

One severely practical question arises immediately: Can the elements comprising the Opposition be united effectively? And the answer, in so far as paramount issues are concerned, is unhesitatingly affirmative. The sharp line of demarcation between Republicans and Progressives drawn by Mr. Roosevelt in his famous Columbus declaration has been blotted out by its author. While not admitting definite and final abandonment of the radical proposals then enunciated, Our Colonel now not only concedes but insists that they be set aside as of minor importance in the face of more pressing problems. It may be assumed safely, moreover, that with the exception of a negligible number of sentimentalists represented by Miss Jane Addams, the Progressive rank and file are in accord with their leader. Indeed, so many have already returned to the Republican fold, as indicated by the various bye-elections, that probably not

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more than one-fourth or at the most one-third of the four millions of the recalcitrants of 1912 remain unaccounted for.

Meanwhile, the chiefs of the Republican party seem to have learned their lesson. Mr. Aldrich, the most powerful and most incorrigible of the reactionaries, is dead, Mr. William Barnes has stepped aside, Mr. Penrose no longer scoffs at the Progressive sentiment of his State, Mr. Taft's animosity does not go beyond Mr. Roosevelt,—and Mr. Elihu Root, who thrilled the country with his eloquently liberal speech at Albany, and Mr. Murray Crane, who redeemed Massachusetts by demanding the election as Governor of a man renowned for his independence, stand forth as the broader-minded, more enlightened and more tolerant leaders of the old organization. Agreement upon a statement of principles under such conditions is readily attained.

The one problem that confronts the Opposition is that which, somewhat oddly, does not affect or even concern the party in power, namely, the selection of candidates. And this task, since no Progressive except Mr. Roosevelt is mentioned in connection with the Presidency, narrows in turn to the Republican party. Can a ticket be constructed, along with a platform, that will serve the two essential purposes of eliminating the possibility of a third menacing candidacy and of winning the support of those independent citizens whose action may prove to be decisive? That is the question, the very interesting question in a political sense and the very vital question as it affects the future of the Nation, that must be answered at Chicago three months from this very week.

The solution, although far from easy, is rendered less difficult by the certainty respecting the outcome of the Democratic convention. The Opposition already knows precisely what and whom it will have to face before the great popular tribunal. So completely has the President possessed his party, it will be in fact Wilson, that's all,—Wilson, his record; Wilson, his foreign policy; Wilson, his Mexico; Wilson, his diplomacy; Wilson, his Congress; Wilson, his party; Wilson, himself, no more like Jefferson than like Cleveland, but more agile than Van Buren, more canny than Tilden, more daring than Jackson. However the balance may be struck when the time shall come to weigh the good against the ill of the present Administration, there is and can be no question of either the intellectual or the

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wilful supremacy within his party of the Democratic candidate.

This fact, no less than the unexampled condition of public and more particularly international affairs, calls for discrimination on the part of the Opposition not unlike that of the colored preacher who, at the time of the Charleston earthquake, implored his Maker to "Come and help us, and come yo'self, o Lord; don't send yo' Son; this ain't no work for boys!" Time was when a Rutherford B. Hayes could be elected or at least inaugurated President by the Republican party,—but not now, when the world is aflame and the country is aroused to the need of its best brain and fullest experience at the helm, not merely for performance at home but for the influence of an international reputation abroad. With all due respect, then, for the many excellent qualifications of Mr. Fairbanks, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Weeks, Mr. Smith, Mr. Estabrook, Mr. Brumbaugh, Mr. Hadley and of all other favorite sons or sons-in-law whose aspirations may have escaped our attention, we pass unhesitatingly on to Mr. Cummins, who is lamentably weak east of the Alleghenies and to Mr. Burton, a man of parts but wholly of negation and consequently quite out of the question as the rival of a personality so vividly affirmative as Woodrow Wilson.

That Mr. Justice Hughes could obtain the nomination we have no doubt; that he would be elected is a common belief in which we do not unreservedly share; that he should not and will not become the candidate we are confident. There might—indeed, there may—come a time when the services of some particular one of the five million individuals qualified might be required as President, or temporarily even as Dictator, to save the Nation. Such a condition or something approaching it, we fear, exists in England today, and if the like obtained in our own country we should not blanch at the desperate remedy. But no peril of so great imminence now confronts us and, if there did, there is no ground for belief that Mr. Justice Hughes's qualifications to meet it, as compared with those of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Root, Mr. Roosevelt or of many others, are pre-eminent. The only conceivable reason for forcing the nomination upon him would be "to beat Wilson" and to gather the offices into the Republican basket. His acceptance of such a nomination, unanimous or not, thus ignobly made, would constitute a flat betrayal of trust, as interpreted from his own reiter-

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ated declarations. While wishing earnestly that Mr. Justice Hughes might see his way clear to say simply, with General Sherman, "If nominated, I will not accept and if elected I will not serve," so far from questioning his sincerity, we consider it a virtual, though perhaps a necessary, impertinence to even mention his name in connection with the Presidency at this time.

There remain Mr. Root, Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Borah and Mr. McCall,—equipped for the filling of the requirements enumerated in the order named. Governor McCall's strong grasp upon public questions, his profundity as a scholar, his breadth of vision and his sturdy independence, no less than his long service in Congress and his demonstrated ability to win Progressive votes, clearly establish his availability. Senator Borah stands easily at the head of the younger statesmen developed within the Republican party, as second, in intellectual capacity, only to Mr. Root, and in strength of purpose, in fidelity to American ideals, in liberal thought and in oratorical power as second to none. If Mr. Root and Mr. Roosevelt must be set aside upon grounds of expediency, as a consequence of the antagonism engendered by the bitter contest of 1912, Borah and McCall or McCall and Borah, as determined by considerations respecting the West or the East as the chief battleground, would make the most effective appeal to the entire Opposition. But neither the Governor of Massachusetts nor the Senator from Idaho has profited from the great experience in international affairs of the former Secretary of State or the former President and in a comparative sense both are practically unknown in foreign capitals.

All resolves, then to the two questions: Would the three and a half millions of regular Republicans who voted for Mr. Taft condone the offense of Mr. Roosevelt? and Would the million and a half of remaining Progressives forgive Mr. Root for his part in the proceedings at Chicago? That Mr. Root personally would support Mr. Roosevelt we are certain. That Mr. Roosevelt would support Mr. Root we have good reason to believe. If anyone is qualified to speak with surety for their respective followers, he is not within the range of our acquaintance.

While to our mind the Republican party would stamp itself a coward by refusing, at this crucial time, to nominate for President Elihu Root, the foremost statesman now

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living in this country or in the world, we fully recognize the strength in union. Despite the fact that he overshadows all others combined, President Wilson cannot be the sole factor on the Democratic side. Linked with him inevitably and most conspicuously will be Colonel Edward M. House, maker of Cabinets, confidential adviser and Ambassador-at-large in full charge, without official responsibility, of foreign affairs, and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, who hangs like a millstone about the neck of his patient but apparently helpless patron. Against this Democratic trio, either of two combinations would seem to be more effective than any other that could be devised, to wit:

I

For President,
ELIHU ROOT

For Vice-President,
WILLIAM E. BORAH

For Secretary of State,
HENRY CABOT LODGE

For Senator from New York,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

For Senator from Massachusetts,
SAMUEL W. MCCALL

Great courage in grave times is good politics!

II

For President,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

For Vice-President,
WILLIAM E. BORAH

For Secretary of State,
ELIHU ROOT

For Governor of Massachusetts,
SAMUEL W. MCCALL

"Nec sibi, sed toti gentium se credere mundo!"

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From the New York Evening Mail—1908

1904 *U. S.—"He's Good Enough for Me!"*

The most bewildering of the many applications of Homer Davenport's famous cartoon we have ever seen, appears in a paper called *Harper's Weekly,* as presented herewith. Our Colonel himself remarks with a grin that it " most emphatically shows an Uncle Sam who would *not* like to have

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From Harper's Weekly—1916



1916 *T. R.—"He's Good Enough for Me!"*

me behind him,"—which we suspect is correct. May it not be possible that, in a busy moment, Brother Hapgood got the wrong man behind that particular conception of our venerable Uncle?

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DOES PREPAREDNESS MEAN MILITARISM?

PROPHECY may be past. Prevision is not. There are men still able to judge the future by the past. There are those still who are sufficiently prudent and foresighted to make preparation for the exigencies which experience teaches us to expect. The words of Washington, Hamilton and their contemporaries, concerning the necessity of military strength, have been cited a thousand times. But such counsels did not die with them. In our own time we have had equally clear sighted men who have continued that same service of admonition and exhortation. Thus only a score of years ago it was said:

> It is idle to say that the rules of international law are more humane, or that they are better understood, or that they are better protected by treaties, than they were a hundred years ago. The rights of neutrals have depended in the past, and will depend in the future, in every life and death struggle between nations, whatever treaties may say, upon the exigencies of the hour. Our naval and military prestige, and our wonderful physical and material resources, are no doubt quite sufficient to cause any statesman, not under stress of some controlling necessity, to think twice before provoking us to war. But who can believe that in the midst of a desperate struggle any great naval Power would, for fear of retribution at some future day, imperil its existence by taking account of the rights of a neutral Power which was for the time being unable to maintain them? We do not need a maritime force as large as that of Great Britain, or even France; but our navy should always be so formidable that no Power could ever deem it wise, even for a moment, to offend against the right of our flag upon the seas.

Those were the words of Hilary A. Herbert, uttered while he was Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Cleveland's second Administration. There were those at that time who considered him an alarmist and a militarist. There are doubtless those to-day who thus esteem him. To such we commend the consideration that his words have been justified by the progress of affairs to a marvellous degree; so perfectly that his words could not have been more accurate if they had been uttered after, instead of a score of years before, the event. There is nothing that this war has made more unmistakably clear than that the methods of warfare are no more humane, and the rights of neutrals are no more secure, than they were a hundred years ago. Indeed, they are actually less so. A hundred years ago there was no practice

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of sinking unarmed passenger ships without warning and without giving an opportunity for saving the women and children who might be aboard. A hundred years ago there was no such flagrant violation of neutral rights as that which Belgium has suffered.

Mr. Herbert's refusal to believe that a great Power would imperil its own existence for the sake of respecting the rights of others has been notably warranted, in a peculiarly direct and specific manner, by the German Government. It, or its chief official spokesman, has frankly admitted that the rape of Belgium was wrong; but has insisted that it was necessary under the law of self-preservation. We may or may not believe that such was the case. Most of us will certainly not believe it. But all the same the policy of the German Government stands confessed: that is, to disregard and violate the rights of neutrals whenever it seems necessary to do so for Germany's security. That is precisely what Mr. Herbert reminded us of, twenty years ago.

The trouble with those who refuse to listen or to credit such warnings is that they confuse rational preparedness for defence with aggressive militarism. The two things are in fact entirely distinct in character and in aim. It may be that militarist nations are prepared. It is quite certain that not all prepared nations are militarist, either in spirit or in practice. The most perfectly prepared nation in Europe, for self-defense, is Switzerland; and it is the least militarist. A similar state of preparation prevails in Australia and New Zealand; but it would provoke Homeric laughter to suggest that those great radical democracies are victims of oppressive militarism.

A current cartoon, much exploited by extreme pacifists, is entitled, "A Dangerous Pet." It represents in one part a playful, apparently harmless kitten, labelled "Preparedness," receiving the caresses of its mistress; and in another part it shows the same creature, now a full grown tiger, savagely rending the prostrate form of her who had cherished and caressed it; the brute being labelled, "Militarism." It is superficially striking. In fact and in essence, however, it is either grossly ignorant or a wanton perversion of the truth. The cartoonist, and those who agree with his view, ignore the radical difference between offense and defense, between aggression and protection. A nation with no standing army at all would be a menace to peace and would

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deserve the reproach of militarism if its purpose were at the first opportunity to attack its neighbors and wage wars of conquest. A nation in which every man is a soldier and in which an enormous standing army is maintained, is not subject to the reproach of militarism and is not a menace to peace if the sole purpose of that preparedness is simply to defend itself against attack.

It is a shallow argument, too, and a most humiliating confession—rather, perhaps, a libellous aspersion—to say that we are not to be trusted with military training and equipment, because the possession of arms and the knowledge how to use them would tempt us to become militaristic, and to become an aggressive conquerer among the nations. That is equivalent to saying that no boy should undergo physical training in a gymnasium for the development of muscular agility and strength, but should remain a weakling lest the possession of strength should make him a swaggering bully and brawler. In the case of the individual, we give instruction, training and equipment, all capable of being perverted to evil uses; but we trust to the effects of moral instruction and training to incline him to use those gifts aright.

Surely it should be no less possible to cultivate in the nation as a whole a similar moral sentiment which would constrain it to employ its military efficiency aright and not to prostitute it to sordid or tyrannous purposes. We are not prepared to admit the United States to be in danger of becoming another Frankenstein; or even to deserve an appellation similar to that of the Indian chief, "Young Man Afraid of His Horses." We are not a nation afraid of our soldiers, afraid of our army and navy; and we shall not be. The military power is constitutionally subject to the civil, and will always be so. No matter how greatly our army and navy are expanded, they will still be insignificant in comparison with our industries and commerce. No matter how generally or how thoroughly our citizenry may become trained and accustomed to arms, they will always be dominated by the interests and pursuits of peace. No matter how much military instruction may be given in our schools and colleges, the instruction in the arts of peace will always immeasurably exceed it. In such circumstances it would be self-stultification to say that we could not keep preparedness as the potential servant of the peace-loving nation without letting it be-

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come transformed into a militarism which would be our master and tyrant.

We believe it to be possible for a nation, as for a man, to be strong without being brutal, to be armed without being a brawler, to be prepared to defend its own rights without being irresistibly impelled to attack the rights of others.

THE HYPHEN MUST GO

It is high time for us to require that aliens coming hither to live shall become Americans. We are confronted with the development of faction based on alien interests, fomented and maintained by great masses of foreign-born or closely foreign-descended citizens, whose naturalization has been technical and legal but not spiritual and vital—in brief, the Hyphenates. They have come hither to live, to enjoy American opportunity, and to exercise American sovereignty; but they are not content to be known simply as Americans, and are not willing to become thoroughly Americanized. They wish to retain their former national designation, and to cherish and cultivate here their old-country ways and manners, and also their friendships and hatreds. Above all, they are actuated in their political action as American citizens by regard, not so much for American interests as for the welfare of the old country.

It is time, high time, to stop all that. It is time to insist that there shall be no dual citizenship and no divided allegiance. It is time for us to insist that the great mass of all that come hither shall become naturalized. At present there are hundreds of thousands who have not become citizens, and who apparently have no thought of so doing. Of some important nationalities among our immigrants less than fifty, or even forty, per cent. have become naturalized. We ought to be able to realize now how pernicious it is to have among us so considerable an element of persistent aliens, unassimilated and undigested. It has long been a reason for opposing Chinese immigration, that Chinese do not become citizens. But they do not become citizens because our laws forbid them to. On the other hand, we have here hundreds of thousands of aliens of other nationalities, who are legally eligible to citizenship, but who by their own choice refrain from naturalization. It is an evil which we should speedily correct by law. It would be quite legitimate

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and doubtless effective to condition the number of immigrants admitted each year from each country upon the proportion of those already here who had become citizens.

There is, however, something more required than the formal taking of the oath of allegiance; even though it should include a specific renunciation of every vestige of the dual citizenship which has been too largely held. The alien should in some way be endowed not merely with citizenship papers, but with an American mind, American sympathies, American ideals, and with so large a degree of American detachment from Europe that European affairs would no longer have more than academic interest for him. That is asking much, but it is not asking too much. If America is worth coming to, it is worth paying for; even the price of complete renunciation of the old country.

At present there are in the United States numerous leagues, associations, societies and what not, with hyphenated names and devoted largely to the work of keeping alive and potent in the hearts of their members an affection for the old country and an interest in its welfare sufficiently strong to control their political action; so that they will vote for or against this or that, not because they are Americans but because they are aliens, and not because of American interests and welfare but because of the interests and welfare of the old country. There ought to be some method of preventing such a spectacle as we have witnessed in this country for months past, of numerous bodies of citizens denouncing the President and Government of the United States simply because they let their policy be directed solely by American interests and not by the interests of some foreign Power. American citizens must be Americans, pure and simple. The Hyphen must go.

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THE NEEDS OF OUR NAVY

AS PERCEIVED BY THE FOREMOST BRITISH EXPERT

BY ARTHUR H. POLLEN

MR. DANIELS'S programme is not an effort to produce a complete new navy. It makes addition to an existing navy. The ships commissioned and now in use will, nearly all of them, be essential portions of the navy it is designed to have in 1922 or 1923. It is an admission that the existing navy is deficient. Its promulgation is tantamount to saying, "We have not enough battleships, we have no battle cruisers, and we ought to have some. Our submarines, destroyers and scout cruisers are too meagre in numbers—too small and too weak in design." A new standard of naval strength is being set up. Certain obvious questions, then, arise for discussion. Are the additions now proposed to be made of the right sort? Are they being added in the right proportion? In other words, will the completed navy, with these new units, be a symmetrical, well-balanced, efficient force? Finally, if the answers to these two questions are generally affirmative—viz., that the right types are being added and in the right proportion—will this new, symmetrical, well-balanced force be adequate for America's needs?

It is the last question that is the most important. It is the only one of which the lay public can judge adequately. Landsmen, however close and intelligent the interest they take in naval affairs, can only in exceptional instances understand all the complicated matters that have to be decided before any new type of ship is finally resolved upon. A large number will be capable of judging—if they have followed the course of the present war closely—of the sort of proportion that should exist between the capital units in a fleet, and the light and subsidiary craft. But here again, to form a judgment of value, a close study of war and naval

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principle is indispensable. But whether the new navy will suffice for America's needs, this any educated man can, with the right data before him, answer. To some extent, of course, the answer depends upon the answers to the first and second questions. It is proposed to spend half a billion dollars on completing the naval force. If the result of carrying out the proposed scheme should be a top-heavy or a lop-sided force, if by spending the money on better types of ship, or good types in a better proportion, a perfectly balanced force will result; then, though the proposed navy might be inadequate, the more wisely selected force might suffice. But, without pausing to consider this alternative, let us push our inquiries as to the third question a little further.

The military power which a nation needs, either on land or on sea, is settled for it by its circumstances and its policy. If Great Britain lost command of the sea,—that is the certainty of being able to use it as the high road of its supplies,—the country holding an adverse command could impose its own terms of surrender on us in about six weeks' time. For practical purposes, we should be starving. We should be utterly defeated by hunger or the threat of hunger in a far shorter period than it would take to organize an invading expeditionary force, to land it, and conquer even the smallest portion of our territory. Any country wishing to defeat Great Britain in war need, therefore, only follow the perfectly simple prescription of building and maintaining a navy that much more powerful than ours as will suffice to insure the British Navy's defeat. The fall of England follows automatically. To every Englishman, then, the answer to the question, "How strong a navy does Great Britain need?" has, for some years, been comparatively simple and plain. We look round the world, we note the general grouping of the Powers, we calculate the naval strength of those likely to be opposed to us in war, and we provide a fleet adequate to engage the navies that might combine against us.

For example, at the beginning of 1914 we had of battleships and battle cruisers of the modern type, 21 in commission, 5 due for completion during the year, 5 building and 3 projected. Germany, Austria and Italy had of ships of the same class 18 built, 9 building and 4 projected. Our total, therefore, was 34 ships against the 31 of the Triple Alliance. Could we have counted upon France as our ally,

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we could have added the whole of her fleet to our total. The Russian fleet, being confined to the Black Sea and the Baltic, would not have assisted us against the Triple Alliance. But even without French assistance, we were in superior force to the whole of our possible enemies. Further, the conditions of the Triple Alliance being what they were, it had for some years been obvious that Italy would never join in a war of aggression waged by Germany and Austria against us, and it was quite certain that we should not force Italy to fight against us, by declaring an aggressive war against her partners. Hence our superiority was easily greater than 34 to 31. And as some thousands of miles separated the home headquarters of Austria and Germany, and as we were astride of the communications, our duty was really almost limited to maintaining an adequate balance against Germany.

Now this was a matter on which the opinion of the man in the street was as good as that of the sailor statesman. In spite of much confused thinking and wrong-headed argument, the man in the street fully realized that command of the sea, in the last resort, must be won and held by the side that possessed the largest number of the strongest naval units. Both in the number of our capital ships and in the power of their armaments, we have been compelled by public opinion to maintain a high percentage of superiority over Germany. At the outbreak of war our superiority in numbers was 40 per cent.; and comparing the striking power of these ships by the combined weights of a single broadside from each, our gunnery superiority was 60 per cent.

Has America in this matter any guide as unmistakable as was ours? Mr. Daniels's statement is quite silent on the subject. It is not a matter on which the foreigner gets very much enlightenment from such American writings, official or unofficial, as reach us on this side. And it is obviously not for him to suggest what the standard of American naval strength should be. And yet it looks like putting the cart before the horse to discuss the character and composition of the new navy without knowing first what it is for! The fleet America needs is the fleet that its circumstances and policies require. It is clear that there is no choice in the matter. Either American circumstances and policy determine the strength of the navy, or the strength of the navy will determine American circumstances and policy. Put

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into plain English the words "circumstance and policy" mean this. From what Powers do you expect trouble? Mr. Gardner and the General Board seem in this matter to take quite a definite and intelligible line. They say that the American navy should be equal to the most powerful which any other nation maintains. The most powerful navy is the British. It has maintained its standard of strength for purely defensive purposes. It has been built to prevent being altered, to Great Britain's disadvantage, the existing balance of power in the world. It stands today for the sanctity of international contract, for the liberty of small nations, for the right of Christendom to resist unscrupulous aggression and the public denial of justice, humanity and law. All these are fine things. The United States stands for them also. It would be to the world's benefit if they put themselves in a position to stand for them with effect. But, clearly, if it needs a navy up to the British standard to enable America to play Great Britain's *rôle* in this respect, then Mr. Daniels's programme is utterly inadequate.

The strength, then, of the navy that America requires must be dictated by the combined strength of the nations whose hostility to American policy and American ideals there is reason to fear. It is a question not for naval experts but for statesmen to settle. When it is settled, the equivalent of the navy required may, to a great extent, be determined by arithmetic. Relative battleship strength is the first point, though it is not the only one. When a list has been made of the Powers that may become enemy, add their battle fleets together, estimate what their strength is likely to be at any future date, and provide the battleship strength necessary for meeting it. With two final observations I shall leave this part of the subject. The General Board and Mr. Gardner want a navy equal to the strongest maintained by any single Power. If this is an intelligible, it is also a large and costly policy. But remember that it is not so costly as failure to have adequate naval strength when the time of trial comes. Secondly, if you want a *successful* naval war, provide a force at least 40 per cent. greater than that you are likely to meet. If you want an *exciting* naval war, provide one which is approximately equal. But a navy which is smaller in numbers and less in power than that of the probable opponent is demonstrably worse than useless. It is useless because there seems no

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rôle at all for an inferior fleet. It neither protects nor enables you to attack. And it is worse than useless, because to possess a great fleet which is not great enough to fight successfully is a waste of treasure and effort and men in time of peace, and a source of bitter humiliation in time of war.

Let us now pass to the second question. Does the new programme provide a well-balanced fighting fleet? To discuss this we must take something in the programme as a basis. And naturally we shall take the strength in capital ships, because, as we have seen, command of the sea ultimately depends upon these and upon no other form of naval force at all. Mr. Daniels proposes to build so that in 1922 or 1923 America will possess 27 battleships and 6 battle cruisers. What relation will the other fleet units bear to this force, judged first by the standard which the peace theory laid down as desirable, and next by that which war has shown to be vitally necessary? The other fleet units are cruisers and destroyers. Until recently cruisers have been of a score of heterogeneous types, ranging from 2,000 to 13,000 tons, with armaments running from 4-inch to 12-inch guns, and with speeds all the way from 19 to 30 knots. Expert analysis and criticism have long since shown that the armored cruiser is a bastard unit. It has neither the armament nor the protection of the battleship, nor the speed of the scout and the commerce protector. The career of von Spee does, it is true, show that a squadron of such ships in the Eastern Pacific, disposing of a broadside of twelve 8-inch guns, could detach from the main seat of war anything from four to six times its strength until that squadron was immobilized or destroyed. But this is the only instance in which the armored cruiser has influenced the war at all. No doubt every armored cruiser that Great Britain possesses has been commissioned and in use since the war began. But they have been little other than more costly and slower substitutes for the faster, lighter, and cheaper cruisers that do not exist.

In naval war there are two purposes which cruising ships fulfill. The first, which makes the greater demand upon their numbers and activities, is the protection of trade. But the second is hardly less important. The capacity to use fleets of capital ships with effect depends not entirely but very largely upon the degree to which the admiral is served with cruising ships. If there is one thing plainly written in the

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history of naval war it is that scarcely ever have the admirals using the capital ship squadrons had a sufficiency of lighter craft at their disposal. In our two great wars against Revolutionary France and Napoleon our admirals sent up an unending complaint of the deficiency of their equipments in this respect. Yet in 1793 we had 135 cruisers commissioned in the Royal Navy. By 1809 this number had risen to 684. In 1796 we had brought our ships of the line to over 100; we already had seven cruisers to each two ships of the line. But in 1809 the ships of the line had hardly increased at all. The proportion of cruisers then to capital ships had practically doubled. In the year of Trafalgar they were five to one. But so great were the demands of trade for protection that neither Nelson nor any of the fleet commanders had at any stage of the campaign a sufficiency of frigates.

What was the British Navy's standard of cruising strength before the war began? In 1914, as we have seen, the British Navy had, built and building, 34 capital ships of the first class. Again, built and building, we had 38 armored cruisers and 89 light cruisers; or 127 cruisers in all. Of these, 46 possessed a speed of between 19 and 21 knots; 32 had a speed of between 22 and 23 knots; 33 had a speed of from 24 to 26 knots; and 16—most of which were still building—had a designed speed of 30 knots. Thus the total ratio of cruisers to capital ships was a little less than four to one. Of slow and more powerful cruisers the ratio was about one and a half to one; of cruisers from two to three knots faster than the battleships, about one to one; of cruisers from three to five knots faster than the battleships, about the same; and of cruisers about 50 per cent faster than battleships, about one to two.

In a modern fleet the destroyers discharge, like cruisers, several functions. They can be used for scouting, for commerce protection, especially against submarines, for protection of battle fleets from submarines, and for the delivery of torpedo attacks on enemy fleets in action. Built and building in 1914, we had 240 destroyers, or 7 to every capital ship. Thus, of all light craft put together, it is fairly accurate to say that for every 2 battleships we had 3 slow cruisers; 2 cruisers 10 per cent. faster; 2 cruisers 25 per cent. faster; one 50 per cent. faster, and 14 destroyers. Of the destroyers, roughly one and a half were capable of a speed

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of 25½ to 27 knots, and the other half of a speed of 30 to 35 knots. How does Mr. Daniels's proposition of light craft to capital ships compare with this, which was Great Britain's peace standard?

The completed American Navy is to consist of 27 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, making 33 capital ships; 10 armored cruisers, 13 scout cruisers, 5 first-class cruisers, 3 second-class cruisers, and 10 third-class cruisers—a total of 41 cruising craft. Of destroyers there will be 108. The proportion of cruisers to capital ships, then, instead of coming up to the British standard of approximately 4 to 1, would actually be less than 1.25 to 1, and the proportion of destroyers to battleships, instead of being 7 to 1, would be a little less than 3½ to 1.

If, then, the British peace standard was right, there will be a deficiency in the American Navy of nearly 120 cruisers and 100 destroyers. It may be quite truly objected that more than one-third of the British cruisers were either of obsolete types, like the armored cruisers, or of a speed which modern conditions make almost useless—that is, of less than 22 knots. It can be urged with justice that 20 fast cruisers would probably more than do the work of these 46 slow ones. But if this is said, then I must object that 28 of the 41 American cruisers would be in exactly the same case. And if these are obsolete already, they will not be less *démodés* five or six or seven years hence. Of the British cruisers, after all, 32 had a speed of from 22 to 23 knots, and 33 a speed of from 24 to 26 knots; 16 were designed for 30 knots. So far as I know, against these 81 cruisers of over 22 knots, America in 1925 will possess only 13.

But a comparison of the proposed American Navy with what was the peace standard of the British Navy does not state the case against Mr. Daniels's programme as strongly as it can be stated. All instructed naval opinion in England had for many years proclaimed that the ratio of fast light craft to battleships had been allowed to sink to dangerously low proportions. The sixteen 30-knot cruisers laid down only just before the war were a belated effort to conciliate this very damaging criticism. The extent to which we have suffered in the war from the lack of cruisers of this type can be judged from the following facts: From the outbreak of war to the present moment, so far as is known, not a single German cruiser has left its home ports and joined

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any squadron abroad, or been able to put itself upon the high seas. At the outbreak of war the *Leipzig, Emden* and *Nürnberg* were with von Spee in the Eastern Pacific; the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe* were in the neighborhood of Mexico or the West Indies; the *Bremen* was in the Atlantic; the *Königsberg* was in the Indian Ocean. A few armed merchantmen were ready for work on the South American trade routes. Of the cruisers the *Dresden* and two armed merchantmen prolonged their existence by taking refuge in the tangled waterways just above Cape Horn. The first was destroyed. The armed merchantmen interned themselves. The *Karlsruhe* ended mysteriously. The *Königsberg* was driven up the Rufigi. Only the *Emden, Leipzig, Nürnberg, Dresden* and *Cap Trafalgar* were brought to action. Between them they inflicted damage on British shipping by direct capture of not less than £6,000,000 sterling. Had von Spee detached the *Leipzig, Nürnberg* and *Dresden* from his squadron the first moment he sighted the battle cruisers in Port Stanley, Heaven knows how long it would have taken before all the three of them were immobilized or sunk, or what damage they might still have done. And the damage they did is not to be measured only by the ships and cargoes they captured and destroyed. The cost of underwriting, and hence the cost of freights from South America to Europe, were gravely affected. The total cost of these cruisers to us can hardly be placed at a lower figure than £8,000,000 sterling. It is a sum that might have been reduced by half or more. Four million pounds would have given us a round dozen of cruisers better armed and faster than any of these. They might have ended the *Karlsruhe* and *Emden* before their depredations had gone far. And these would have been of incalculable war value apart from completing this particular job. It is only a single instance that goes to prove that the ratio of non-battleship strength to battleship strength, instead of being too high, was undoubtedly too low in the British Navy.

The deficiency of fast light craft became still more evident when the rude experience of war wakened our Admiralty up to the fact that it had entirely failed to provide adequate protection against submarines. Before the submarine attack on trade began, the objectives of these much discussed and little understood units of naval force were the ships of the Royal Navy and the transports plying be-

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tween England and France. No unit of the first importance of the Royal Navy was successfully attacked by submarines at all. And almost no unit of any importance amongst the transports was hit or damaged. Of the warships that were lost, hardly one fell in conditions that would have seemed permissible had the capacity of the submarine to attack fleets been adequately analyzed before war began. When the three *Cressys,* the *Hermes, Hawke* and *Niger* had been sunk, the principles of defense came to be better understood. In effect, our 240 destroyers proved adequate for the maintenance of the requisite flotillas for dealing with the German fleet if it came out, and for the protection of the fleet and the transports. But when the attack on trade began there was no margin available. I cannot then doubt, supposing that we lumped all the cruisers and destroyers together, and say that we possessed at the beginning of the war a proportion of about 11 other craft to each battleship, that that proportion was far too low. It was too low because so large a number of the units had not the speed requisite for modern conditions. But apart altogether from this, had the provision been 50 per cent. higher, it would not have been excessive. The saving in the protection of trade might more than have equaled the outlay necessary to provide it.

As a criticism, then, of Mr. Daniels's programme, one is tempted to suggest that its weakest point is the inadequacy of its light craft, and certain special conditions arising out of the naval situation in America seem to lend additional point to this criticism. The naval enemies of Great Britain could both of them be cooped up. Within one hour of the declaration of war the German Navy was completely blocked in, and the Austrian Navy no less. But if America finds herself in a naval war it will be quite impossible for her to slam the door of the fleets hostile to her with the promptitude and completeness with which these two doors were slammed by us. Her enemies will be able to put everything afloat to sea before she can turn a screw to stop them. The only difference between our case and yours is that the British sea trade is much greater. But that, after all, touches only part of the case. And it should be added that the United States has a coast line almost incalculably greater than ours, and she may have to fight on two fronts and not on one only. It would seem, then, if the ratio of light craft to battleships

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was too low at 11 to 1 in the British Navy, and should have been 15 to 1, the ratio of America would certainly not be much too high at the latter figure, and should certainly not fall short of the former.

And now to the first of my questions: Is Mr. Daniels proposing to add the right kind of units to the American Navy? This is rather difficult to discuss without going into a series of technical matters which perhaps the majority of readers of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW might find tedious. But certain things leap to the eye. It is noticeable, for instance, that the cost of the unit battleship is to be $18,800,000. The cost of the *Iron Duke,* the flagship of the Grand fleet, was under $10,000,000; the cost of our battle cruisers of contemporary design, that is the *Lion* and *Queen Mary,* was approximately equal to that of the *Iron Duke.* The American battle cruisers, I observe, are to cost $17,500,000, or $1,300,000 less than the dreadnoughts. When all allowance is made for the increased cost of material, these seem to be prodigious figures, and one supposes that this great increase in cost must reflect some great increase in size, protection, armament and speed. It has been stated here that the Bureau of Construction and Repair does not propose to adopt a bigger gun. It seems incredible that a greater number of guns should be put into the new battleships than is already put into the latest class which America is building. Where, then, is the extra money going? Greater speed, of course, is costly, and greater armor protection still more costly, because it adds to the size and strength of hull and increases the power necessary to attain to any given speed. Do the events of the war make any case for increasing the speed and protection of battleships? Surely not. There has been no fleet engagement, and the only time that dreadnoughts met, viz., when Sir David Beatty chased the German battle cruisers across the North Sea, the circumstances were in no way parallel to those of previous fleet actions, nor do they suggest anything that is likely to recur. Undoubtedly they advertised speed, but they threw little light on the question of armor. The naval constructor, then, must be in a difficulty. No one knows from experience whether higher speeds will prove of value when both sides want to fight—whether larger guns are worth the sacrifices they extort, whether thicker armor is a necessity. All one can say with confidence is that so far very little new light has been thrown on the

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principles which have governed battleship construction to the present time.

In 1913 the British Admiralty decided to arm our new capital ships with the 15-inch guns instead of the 13.5. It was an advance in projectile weight from 1,400 pounds to approximately 2,000. It involved a diminution in the number of guns carried. What the arguments were on which this change was brought about the British public has not been told. The only information it has on this subject is exceedingly disquieting. It is that the experts disagreed and that it fell to Mr. Churchill to decide this knotty point himself. It was he, and not the seamen, who had settled the matter! In his farewell speech in the House of Commons he informed us of this staggering fact, as if the rightness of the decision could be taken for granted. He entirely failed to perceive that the fact that it was a lay decision was almost conclusive as to its being wrong.

From almost every point of view it seems bad policy to diminish the number of guns that a capital ship carries. There is only one argument to counterbalance the objection. The heavier the shell, the flatter the trajectory and the greater the constancy or accuracy of the gun at great ranges. The standard of exactness in knowledge of range is determined by the flatness of trajectory. If to hit with a 6-inch gun at 12,000 yards you must know the range within 40 yards, to hit with a 15-inch gun you need not know it more nearly than to 150 or 200 yards. In other words, you may be allowed an error four or five times as great and yet hit. But more than this, the 15-inch gun will probably make three times as high a proportion of hits to rounds fired as the smaller weapon at this range. If the 15-inch gun was preferred on the ground that a higher standard of marksmanship could more easily be obtained with it than with the 13.5, then there was a good military reason for preferring it. But there would have to be something in the ease of obtaining the higher standard of marksmanship to compensate for the loss of volume of fire.

Most landsmen—and some seamen—judge of naval weapons not by what they *can do* in practice but by what *they are* in theory. They are more impressed by the torpedo than by the gun, because a torpedo strikes a ship under water, while the gun strikes it above water, and they know that the damage inflicted by the smallest torpedo may be

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much greater than that effected by the largest shell. And as between different sizes of guns they conclude that the bigger the shell and the greater the range to which it carries, the more effective the gun must be. They ignore the only thing worth remembering. It is that guns are made to *hit* with. Unless a larger gun promises more hits it is not worth changing.

There is, then, so far as the public knows, no reason for supposing that if American seamen stick to the 14-inch rifle they are making any mistake in so doing. It is possible that the 15-inch would give better results at ranges from 16,000 to 19,000 yards. But surely inside those ranges the difference would not be material. Probably the cost in the increase of capital ships is mostly due to an increase in speed. High speed is of undoubted value. But it is of less value if it is in a few ships of the fleet and not in all. It might not be worth raising the price to obtain only this. But the choice in speed, like the choice in the size of guns, is emphatically a matter for experts to decide. It will be dangerous if public opinion pushes them to larger and costlier ships, if this leads to a diminution of numbers in seeking a higher standard of individual power.

The most interesting features in the American programme are the battle-cruisers, the 10 scout cruisers, and the submarines. With regard to the type of battle cruisers what has been said in the matter of battleships applies still more strongly here. If you are likely to engage an enemy that possesses this form of craft, it is necessary for you to possess them too. But the ships must be individually faster and more powerful. If they are not, you may be just as well without them. The battle cruiser really is a luxury of the rich Power. Germany's battle cruisers have been perfectly useless to her. They made a certain amount of sport for Sir David Beatty a year ago, but they have never, in the North Sea, attempted and have never achieved any military result of the least importance. The only battle cruiser that has done good service to Germany was the *Goeben,* that dodged the British squadrons in the Mediterranean and brought Turkey into the war, and she should have been sunk long before she reached the Dardanelles. The four left in home waters might just as well never have been built. Indeed, had Germany constructed five dreadnought battleships to take their place, the outlay would have been about the

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same—for over here the fast battle cruisers cost at first more than dreadnoughts—and she would be in a far better naval position. For the war opened with our having 22 dreadnoughts in commission, and had Germany preferred battleships to battle cruisers, she might have had 21. Her chances in a fleet action would have been much better if our superiority in capital ships had been represented solely by a single battleship and the four battle cruisers that were in home waters.

Of the proposed scout cruisers, what strikes one most—as in the case of battleships—is their enormous cost: $5,000,000 each! The latest British type of light cruiser, the *Arethusa* and *Calliope,* displace 3,800 and 3,520 tons each, according to the publications given out before the war. Their cost has not been published. But I should be surprised if either type exceeded $2,000,000. The weakness of these ships is their armament—three and two 6-inch guns and six 4-inch. The ideal light cruiser armament would appear to be five or six 6-inch guns. No gun that is any smaller gives sufficient results—as is shown by the fact that the German 4-inch shells never did any harm to those of our ships that have engaged them. But, on the other hand, it is bad policy to increase the weight and size of the ship unduly. Speed and high speed are of course badly wanted, but when it comes to $5,000,000 a ship it looks as if the new scout cruisers would be more like the armored cruisers of a former date—unduly fast, or unduly armed, or unduly armored. To do this is to fall into the error of sacrificing numbers to speed and strength. The cruiser is primarily a scout and commerce protector. If its strength and speed are adequate for meeting enemy cruisers, it is all that is needed. And for this a 6-inch gun should suffice. Surely it would be better economy in this particular to spend the money on larger numbers. For, as we have seen already, it is the numbers of fast craft that is the most conspicuous lack in the programme as it stands. As to destroyers we have no details, but here again speed, radius of action and armament are all vital factors.

The most questionable element in the American programme is the very large provision of submarines. Fifty fleet submarines and 85 coast submarines, which are to cost in all nearly $80,000,000, make a vast hole in the half billion that it is proposed to spend. As it is in many respects the most striking, so in another it is the most difficult item to criti-

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cise. The special circumstances of this war and the very extraordinary circumstances which preceded it, have given the submarine an entirely false importance in the public eye. Essentially the submarine is a variant of the destroyer. Once within attacking range of an enemy it has what the destroyer has not, the power of delivering a daylight attack, remaining itself almost unseen. But invisibility is not a new attribute. The torpedo boat and the destroyer possessed it at night. Their speed enabled them to deliver the equivalent of unseen attack in the dusk. Except that the submarine's invisibility is more complete, it is the destroyer's inferior. It has less speed, it is less strongly armed.

But its invisibility does give it a function new to naval war. It has the capacity to pass through waters which are absolutely commanded by surface ships—because it can pass them submerged and unseen. Fleets otherwise powerless to enter commanded waters can now enter them with this form of craft. Thus the German submarines have been at large to a limited extent in the English Channel, and with extraordinary freedom in the North Sea, in the Western Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. They have gone, in point of fact, where no German surface ship could have gone at all. British submarines similarly have penetrated the Sea of Marmora and the Baltic. The first and most striking fact about the submarine, then, is its capacity to enter into and operate in waters that are adversely commanded.

But once in those waters the power of the submarine is extraordinarily limited. Indeed, its capacity to enter those waters can also be limited. The use of nets, of mines and of patrols—especially when assisted by aircraft—these at any focal point which submarines coming or going must pass, can do much to obstruct their free passage. The narrower the waters, the easier their control by these means. And even in comparatively open waters great destruction can be and has been done by surface craft upon them.

But, apart altogether from the dangers to which the submarine is exposed, what is its value when it is at work in hostile waters? It has two weapons, the torpedo and the gun. It can carry but few torpedoes—few, that is, compared with the number of rounds of gun ammunition that it can stow away. The torpedo, too, is an uncertain weapon at the best of times, particularly uncertain when aimed while the submarine is submerged. Wherever it is possible,

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then, the captain of the submarine has done his work with his guns. But as a gunned ship the submarine is the weakest thing afloat. Hence its guns can be used only against unarmed craft. It dare not approach any armed ship on the surface at all. If it has to approach an armed ship submerged, its speed of approach is greatly limited. The highest submerged speed does not exceed the half-power speed of the slowest warship. Hence high speed and a high standard of vigilance in ships which are armed makes them altogether immune from submarine attack except in the rare cases when, by pure chance, their course takes them within the submarine's striking radius. It was thus, it is supposed, that the *Formidable* was destroyed on New Year's Day, 1915. It was thus that the *Lusitania* fell—if the fact that she was within a yard or two of the course she had taken every time she had ever crossed the Atlantic can be described as chance and not as folly. The point, however, is that if the ship is armed the submarine must keep submerged, and if it keeps submerged its maneuvering speed is low, its capacity to get within striking distance very limited, and its weapon very uncertain. If the ship it intends to strike is both at speed and accompanied by destroyers or fast craft, the area of danger to the submarine and the intensity of the vigilance are increased, and the danger from submarines becomes altogether negligible.

The success of the submarine against the merchantman is to be explained by the fact that merchantmen being unarmed, the submarine has been able to deal with them as any other armed surface ships would do. The speed of the modern big submarine is higher than that of any but a score or so of the fastest liners, and a single 12-pounder is quite sufficient armament to subdue a merchantman if the merchantman is unarmed itself. If submarine attacks on trading ships become recognized as legitimate by civilized nations, then all merchantmen will be armed, and their case will approximate that of the warship.

But the most remarkable failure of the submarine in this war is its incapacity to do the one thing which even those who thought least of its capacity took for granted. It has entirely failed in its function of coast defence. The German submarines have been unable to defend either the ports of France, the coast of Gallipoli, Salonika, Valona, or the coast of Egypt from the allied battleships and transports. The

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explanation is simple. It has not been able to interfere with the transport and disembarkation of troops because these operations have been carried out in waters superficially controlled by the fleet to which the transports belonged. What the submarine could do in defending a coast in waters superficially controlled by its own side will probably never be proved. These are not the conditions in which intending invaders send their armies across the sea. Had the Germans been mad enough to try to land a force in England, I have no doubt that British submarines, acting without any fear whatever of destroyers or other fast craft, could have accounted easily for every transport that got past our battleships, our cruisers and our destroyers. But I have, if it is permissible to say so, still less doubt that any transports would ever have got past!

The root of the matter seems to be this: If you command the seas with surface craft the *rôle* of the enemy submarine is limited to being a somewhat inefficient guerilla. It can waylay peaceful merchantmen, just as the highwaymen of old in England held up travelers, and "bad" men in America have occasionally held up trains. But it has not taken any such toll of British shipping as the privateers took in olden days, and, like the privateers, it has been absolutely incapable of interfering with military communications where the surface is efficiently commanded. In this matter the British submarines have entirely eclipsed the German. Both in the Sea of Marmora and in the Baltic, our successes against transports have often been greater in a single week than the German submarines' against our transports in the whole campaign.

A foolish and most unfortunate statement of the British Admiralty in January, 1915, had attributed to submarines an importance that they never possessed. It was said that the British fleet desisted from the attack on the Germans at the Dogger Bank because of the presence of under-water craft. I am persuaded that no British Admiral could ever have made this excuse—and survived. If enemy submarines are observed at sea, it will no doubt be necessary to avoid passing within range of them. But a suddenly discovered minefield or a well-planned torpedo attack from destroyers each would have exactly the same effect. It would impose upon the commander of a battleship squadron a sudden, and perhaps a large and violent, change of course. But it would

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be no excuse for flight. If such an excuse were admitted it would be tantamount to saying that submarines could sweep the sea!

What is the application of these considerations to the American programme? I suggest that the principles to bear in mind are these: The more certain you are of commanding the sea against your adversaries, the more useless submarines will be to you. If you command the seas you will not want them for coast defence. If you do not command the seas they will not defend your coasts. They will not help to win command of the sea. You will hardly want them for attacking the enemy's trade, for you are too far from the focal points of any enemy's trade to be able to maintain submarines upon them.

Take it for all in all, I suggest,—while Mr. Daniels's programme shows no sign of the idiotic absurdities about submarines that have been put forward on this side,—that, nevertheless, it has been influenced by the great effect the submarine has had on the public and professional imagination. And this leads me to my concluding point.

It is impossible to get any large change of policy carried in this country unless public opinion is instructed and educated in the issues and principles involved. The same conditions no doubt prevail in America, and may prevail to a still greater extent. But it must be remembered that the details of naval programmes are not fit matter to be settled by public acclamation. The scale of the programme is certainly so. The objects for which the navy is to be built are so, but the details manifestly are not. If the American statesmen and the American public can agree together as to the standard of strength that their navy ought to attain, there is only one sound way of insuring that that strength is attained and at the smallest sacrifice. It is to leave the details to be decided by the best expert opinion that your navy can produce. Remember that you want experts on a great many subjects. Remember also that to put yourselves into the hands of an individual expert is not the only way, and seldom the best way, to secure the best results. The general knowledge of a great service like the American Navy is more extensive, and its judgment is saner, than that of any single man, however gifted he may be. Remember, too, that the criticism of those who *use* the things that are provided is far more valuable than the suggestions of those that *make*

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them. The programme is quite silent as to expenditure on methods—and yet the methods of using weapons are of far vaster moment than the size or power or cost of the weapons themselves. The provision of a navy is certain to be bungled if it is not guided by the best strategical and tactical brains you have. And the strategical brains will be misled unless they have mastered tactics, and the study of tactics cannot begin until the art of using weapons has been brought to perfection.

If the occasion of a great naval programme were made the occasion for organizing a well-proportioned naval staff—not a staff for executive administration, but one for dealing with all naval problems from the point of view of right theory and scientific practice—then a result would be produced far greater and more valuable than can be got by any mere provision of inert and costly things. It is, after all, on the men, and not on the ships, that you rely. See that they have the ships — guns — methods — plans—preparations—training, *that they ask for.*

ARTHUR H. POLLEN.

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THE NEW AMERICA

BY SYDNEY BROOKS

During the past twenty years it has been my privilege to pay frequent and occasionally prolonged visits to the United States. Whenever I have felt that a new America had arisen of which I was unaccountably ignorant, I have made a point of coming over to look at it. Such a habit, if persistently indulged, involves, I find, crossing the Atlantic about once every two years. That is the usual interval required to humiliate a European into confessing that his knowledge of the United States is full of interstices, or, at least, since the fundamentals of American life are by now pretty well established, that he has lost touch with its surface manifestations, and needs once more to be on the spot, if the new questions and the new men of whom he vaguely hears and the new atmosphere of which he is tantalizingly conscious are to be rightly understood. At no period, perhaps, of American history have such confessions been less avoidable than during the past two decades. It asks an effort that seems almost to be rather one of the imagination than of the memory to visualize the America of 1896, to recall the issues that were then so engrossing, to reconstruct the social, the economic, and the political circumstances which gave them their interest and importance, and above all to recapture the mental angle from which they were approached. But amid all the whirl of changes that to any one who today sat down to catalogue them would seem in retrospect well nigh fantastic, changes some of which have cut deeply and even convulsively into the spirit and outlook and conditions of America, the returning visitor from Europe has never once felt them to be beyond his powers of assimilation. He has never once been obliged to own to himself that America had outstripped his comprehension, was no longer recognizable, and had

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evolved policies or attitudes that defied his efforts to grasp them. It is only now that I feel myself a stranger in the country I have unceasingly studied for so many years. It is only now that it eludes and bewilders me, that I fail to get my bearings with anything like the old promptitude and certainty, and that my sensations are those not of renewing a familiar and delightful acquaintance but of exploring very gingerly an uncharted sea. But I am not alone—and the fact at once consoles and staggers me—in this avowal of confusion. Americans themselves hardly appear to know where they stand or what their country is really thinking or whither, if anywhere, it is consciously pressing. The President in his December message to Congress, one of the best-written documents that has ever come from an official pen, spoke of the violence of the German-Americans as a thing that only a little while ago would have seemed incredible. To me almost the whole of America seems incredible; and even from those of its citizens whose judgment I have most been accustomed to lean upon, I fail to extract the usual clear and incisive guidance. In Europe, or at least in the belligerent nations, we know our own minds with the terrible precision of monomaniacs. War is a great simplifier, and in England as in France and Germany all emotions are compressed to a single point and run along just one track. Sane and neutral America appears by comparison a veritable Clapham Junction of intricate interlacings and perturbations among which the traveller gropes his way with a growing sense of mystification. I had positively forgotten, until I landed once more on Manhattan Island, what a chaos of conflicting aims and sentiments and moods is that condition which we label peace; and I had altogether failed to anticipate with how great a force of paradox and irony the spectacle of discord and indecision it presents would strike upon one fresh from the fused unity, the concentrated resolutions and purposes, of nations battling for their life. Almost in the last few weeks have I been tempted to declare that there is not only a different America but a new America, and that my feeling of strangeness in its atmosphere is due to the fact that the present phase of sentiment through which the United States is passing is something for which its history affords no precedent.

I have been tempted, I say, but I have not yielded. Much, no doubt, of the difficulty that an Englishman feels

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in adjusting his focus to the thought and life of America today arises from the unhappy circumstance which makes New York practically his only port of entry. To come from England to Manhattan Island, from a country strung up as never before in its annals to the heroic pitch, full of the spirit of sacrifice and endurance and in daily touch with the grimmest facts of life and death—to come from such a country and to land in New York is to make a change indeed. For New York, always a feverish and pleasure-loving city, is today simply drunk with money. Even during the height of the steel boom of twelve or thirteen years ago when every train from the West seemed to bring fresh carloads of brand-new millionaires, the metropolis was not so openly reeling with dollars as it is at this moment, when the gayest "season" of its history is drawing to a close. It almost appals an Englishman to find there in full swing the old rotten life that we in England have put completely behind us. And it appals him still more to reflect that a bare two years ago he was leading, if one allows for the extra intensity that New York throws into all its activities, very much the same life himself. One despairs of ever being able to convey to one's American friends how completely the war and its conditions and consequences have become not merely a part of, or a side-issue to, but literally the whole of British existence. They are so dominant, have so utterly swallowed up everything else, that no other form of life, least of all the trivial carelessness of peace, seems normal or even credible. I catch myself in New York, if I enter a lighted room, instinctively reaching out to draw down the blinds lest a Zeppelin raider should note the glare; and of all the sights that crowd in upon me that of multitudes of young men who are not in khaki strikes me as the strangest and the most repellent. It may be one more proof of our demented state, but it is the bare fact that not for anything would we in England change places with you in America or part with the waste and misery of the war to receive in return the "blessings" of such a peace as yours. Stay-at-home Americans simply cannot enter into or even conceive the atmosphere of the belligerent nations in this struggle; and conversely, so long as it lasts, a visitor from any one of the countries at war will continue to be shocked by the atmosphere of America as something unnatural to the point of being grotesque.

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In New York the fact and the vastness of this chasm of sentiment assail the visitor with the sharp finality of a bayonet thrust. Louvain and Rheims are among the stricken victims of the war, but New York is its supreme and gilded tragedy, and has, I fear, neither the sense nor the soul to know it. Americans must by now have heard of the English charwoman whose husband was at the front and who was drawing her weekly separation allowance. She was asked what she thought of the war. 'What!" she replied. "A pound a week and no 'usband! Why, it's 'eaven! It's too good to last!" There is something in New York's attitude towards the war which reminds one of this simple soul—something, but after all, I gladly agree, not very much. I do sincerely believe that there are thousands and scores of thousands of New Yorkers to whom their unavoidable enrichment by the war brings a very mingled sort of satisfaction and who would readily sacrifice all they have gained for the sake of an ideal or a principle. Nor do I forget the splendid contributions of money and gifts the citizens of Manhattan Island have made to the Allies. It would be a very shallow view that would picture New York as merely dining and dancing on behalf of the causes for which the Allies are dying. I know the city better than that. I know that its present dementia of getting and spending, its mushroom millionaires, and the excitements of the curb market, have not dulled its ear to the noble appeal; and I know, too, that the metropolis is, and always must be, a little world to itself, an intensely self-absorbed and self-conscious world; that almost any other spot is more really representative of the nation; and that to land on Manhattan Island, now as ever, is to have left Europe without having quite succeeded in reaching America.

But even when all allowances are made, New York remains for an Englishman a somewhat disconcerting introduction to the United States in these cataclysmic times. In the same way if he visits Washington he will find plenty to intrigue and amuse him, but will hardly be any better placed for discovering the real opinions of the American people. His amusement will proceed mainly from the spectacle of that small, isolated, curiously un-American society attempting to walk on the egg-shells of a dispassionate neutrality. The problems of conduct befitting the capital of a neutral country engage the attention of Washington now-

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adays even more than the problems of precedence. Butler wrote of one of his characters in *Hudibras* that

> He could distinguish and divide
> A hair 'twixt south and south-west side.

Washington is at least as great an adept in the refinements of neutral behavior. And as the city, today as always, is a huge whispering gallery,—a city not, as Mr. Henry James described it, of conversation, but of chatter, in which everything becomes public property in a couple of days at the outside,—this scrupulosity of speech and bearing is, no doubt, one of the necessities of the situation. Another and a not less inevitable consequence is that Washington should be the residence of a large number of people whom one can only describe as pro-Ally-Buts. That is to say, they will whisper to one, "Of course, I am a pro-Ally, but——." The "But" in some cases means, quite rationally and intelligibly, that their official positions will not permit them to declare their real sentiments. In other cases it means that they are afraid not of hurting themselves but of offending others—it is a suppression of convictions in the interests of peace and politeness. In all cases it is a symptom of the trials besetting the country which erects an official policy of neutrality on a basis of genuine but unavowed partisanship.

That the sympathies of the great mass of the American people are with the Allies in this war I never doubted when I was in England, and I doubt still less now that I have revisited the United States. It could not be otherwise. The American nation would have parted with almost all its fundamental characteristics if it did not range itself in hope and sentiment on the side of democracy and against absolutism, on the side of the principle that every nation, however small and however weak, has the right to live its own life, and against the principle that a single jack-booted Power is to rule and pervert civilization in the interests of a military oligarchy. If Americans as a whole were not instinctively against Germany they would have ceased to be Americans. I have heard of pro-Germans of American birth and parentage, but I have yet to convince myself by actual contact that such anomalies exist. The longer the war lasts, the more clearly, I conceive, do Americans realize that a Teutonic victory would menace every ideal they cherish and every interest they possess. The admirable qualities of the German immigrant, the heavy debt which the United States,

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beyond perhaps any other nation, owes to the example of German educationalists, the generous respect which Americans are ever anxious to pay to learning and intellect, and a very natural, sincere and half-pitying admiration for the efficiency and self-sacrifice with which the German people have flung themselves into this struggle—have not concealed, have hardly even disguised, the fact that between the genius of Germany and the United States there exists a very real conflict of ideas and aspirations and between their policies and tendencies a not less real antagonism of interest. One need not labor the point. It is implicit in the very soul and spirit of America and rooted in all her conceptions of herself and her mission in the world; and to come to the United States is to fortify well-nigh impregnably the impression one had formed at a distance, that the heart and feelings of America are where every Englishman would expect and desire to find them.

I hold by that. If one is inclined at moments to be irritated with the unrestrained prodigality of New York's pursuit of pleasure; if one hears with something like incredulity that west of Chicago there are large areas where the war is of comparatively little popular interest and where the average, busy, self-complacent citizen makes little effort to understand what is going on in Europe; and if the results that inevitably ensue from the adoption of a neutral policy strike one now and then as having a certain quality of anæmia, one is none the less able to discount all this by reflecting that on the main question America is absolutely sound. But that in some ways only heightens the Englishman's sense of bewilderment. It takes time before he can strike even approximately a balance between official neutrality and popular feeling. It takes time before he can reconcile the very palpable determination of the American people to keep, if possible, out of the war, with their sincere anxiety to see the Allies prevail. And even when he has resolved to his own satisfaction this central perplexity there still remain many minor but cognate issues that baffle and elude him—issues on which he discovers some of the shrewdest native judges of American opinion to be absolutely at variance. I have frequently in the past few weeks put to my American friends such questions as these: "Is America more anti-German than pro-Ally?" "Is America more anti-war than it is anti-German and more pro-peace than it is pro-Ally?" The

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oracles profoundly differ, but my own rough conclusion is that at present at least nine-tenths of the American people gratefully subscribe to President Wilson's policy because they believe it has saved them from being drawn into the war. They are convinced supporters of his programme of neutrality, but a small, though I think a growing, minority among them are beginning, not quite logically but very naturally, to wish it had been a different kind of neutrality, one more consonant with the national self-respect, one that would have raised and not lowered American prestige in the eyes of the world. The number of men one meets, especially in the East, who are genuinely distressed by the attitude of the Administration during the past eighteen months, who are equally saddened and infuriated by the sense of opportunities lost and crises mishandled, and whose pride and conscience find nothing to satisfy them in the figure their country has been made to cut throughout the war, is prodigious. And the number of women who have been stung to a yet more fiery scorn is, as one might expect, even greater. But I cannot accept these unabashed rebels against the Presidential injunction to be neutral in speech and thought as representative of all America. I do seem to catch in their utterances the authentic accent of an older America, an America I was personally more familiar with, but it is not in my judgment the America of today. So far as I can see, the supreme desire of the country is to remain at peace, and this desire is as yet more potent than any desire to see Germany vanquished or the Allies win, or than any desire to exact the full penalty for the injuries and affronts that the Central Powers have heaped upon the American Government and upon American citizens. And what I further feel is that this attitude, if I have correctly appraised it, denotes a very considerable change from the spirit and temper that would have governed American policy and feelings at other times and under other leaders.

There indeed one lays bare the very heart of the trouble that lies in wait for the Englishman who revisits at this juncture the United States. He feels as though all the assumptions on which he had builded had broken down, as though two decades of admiring and sympathetic study had been as good as wasted, as though a new America had suddenly arisen of which he knew and could predict nothing. That feeling, no doubt, is at bottom unsubstantial and erro-

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neous. Yet it comes very naturally to one who in 1896 found the majority of the American people ready to go to war with Great Britain almost for the dropping of a hat; who lived in the country during the Spanish War; and who witnessed and shared in the stir and strife of Mr. Roosevelt's Administrations. Such a one would remember an America that was prompt and sometimes overprompt to resent any injuries to its citizens; an America that was quick, perhaps even too quick, on the trigger whenever it felt that its honor or dignity had been insulted; an America that, if anything, was rather belligerently given to making international mountains out of molehills. The contrast between that America and the one that now confronts the returning visitor is one that, whether real or not, seems so to him. What, he is inclined to ask, has become of the old virility, the old ardent fund of idealism and humanity, the old capacity for clear-edged decisions and sharp action, the old irrepressible spring of outraged Americanism to meet and punish aggression? What has become of the America of Washington and Lincoln or even of Cleveland and Roosevelt? Is it dead or does it merely sleep? Have prolonged and ineffective silence and inaction in the presence of the infamies that have filled Mexico for four years and all Europe for a year and a half induced in the American people an insensitiveness, a callousness, that makes them accept any outrage, even when they are its chief victims, almost as a matter of course? Has materialism so colored their outlook and their consciousness as to make them think first of all of their skins and pockets and to put wholly away from them anything that menaces their prosperity or calls upon them for personal self-sacrifice? Is America really so vast, so incoherent, so much a medley of unassimilated peoples as to be incapable at a crisis of genuinely national compactness either in feeling or in policy? Or is it that the great mass of the American people do not yet understand what is happening in Europe, and persist in denying that it touches them at all vitally and in hugging to themselves the delusion that in any event their invulnerability is secure? And if the answer to these questions—or to such of them as seem to reflect on the patriotism and common sense and spiritual robustness of the American people—is, as I profoundly believe it to be, mainly in the negative, then how comes it that their impulse to make the American flag and American citizenship respected, their

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hardy sense of nationality, their former unhesitating vigor in accepting a challenge and chastising the wrong-doer, and their once famous passion for freedom and democracy, have not found clearer expression at Washington during the past few years?

It is such questions as these that an Englishman in the United States of today finds himself revolving. And they are prompted not merely by what has happened in Europe since August, 1914, but by what has been going on in Mexico for thrice as long. I was reading a few months ago in a New York paper the impressions of a tour across the Continent to the Pacific Coast undertaken by Mr. J. D. Whelpley, a competent American observer. "So great," he wrote, "has become the horror of war as exemplified in Europe that any idea of armed interference in Mexico by the United States is viewed with loathing. 'Let them fight it out among themselves. We are not going to send our fathers, husbands, brothers or sons to be killed or maimed by a lot of squabbling Greasers,' is the way they put it." The course of American policy since Diaz fell has been entirely in accordance with this attitude. The United States Government has seen Mexico ground into anarchy by civil war. It has seen American citizens murdered and their property destroyed. It has seen European residents, for whose safety it can hardly disavow responsibility, similarly maltreated. It has seen the Mexicans tearing up treaties, defiling the Stars and Stripes, and insulting Mr. Wilson's personal representatives. And all this it has borne with a patience to which there is no parallel in modern history, a patience that seems only to increase the more it is abused. Never once, apparently, has the President seriously considered the remedy that almost any other ruler would long ago have enforced—the invasion and occupation of the country. Some of his fellow citizens have found fault with his policy and its consequences; but, unless I am wholly mistaken, the great majority of them answer all such criticisms by reflecting with a sense of overwhelming gratitude that he has kept the peace. And it is with the same conclusive retort that they vanquish the opponents of Mr. Wilson's methods of dealing with Germany and her Allies. In the last eighteen months the United States Government has suffered at the hands of the Central Powers a series of unexampled outrages and it has suffered them with an equally

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unexampled meekness and forbearance. There are Americans—I meet them everywhere, and they are just as common in the United States as in Europe—who all but foam at the mouth when they recall the silence of their Government in the face of the rape of Belgium, that luckless "too proud to fight" impromptu, and the whole spirit in which the Administration has handled the *Lusitania* and other incidents. But I am persuaded, I am indeed convinced, that the vast bulk of the people of this country smother whatever dissatisfaction they may feel with this or that detail of the President's policy in one comprehensive and all-justifying formula: "He has kept the peace."

This passion for peace, at any rate in its present intense and pervasive form, is a phenomenon of such recent development that only observations taken on the spot can gauge its magnitude. It is impossible to convince Americans abroad of its depth and fervor and extensiveness. I will even venture on the assertion that no American who has been out of the United States during the past two years can by any effort of the imagination appreciate it. I have discussed the war and the policy of the United States with scores, I dare say hundreds, of Americans in Europe. With hardly an exception I have found them ashamed of their Government's attitude, disgusted by it, and above all amazed at it. They feel utterly alien to and unable to comprehend the popular spirit of which it is the manifestation. Yet American pacificism, while aggravated by the war, is not the product of the war. It is, as I see it, a far older growth than that, and draws its sustenance from a much more complicated variety of conditions. In the first place, you have in the United States a country that is not only physically isolated but is relieved from the constant external pressure of powerful neighbors. Fortune and the accident of her geographical position and surroundings have exempted her from the animosities and rivalries which convulse that older world on which her people look down with a more or less pitying contempt as an institution whose main utility is to serve as a foil to the singular blessedness of American conditions. She is aware of no specific enemies to guard against, no definite or even probable crisis to prepare for, no opposing standard by which to measure her naval and military equipment. Of all that follows when two Powers of nearly equal strength and of possibly conflicting interests live

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within striking distance of one another, she knows next to nothing. A diplomatic dispute with another Power, conducted by either side upon the implication of force, is of all experiences the one most foreign to the normal routine of American existence. When you have mentioned the Monroe Doctrine you have pretty well indicated the sum total of the average citizen's interest in external politics. The description of the Americans as "a nation of villagers" still holds good in the sense that their local consciousness is far more intensive than their national, and still more than their international, consciousness. Deeply ingrained in the popular mind is the conviction that Europe has one set of interests and America another; and the "man in the cars," self-centred, preoccupied and remote, knowing nothing of the fierce juxtapositions and imminent contentions of Europe, and assured of the unassailable strength of the United States, still, I suppose, regards the wars of the Old World with a mainly spectacular interest, as a sort of drama provided for his diversion. Millions of Americans have never seen the sea; with a great capacity for idealism, their time and thought are necessarily absorbed by the needs and opportunities of material development; the unprecedented mixture of races which is spread over their vast areas, in an atmosphere of tranquil security, makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, for them to attain to the unity either in sentiment or in action of a France or an England; and an unrealizing attitude of mind towards the issues of world-politics is the natural fruit of their aloof, their seemingly invulnerable, conditions.

To me, I confess, there has seemed and there still seems a much more significant question to be resolved than whether America will enter the war. It is whether America will enter the world. Since she chased the Barbary pirates off the sea the United States has been virtually a recluse among the nations. She has signed Hague Conventions, but with the distinct and public proviso that their enforcement is no concern of hers. She has attended European Conferences, as at Algeciras, but only on the understanding that they commit her to nothing. She has written in the past fifteen years innumerable despatches on the developments in the Far East, but she has never once seriously contemplated backing up words by action. Outside the radius of the Monroe Doctrine the Americans neither have nor wish to have any foreign

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policy whatever. Some thought they had developed one when they bounded out of their long innocuous isolation, felled at a stroke an essential member of the European family, freed Cuba, occupied Porto Rico, and strewed the Pacific with stepping stones from Hawaii to Manila. But they were mistaken. The past decade and a half have completely disenchanted Americans with the fruits of Imperialism. Question the average citizen of the United States today, and you will find him either a monument of indifference or an encyclopedia of cloudy misinformation as to all that is happening in America's insular possessions, and as to the international and strategic problems that their retention propounds. The white man's burden, so far as Americans are concerned, has become the white man's boredom; and as the Senate has recently shown, if there were any way of disposing of the Philippines without seeming to lose face too abjectly, both Congress and the majority of the American people would welcome it and follow it with something like enthusiasm. They have failed even to achieve that vague pride of ownership and responsibility which among the masses of the British people does duty for Imperialism; and the glamor of being an Asiatic Power and of ruling over tropical dependencies has utterly faded.

The truth is, I believe, that what dominates the thought and sentiment and policy of the American people is still that quiet home-keeping instinct of theirs. The questions that really affect them are still American questions. For all practical purposes the national self-engrossment is hardly less complete today than it has been any time during the last hundred years. The operative opinion of the Commonwealth still desires to have as few dealings as possible with foreign Powers, still quotes and abides by Washington's warning against permanent and entangling alliances (whilst altogether ignoring his emphatic advocacy of " temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies "), still shrinks from any course that threatens " complications," still clings to the policy of isolation as the one that most adequately squares with the needs of American conditions. That this attitude must in the long run prove untenable; that the United States cannot indefinitely preserve the immunity from the conflicts and problems of Europe and the Far East which has served her well during the century and a quarter of her material upbuilding; that she is destined to be drawn

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with a constantly increasing celerity into those clashes of policy and ambition that formerly she could afford to look upon with an almost complete detachment—all this, which seems axiomatic to a dispassionate onlooker, is still not only disputed but denied by the great majority of the American people. They hold, I should judge, that America's true destiny and most useful task is to develop on the American continent a distinctive and ideal type of civilization, to eschew war, militarism, and all the burdens and the deceptive glories of the older world, and to inspire mankind by the spectacle of a nation given up solely to the pursuit of liberty and justice and the arts of peace and equal rights for all. That is unquestionably a fine ideal. But it is an ideal that in its implications of aloofness and self-sufficiency is incompatible with the ambition, which none the less Americans avowedly cherish, to play a commanding part in the future ordering of the world; to end not only this war but all wars, and to start civilization on a new and saner path. What, however, Americans do not yet seem to realize is the conditions on which alone this honorable ambition of theirs can be fulfilled. It cannot be fulfilled unless they for their part get rid of certain inveterate prepossessions, readjust their political focus, and accept responsibilities they have hitherto and deliberately declined to assume. It is difficult, for instance, to conceive any League of Peace, any possible reconstitution of the world on an international basis, from which the necessity of enforcing decisions from time to time by common action shall be excluded; and if the new dispensation is to comprise the United States it can only be on condition that Americans are prepared to co-operate on equal terms with the citizens and Governments of other countries, to shoulder their part of the common liabilities, and to contribute their proportion of naval and military power to the general stock. However slight or however onerous the task of maintaining a lasting peace may afterwards prove, Americans can take no effective hand in it so long as they confine themselves to expressions of good will and pacific protestations and, for the rest, wash their hands of Europe.

I have wandered, however, somewhat from my point, which was that of setting forth the circumstances which have made America pre-eminently the land of peace. One of them unquestionably is the brutality of modern war. The spectacle that Europe presents has frankly horrified and

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sobered them. There is little trace in the United States of today of the rather bellicose heedlessness which Americans used to inject into their international disputes. On the contrary there is nothing they desire more fervently than to keep out of the present ghastly struggle. They regard Europe as rattling madly back into barbarism, while they themselves are the sole depositories of sanity and civilization. They feel the waste and horror and criminality of it all with a physical intensity all the more stark for being devoid of the ennobling consolations which support the actual belligerents. They peer down at us in our European shambles, pitying us as the victims of dynastic ambitions, diplomatic plots, and an anti-democratic dispensation, and thanking their stars that in America they are exempt from the conditions which have produced so measureless a catastrophe. To remain outside the orbit of its ravages there are few sacrifices of what in the old phraseology used to be called "national honor," or "national self-respect" or "national interests" to which, I imagine, they will not consent. They see no obligation of honor or self-respect more stringent, and no interest more compelling, than that of discouraging this war madness and enlisting sentiment on the side of reason and legality. The great bulk of Americans, in my judgment, simply do not believe that the present conflict, whatever its upshot, touches their national security or endangers their power to hold fast to their own ideals of government and society. They have been brought up to believe in the irresistible strength of the country, in the completeness of its separation from the feuds and ferment of the Old World, and in the wisdom of the tradition that has prescribed for them a policy of non-interference as the logical corollary to their fortunate geographical remoteness. That they should forfeit these advantages for any cause less urgent than the existence or safety of the Commonwealth seems to many millions of Americans a counsel of suicidal insanity. It is not a social or a political accident but a deep spiritual conviction which makes Americans look askance on militarism and all its accessories. There is a type of mind that still associates the love of peace with effeminacy. But the Americans are among the highest spirited, the most robust and adventurous people on this planet; and it is worth noting that the aversion from war is most pronounced in the West and Middle West, where life is simpler and hardier than in

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the East, and where all the conditions make for an unusual abundance of enterprise and physical vigor. In that spacious unhampered seclusion of theirs, in a society where women and the churches have taken into their own hands the decision on all questions of ethics, and among a people of such varied extraction and scattered over so vast a territory, the reaction against war develops under more favorable circumstances than obtain or are even imaginable anywhere else. That it is assisted by a great deal of half-baked metaphysics of the Bryanite order, by an excess of feminine sentimentality, by too much easy-going individualism and too little sense of the State, and by the incessant importunities of business, is no doubt true enough. But whatever may be the impulses behind it, I find that the dominant, almost the exclusive, bent of American aspirations today is away from war and force and towards conciliation and legality. And I ask myself whether this may not portend a gradual widening of the respective angles from which the United States and Europe approach the problems of international politics and whether in these matters the Old World and the New may not soon be moving on different ethical planes, with a different set of standards and values. Who knows, on the other hand, but that the unique patience with which President Wilson has confronted the foreign problems of his Administration—a patience that to many of his countrymen appears ultra-Christian in its charity—may not eventually become the established rule of all international conduct? Who can say that the steady and unceasing revulsion of the American people against imperialism, external adventures, and the whole doctrine of militarism may not communicate itself to other nations and be accepted as the universal guide?

But while pacificism cannot but strike one as the outstanding fact of American life and thought at this moment, and while there is much in the permanent conditions of the United States to foster its growth, I think also it is in some respects an accidental phenomenon. I do not for instance doubt that even today a suspicion that that extremely elastic formula, the Monroe Doctrine, was being flouted or infringed, would make every American grope for a rifle. The force of the peace sentiment in the United States depends, I should say, at any given moment largely upon the nature of the questions that are on the carpet; and in this war, it

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would seem, the American people, or most of them, have pretty well decided that the issues which are being fought out are primarily European and not American issues. But it depends also, and even more largely, upon another and more shifting factor—the views and personality of the particular President who may happen to be in the White House. The more I attempt to weigh this consideration the greater is the importance I find myself attaching to it. One of the features of the American governmental system which the events of the past eighteen months have most deeply and palpably underscored is the enormous and almost autocratic power of the President and the extreme significance of the Presidential ego at a time of crisis. When Americans talk to me of the dangers of " secret diplomacy " as one of the causes of this European conflagration and when they inveigh against a dispensation which allows an individual or a class or a clique to throw a whole country into the cockpit of war, I am tempted, while agreeing with them, to ask whether, after all, matters are so very different in the United States. Certainly I cannot away with the impression that American policy during the past three years in Mexico has been preponderantly a one-man policy and the product far more of a single brain and a single temperament than of Congressional discussion or popular insistence. So, too, with the course of American diplomacy since the beginning of the great war —it was initiated and devised and has been consistently controlled, to the best of my knowledge, by nothing one-tenth as much as by the opinions, the disposition, the instinctive ways of looking at things of President Wilson and his interpretation of the public mind. In general, indeed, I do not know of any country in which the executive has a more liberal license in formulating the conduct of foreign affairs, in which it is easier to impose a policy by a mere *ipse dixit* or in which official diplomacy proceeds in a closer atmosphere of reserve, with less interference from the national legislature, or with a wider assumption on the part of the people, than it is for the White House to show the way. A terrible —of late it must have been an almost unbearable—responsibility is thus thrust upon the President, and the manner in which he meets it is the resultant of the traits and predelictions, the sympathies, outlook and training that have made him what he is.

That is what I had in mind when I said just now that the

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supremacy of pacificism in the United States today denotes "a very considerable change from the spirit and temper that would have governed American policy and feeling at other times and under other leaders." May it not be that those words "under other leaders" are in great part the clue to the mystery? The Americans are a malleable people and eminently responsive to the touch of a firm hand. Implicit, indeed, in all one's speculations on American affairs is the conviction that at any national crisis the people will always stand by a President who gives them a lead. It is a question far more of character and individuality than of Constitutional prescription whether he guides or follows, whether he moulds opinion or merely echoes and transmits it. He can always, if he chooses,—or rather if his mind and nature have the qualities of certitude and command,—fashion for himself the weapon which the people place in his hands, and determine not alone its temper but the manner of its wielding; and I find it difficult not to believe that had Mr. Roosevelt been in the White House at the outbreak of the war, not only would matters have gone very differently, but the spirit of the land under the reflex action of his personality would today be nearly the opposite of what it is. What policy he would have followed is, of course, a mere matter of guesswork, but it seems a moderately safe assumption that it would not have been the policy which has actually been pursued. Mr. Wilson's views and temperament, his poise and circumspection, his abhorrence of the employment of force except after much painful self-communion and under the stress of sheer necessity, and his revulsion from the militarist school of thought appear to me to have been factors of the utmost moment in shaping the attitude of the country. They acted on the national nerves like a sedative. Everything he did and said was said and done to restrain and not to excite; and in the result he has, in my judgment, at least nine-tenths of the country arrayed on his side in trust and thankfulness. But I feel too that Mr. Roosevelt, had he been President, would also have gathered around him the substantial and enthusiastic support of the people—say, seven-tenths of them—in loud approval of a policy they now condemn and animated by a spirit which, whether nobler or otherwise, would assuredly have been different from that which they now display. I am half inclined, in other words, to think that what gave the de-

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cisive twist to American thought and policy was the chance that the war broke out when a man of Mr. Wilson's instincts and character was in the White House, and not a man of Mr. Roosevelt's.

I would not, however, wish for a moment to appear to be deploring that chance. For the past eighteen months, indeed, I may claim without presumption to have done rather more than any other Englishman to explain to my countrymen Mr. Wilson's policy and difficulties and to defend the action of the American Government against the many misunderstandings to which it has been exposed. Neither in Great Britain nor in any of the Allied nations is there any desire that America should depart from her neutrality except under the compulsion of purely American interests. We welcome American sympathy; we have amply availed ourselves of the opportunity secured to us by the command of the sea to draw upon American resources; but we stand in no need of American naval or military assistance, and we want indeed nothing from America except what America may care spontaneously to give. Prodigious as would certainly have been the political and atmospheric differences had a Rooseveltian and not a Wilsonic President happened to coincide with the outbreak of the war, it is by no means certain that all of them would have been to the advantage either of America or the Allies. At any rate an Englishman feels no difficulty in speculating on the subject as a matter of impersonal interest to himself and his nation but of irresistible fascination to the student of American politics and of the psychology of the American people. It is a point —this accident of the presence in the White House of a President of one type and not of another—that to my mind acquires fresh weight the longer it is pondered; and many of the developments and manifestations that I have dwelt upon as seemingly indicative of a new America may really be explained by the fact that there is a new President at the head of it.

SYDNEY BROOKS.

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THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

BY DAVID JAYNE HILL

For more than a year the American people, and particularly the Congress, have been urged to make more serious preparation for National Defense. Voluntary organizations, composed of patriotic citizens, solicitous of the welfare of the country, have advocated measures for its greater security. The public interest has, however, been by no means universal; partly because we have a traditional belief in our immunity from foreign aggression, partly because there is among us a wholesome dread of militarism, and partly because we have been officially assured that the question of National Defense is merely academic, the army and navy of the United States being sufficiently strong and well equipped to furnish us adequate protection in any circumstances likely to arise.

Within a few months the situation has produced great disquietude. The continued disturbance along our borders, resulting in the death of considerable numbers of American citizens in Mexico and assaults on our troops upon the Mexican frontier, has not abated. New complications upon the high seas have arisen involving the safety of American travelers. Grave questions of national honor and duty have deeply impressed the people, and all thoughtful men throughout the country have had their attention turned to conditions which the more far-seeing had long apprehended as likely to exist.

In an unprecedented fashion, the President, himself finally convinced that our national defenses are inadequate, in order to overcome the apathy of a Congress, more interested in measures of its own than in providing for the defense of the nation, or still believing that it has no duty to

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perform, has in person gone to the people with eloquent appeals to press the Congress to give him the support he had previously considered unnecessary.

It is still uncertain whether that support will be accorded. The emergency that was particularly in the President's mind when he made those appeals, may, in the meantime, have disappeared. In this case, the demand for an increase in our military and naval strength may be less insistent; or—for such changes in American policy are not unknown—it may cease altogether.

It is timely, therefore, to consider what should be the permanent and unalterable policy of the United States, and the means available to carry it into execution.

It would be a reprehensible course if, after stirring the soul of the nation regarding its possible perils, it should be left to some other, and perhaps less favorable occasion, to emphasize our duties. It is a sufficiently humiliating commentary on the negligence of American democracy, that it should have been found necessary for the President of the United States to leave the seat of government at a moment of critical diplomatic negotiation, and appeal to the country for the popular support in giving him a mandate and the means of action in sustaining the honor of the nation and performing the duties of his office as its constitutional guardian. If it is still a matter of doubt whether, in like circumstances, the President should feel able, without a specific appeal, to perform those duties and to rely upon unanimous support, there is occasion for grave anxiety regarding the future prestige of the United States among the nations of the world.

There is, then, good reason for continuing, apart from special conditions, the discussion of National Defense. Do we need it? Can we afford not to have it? Shall we be able to secure it in adequate measure?

It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to answer all of these questions. It is designed solely to concentrate attention upon the proper answer to the first; for every intelligent man quite naturally feels that he must first settle in his own mind that something is in danger,—in short, that there is something for which we as a people are responsible, and which it is our duty to defend.

Nothing is easier than to dismiss as groundless fears some of the suppositions that have been put forward as

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reasons why we should at once organize a great army to be kept on a war footing.

I cannot believe, for example, that we are exposed at this time to the danger of any immediate attack upon our territory. There is no invincible armada turning its prows toward our coasts, or at this time preparing to do so. I do not believe that there is any nation that has it in mind to organize a band of conquistadors to restore piracy on the high seas, or to sally forth in quest of new colonies, to be taken by force from a civilized people; and I consider it detrimental to the cause of national defense to advance such arguments.

What we have to fear is, that sometime, somewhere, there will arise a dispute over the rights of our citizens, or the rights of the citizens of other countries within our jurisdiction or sphere of influence, which we shall not be able to settle amicably, unless we are strong enough to be really formidable, and to make our words and our standards of conduct universally respected.

Such an occasion may occur regarding the safety of American life and property in ill-governed countries; or on the high seas; or respecting the rights of innocent commerce; or the right of other nations to establish naval bases and erect defenses in territories in proximity to our own; or movements upon those waters where we desire that in future there shall be no warlike operations.

The fundamental question is, therefore, how far are we prepared to go in protecting the lives and property of American citizens or in prohibiting such operations on land and sea as are likely to endanger them in the future?

If we desire to avoid the hostility of other nations, we must make it evident that what we aim at is defense and not aggression; that we have no imperial designs; that we have no spirit of conquest, spoliation, or vindictiveness; and that we stand unitedly upon the solid platform of recognized international law as the protector of human rights.

We do, undoubtedly, differ from some other peoples in our belief that there are human rights, inherent and inalienable, for which every American citizen may justly claim the protection of his Government. That is the corner-stone of our democracy. Our whole edifice rests upon it, and we cannot permit it to be questioned. We cannot concede that there is only *one* duty—the duty of the individual to the State.

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We must uphold the doctrine that the State has a duty to the individual, and to every individual,—be it man, woman, or child,—within our borders, and beyond our borders, especially upon the sea, which is our common highway. We demand no special privileges there, we pretend to no dominant authority there, but we claim the right to safety and to justice there, and everywhere where we are expected to call men friends.

And here is where our doctrines are most likely to bring us into conflict with others. We cannot allow the law of war utterly to destroy the rights of peace. We cannot allow new conditions of warfare, which may increase the burdens and dangers that must be endured by belligerents, to annihilate the time-honored privileges and safety of neutrals. We shall find it very difficult to call by the name of "friend" any nation which, in its desire to conquer, shall insist upon taking means to do so that involve the certain destruction of innocent American lives or the needless interruption of innocent American commerce.

We shall, of course, distinguish between the assault upon life and the sequestration and even the destruction of property; for the reason that property losses may be made good by the payment of indemnities, while the loss of human life can never be indemnified. In neither case, however, can the absence of direct hostility or intention to injure serve to excuse an injurious act. International friendship, as well as private friendship, implies not only the absence of an intention to injure, but a disposition to avoid injury by employing every means of protection.

It would, however, be ungenerous not to remember that unusual, and even abnormal, feelings, such as may lead to momentary moral irresponsibility, are often excited in time of bitter warfare. These feelings may explain, but they can never justify, a disregard for the rights of others; and it is the custom of all civilized nations to offer protection, even to their enemies, against such expressions of feeling in moments of violent excitement. That is the whole significance of the laws of war, carefully elaborated in the interest of humanity, in the full consciousness of the insufficiency of self-restraint when men are struggling for their very existence.

We cannot, therefore, whatever the emergency may be, freely consent, or consent under constraint, that the right,

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knowingly, not to say purposely, to take innocent life where it can be avoided, be written, even by implication, into the law of nations. International law is, it is true, still in the process of formation; and every great precedent is considered as changing it, when it becomes a matter of common consent, even though the consent be tacit. International law should not rest upon personal feelings, or good or evil intentions, or the exigencies of a trying situation. It should rest upon just and defensible principles, which are fit to govern the conduct of civilized nations toward one another.

It is in view of this fact that the right of protest or remonstrance always exists. Without it there could be no true society of nations. International law is made by the weight of international opinion, and it is the right of every sovereign state to countenance or to discountenance any procedure and especially any innovation affecting the law of the future.

I have said that we shall find it difficult to speak of "friendship" where, for any reason, a Government insists that a new form of power confers a right to destroy, knowingly, innocent and undefended non-combatants upon the high seas. New forms of international law may be necessary with regard to the transportation of passengers and contraband of war upon the same vessel, and there may be room for the discussion by an international conference, in the interest of an equitable adjustment of belligerent and neutral rights at sea, upon this point; but it would be a delinquency to permit that there shall be a recession to that condition of lawlessness which all civilized nations have endeavored to prevent.

On the contrary, if changes are to be made, they should be in the direction of rendering war more difficult and peace more secure. It is precisely because international law is in the process of formation, and because we should have a voice in determining the direction in which it should be developed, that pending decisions are of interest to us. It is interesting to recall that the highest standards of international ethics that had ever been written into treaties are to be found in the Treaty of 1785 between the United States and Prussia.

In that celebrated convention (long cited as a model of its kind, but which expired, with the exception of Article XII, by its own limitation, in 1796), occurs the following:

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Article IX

When any vessel of either party shall be wrecked, foundered, or otherwise damaged on the coasts, or within the dominion of the other, their respective subjects or citizens shall receive, as well for themselves as for their vessels and effects, the same assistance as would be due to the inhabitants of the country where the damage happens. . . . The ancient and barbarous right to wrecks of the sea shall be entirely abolished, with respect to the subjects or citizens of the two contracting parties.

Could anything be more friendly and fraternal than this engagement? Could anything be more promising for the future? And again, in

Article XII

If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the ports and the coasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels making free goods, insomuch that all things shall be judged free which be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral party, although such things *belong to an enemy of the other;* and the same freedom shall be extended to *persons* who shall be on board a free vessel, *although they should be enemies to the other party,* unless they be soldiers in actual service of such enemy.

Could there be any higher respect for neutral rights than this? And yet this article, revived by the Treaty of 1828, is regarded as in force to-day.

Article XIII

And, in the same case, if one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings, that usually arise respecting the merchandise heretofore called contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, *to the enemies of the other,* shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a *loss of property to individuals.* . . . But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage.

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And this article is also regarded as in force today. I have cited these articles, not for the purpose of establishing any present rights of the United States, but merely to illustrate the spirit of justice and humanity that inspired these treaties; the first of which was signed by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams, and registers the high-water mark of neutral rights upon the sea.

They show what those two Governments then considered right, and fit to be made into the Law of Nations. That law may not have developed as it was then hoped it would, but the principles of international morality have not changed, and above all the just requirements of friendship.

Can we, or can the other contracting party to this ancient and solemn engagement, wish to recede from the moral standard set up in that treaty; which recognized the immunity of innocent private property and of all non-combatant persons, even though enemies, upon the sea?

I do not overlook the fact that these treaties relate only to life and property on neutral vessels. Nor do I here attempt to establish the existence of a common law of nations which protects innocent life on all non-combatant vessels, even though belonging to an enemy; for this cannot be called in question. What I maintain is, that reason and conscience support the standard set up in the treaties I have cited: that innocent life and property ought always to be respected on the world's highway, the great seas and oceans which, for scores of reasons, innocent and hitherto unsuspecting travelers—men, women, and children—must traverse, during war as well as peace.

And what I am solicitous about is, that we should not, for fear of any consequence,—not only in the interest of American citizens, who carry our business into every part of the world, but in the interest of civilization itself, as dependent upon a just law of nations,—fail to make a firm stand, and do our part, in impressing upon all mankind the intrinsic value of innocent human life, and its right to protection by all Governments.

David Jayne Hill.

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THE STRENGTHENING OF LATIN AMERICA

BY CHARLES H. SHERRILL

In view of the changing relations to us and to the rest of the world of the great continent to the south of us, there are here suggested certain map changes, advanced in the hope that from the betterments already achieved by Pan-Americanism, even greater benefits may be realized in the future for the hemisphere which to Pan-Americans means home. It is clear that the fixed policy of the United States is forever to refrain from taking any territory from any of our fellow-republics. No such alterations in the map are in prospect, nor should they ever be possible. But is it not probable that certain changes will take place in that portion of the map belonging to Latin America, not changes born of aggression, but those making for the real strengthening of existing Governments by combinations thereof?

Why should we not seek to draw aside the curtain behind which lies the future? Perhaps it might be we ourselves who, by some act of national altruism, could initiate such combinations as would make them of greater strength for our neighbors—our friends. Monroe, by his famous pronouncement of 1823, attempted to protect us from all danger of entanglement in European politics, but he stopped at forbidding future European colonization here, whereas the Venezuelan crisis of 1895 so splendidly handled by President Cleveland proved that existing European colonies were as pregnant of trouble as future ones. British Guiana existed in Monroe's day, and yet England's desire to extend the borders of that colony at the expense of its neighbor, Venezuela, precipitated the very situation against which the Monroe Doctrine was set up. If Monroe was right, and right he undoubtedly was, then his doctrine should be ful-

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filled and this hemisphere purged of existing colonies as well as protected against future ones.

And this is a most opportune moment for us to offer to pay Denmark, Holland, France and England for their colonial possessions in the New World, since never before have they been put under so great a financial strain as to make such payments welcome. This altruistic offer to free all Pan-American soil from European domination would ring especially true when coming from the nation which had already expended millions to free Cuba. Of course Canada would not be included in this suggestion, for the very good reason that she is in an entirely different case from all the other colonial possessions in the New World because she is self-governing, speaks the language of the mother country, and (most important difference of all) can have her complete freedom at any moment she desires. Thus she is entirely different from the other colonies.

With those who urge that European colonies in the Americas are better off than they would be if free, I have no patience. Do such people know that in all the three Guianas, a territory the size of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, there are less than 200 miles of railroad? Compare that with the 588 miles in Venezuela, next adjoining them, or the 614 miles in Colombia, and also compare the poor schooling facilities or none at all that characterize the three Guianas with the 1,700 schools of Venezuela or the 5,000 of Colombia! In British Guiana, the most advanced of the three Guianas, there are 10,000 whites, 126,000 East Indian coolies, and 115,000 negroes, all brought there for what purpose? To advance the colonization of this hemisphere, or to exploit the land for its European masters? This East Indian coolie traffic was started in 1838 by John Gladstone, father of the great English Prime Minister. The French have brought many Siamese and Chinese into French Guiana, and the Dutch many Japanese into Dutch Guiana. French Guiana is chiefly known for its penal settlements, in one of which Dreyfus languished so many years. The annual foreign trade of the French islands steadily declined from 1882 to 1907—that of Martinique from 67 to 34 million francs annually, and that of Guadeloupe from 68 to 29 millions. The population of the Danish West Indies steadily decreased from 43,000 in 1835 to 31,000 in 1901. Compare figures like the foregoing with the steady upward progress of free Latin America, and

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it puts European colonial systems in a bad light, at least as practised on the soil of the New World.

All this European control of Pan-American territory should be eliminated, and it is our duty, following in Monroe's footsteps, to initiate the movement. Furthermore, the cost of the operation would not be excessive, as almost none of these colonies are able to pay their own way, and their only value as military bases would be in case their European owners wished to attack us, so ridiculous a hypothesis as hardly to be figured in the purchase price.

Suppose that either by a money purchase or by offering in exchange the hilippine Islands, we could eliminate Europe from all her colonial possessions to the south of us and also her interference with our control of our Panama Canal, would we not, by gaining freedom for colonies and canal, not only make a substantial contribution to true Pan-Americanism, but also materially improve our own chance for continued tranquillity in the future? Does not this provide a reasonable and honorable solution of the vexed Philippine problem?

But if all these colonies should be freed from their European masters there at once arises the interesting problem of what is to be done with them—are they to be started as independent republics or are they to be joined to some neighboring commonwealth? If the alternative of making them all independent should prevail, can we blind ourselves to the fact that some of them are really too small for such a lot, and also that in no case have their European masters equipped them either politically or by the physical development of their territory for any form of self government? If it be suggested that all such freed land be turned over to some adjoining republic, would not the prospect of such territorial largesse arouse unfortunate discussion (to say at least!) as to which country had the better right to them for either historical or geographical reasons? Either one of these possible adjustments would, if sweepingly adopted, cause unnecessary difficulties. Let us see if there is not some safe middleground along which there can securely proceed an orderly rearrangement of geographical lines which shall not only benefit the liberated colonies, but also at the same time strengthen existing Governments in South and Central America. Because this is a Latin American problem, we must begin by adjusting ourselves to their point of

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view, or at least do so as far as we possibly can. Unless we try so to do, we may evolve a plan that will suit us, but one which almost surely will fail to meet with the approval of the very people most concerned. Starting therefore with a determination constantly to consider the South American viewpoint, what better plan can we Anglo-Saxons devise for the major portion of the freed territory, the three Guianas, than to help them to further the statesmanlike project of Bolivar, the liberator of the northern part of that continent from the Spanish yoke? Why should not we, by our gift of the freed Guianas, powerfully help to reconstitute the New Granada or greater Colombia of his dreams—a splendid confederation of the Guianas with Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador? The flags of those three last republics are so similar as to bear striking testimony to their historical relations in the past, and further, would make very easy the selection of the national flag of this new and powerful republic, so much more powerful in combination than are all of the integral parts as separate states.

Nor can the lack of railway intercommunication be fairly urged as an argument against such an assembling of the parts into a whole, because the united country would enjoy a continued sea front on the Caribbean Sea, and, through the Panama Canal, along the Pacific Ocean. This continued littoral would provide the same sort of sail and steamship connection and cohesion that is provided for Chile by its longer Pacific shore line. Back from the sea there still exist the old Spanish cart roads, connecting up all this inland country, and it is surprising to learn how much they are still used by the Indians to transport their wares such long journeys as that from lofty Quito down across Colombia and on to interior Venezuela. If the reader will take up some modern map he will be surprised to see how many large rivers, feeders of the Orinoco, that great artery of Venezuela, extend westward far into Colombia and Ecuador, thus providing still another and a cheap channel of communication between those districts.

If there should arise a conflict of claims among the capitals of the existing republics for the honor of obtaining the seat of the new federated government, a solution could be found by turning to the writings of sundry statesmen of those very countries, where are to be found suggestions of some neutral inland and central point so situated at the

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junction of interior lines of communication as to please all by its ready accessibility. Such a point would be San Fernando de Atabapo, in western Venezuela. It was of this town that Humboldt (reporting trips made by him from 1808 to 1814) says:

> San Fernando de Atabapo stands near the confluence of three great rivers (Orinoco, Guaviare, Atabapo). Its situation is similar to that of St. Louis . . . at the junction of the Mississippi with the Missouri and the Ohio . . . In proportion as the activity of commerce increases by these immense rivers, the towns situated at their confluence will become centre points of civilization.

He predicted so correctly the future of St. Louis, that this great geographer may yet prove right about San Fernando de Atabapo. However, any such minor questions as the location of the capital would fade into insignificance beside the realization of the New Granada of Bolivar's dreams, a stately republic with a population of ten and a half millions, with a commanding position on the Caribbean Sea, and a shoulder on the Pacific—a considerable nation with much more voice in the family of nations than have the divided states of Bolivar's house as they now stand. In passing, it is important to notice that all these northern peoples, so assembled under one flag, could not fail to recognize our altruism in rendering that assembling possible by our purchasing the release of the three Guianas. If it obtained us no other advantage than regaining us the good will of Colombia, it would be well worth while.

Another possible readjustment might be the allocation of French Guiana, the most easterly of the three, to Brazil, thus completing on the north the eastern coast-line of that republic, while Dutch and British Guiana would go to complete the north coast republic of their neighbors on the west.

While speaking of Brazilian boundaries it is highly appropriate to remark that no consideration of the map of South America would be complete without a reference to that great Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Rio Branco of Brazil. During his long tenure of office he devoted himself unceasingly to the adjustment of boundary disputes between Brazil and her neighbors. Because she joins boundaries with every other country of the continent but Chile and perhaps Ecuador, his labors in closing up so many disputed questions contributed greatly to guarantee peace by elminating many long-standing elements of friction.

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I well remember it was generally remarked that the delegates of the different Central American states to the 4th Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires in 1910, were, if considered as a whole, in every way equal to the delegations sent there by any of the larger republics of the mainland, strong as some of the latter undoubtedly were. If the Central Americans had represented one larger instead of so many smaller states, they would have had even a larger voice in the councils of that convention than they enjoyed.

Every well-wisher of the Spanish-speaking republics will agree that just as such a confederation would strengthen the political and economic position of the northerly states of the mainland, so a similar combination of the Central American republics would also benefit them and lend importance to their federation. The stronger all such groupings of republics become the less they are apt to fear and therefore distrust us, and anything which tends to diminish that distrust is of great value to all concerned. Furthermore, the stronger such groupings become, the better able are they to take their part in causing the territory of this hemisphere to be respected by outsiders.

And how can we best help to bring into being such a Central American Federation? Could any argument on its behalf coming from us be more effective than the obviously altruistic one of offering to add to its united territory that of British Honduras if and when the plan of freeing all these foreign-owned colonies shall have been effectuated? This offer could be made conditional on the argeement of the other republics to unite into a Confederation which should receive this additional territory. In this connection, because one of those states, Nicaragua, has already accepted the principal of the so-called Platt Amendment (by a signed treaty not yet ratified by our Senate) which gives the United States certain rights in regard to the relations of Cuba with the outside world, it is our duty frankly to speak of the terms of that document, for such an article as this would be incomplete without its inclusion. It is common knowledge that this amendment was drafted by Elihu Root while Secretary of State, but bears the name of Senator Platt of Connecticut because it was he who introduced it into the Senate. The portions affecting the foreign affairs of Cuba are as follows:

Article I. The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which will

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impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

Article II. The Government of Cuba shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenue of the Island of Cuba, after defraying the current expenses of the Government, shall be inadequate.

Article III. The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

Inasmuch as Nicaragua has accepted the principle embodied in this Platt Amendment, its entry into a Central American Confederation would necessitate negotiation concerning that amendment with the new combination. As British Honduras would probably be offered by us also protection by this amendment, it might be that under these new circumstances and in consideration of our freeing British Honduras, the other states—Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and Slavador—might care to have the new and greater republic acccept our co-operation in this regard. It is a matter for negotiation, but that it must be faced can not be overlooked here.

The West Indian islands now belonging to nations of Europe would, if purchased by us, lie in very different case from the other colonial possessions similarly released by us from their foreign owners. The territory on the mainland could, as we have just seen, be added to existing republics adjoining them and thus serve the threefold purpose of strengthening those republics, improving their own condition by the practise of self-government, and lastly, advance the cause of Pan-Americanism by showing added proofs of our altruism toward it. But there would be no free territory directly adjoining the purchased West Indian islands, and furthermore they are important defensive points which it is our duty to hold, because it is our duty to the whole hemisphere to neglect nothing which may defend for all of us the free use of the Panama Canal. For this reason, if for no

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other, we should retain under our flag such of those Caribbean islands as we may acquire by purchase except the two or three lying close against the coast of Venezuela, which should be given to that country. But in the freeing of the Falkland Islands from English rule, no such geographical reason or defensive duty obtains as in the case of the West Indies, and those Falkland Islands should therefore be restored to the Argentine Republic.

What we have said thus far disposes of that portion of map alteration which could be furthered by our gifts of newly freed territory. We now turn to an entirely different state of affairs, existing at the other end of the continent, in the temperate latitudes, where climate is aiding progress in many ways, of which immigration is not the least important.

What is the state of affairs that we shall find existing among those forward-looking peoples? Already there has been recognized the value—the world-significance—of combining units to form a whole on external questions. Already this realization of world-tendencies has taken shape in certain political engagements entered into by Argentina, Brazil and Chile by means of several recently signed treaties which together result in what is popularly known as the A. B. C. Alliance. Those treaties are doubtless serving a useful purpose because they make for a better understanding between the contracting nations. Nevertheless, it is to be doubted if those treaties will in the more or less distant future prevent a changed alignment in that part of the world, a more natural combination, based on common language, climate and racial tendencies.

How long can there be deferred in that part of the continent a confederation which the rapidly increasing ties of railroad and river connection between republics having the same language and institutions as have Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, would seem naturally to make of them? The Andes that so long kept Chile and Argentina apart are already conquered by one railroad and soon will be by others, and so will prove no more of a political barrier between those peoples than does the lofty Sierra Nevada range which separates California from the rest of the United States. There are not a few who believe that if and when a political union is effected between Chile and Argentina, the former, though placed as is Cali-

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fornia in our union of States, will be rather the Ohio of the combination, which means that the statesmen of what is now Argentina will have to look to their political laurels in the new confederation lest the Chilians snatch them away!

As for Bolivia, the two railways now connecting her with Chile, and the new line from La Paz, her capital, to Argentina, will prove strong arguments for Bolivia's joining a confederation having all its political elements in common with hers.

Just as Bolivia would be linked with a combined Chile and Argentina by three great railway arteries, so Paraguay has its capital, Asuncion, already connected both by railway and by steamship with Buenos Aires, the majestic metropolis of all South America. That enormous artery of trade, the River Plate, is so much greater than any of our own rivers that it is difficult to make our people understand what a highway of commerce it affords from Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay, stationed at its mouth, all the way up to Asuncion and beyond, a huge physical argument for the union of Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. One has only to live a few months on either bank of this great river to learn of the close affiliations already existing between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, as well as between the nations of which they are the capitals, ties not only of commerce and race, but also of frequent intermarriage.

The more one comes to know of the people and conditions of that part of the world, the more irresistible becomes the conclusion that some such combination of their Spanish-speaking republics will ensue. This alliance between Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay is a natural one, and would bring into being a united and majestic nation of eighteen million souls, a balance in their temperate latitudes to the great Portuguese-speaking republic of the tropics: Brazil, with her twenty-one millions.

Perhaps there is here sketched nothing but the dream of a dreamer, but at least it seeks to advance the political importance before the world of his friends in the southern continent.

CHARLES H. SHERRILL.

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SOUTH AMERICA AND INVESTMENTS

BY PERCIVAL FARQUHAR

THE times are fraught with lessons in all fields of national activity; and, for the United States, one of these lessons is that materials taken from abroad for agriculture, industries and general consumption should not be dependent on trade routes and conditions which it may not be in our power to keep open and unfettered by restrictions; for example, in the case of tin from the Straits Settlements, rubber from the Straits Settlements and Ceylon, burlap and manganese from India, and so forth.

To carry out the obligations involved in the Monroe Doctrine, which can now be considered to have taken on new life and development and to be more firmly grounded than ever, we are compelled to keep control of the sea roads to the countries of South America, which means keeping them open for our commerce also. This requires a sufficient fleet, coaling stations, forts, etc., along these routes, including the Panama Canal, for which purpose we have the element in our favor, existing nowhere else, of traversing waters of friendly republics equally interested with ourselves.

South America is one of the great natural fields for American investment. The others are Russia and China; but in addition to the question of trade routes, with Russia there are to be considered eventualities of the war, and with China the possibility of Japanese domination.

Does not all this point to the fact that, to suffer the least national derangement in our commercial and industrial life in case of war, we should as far as possible concentrate in South America our foreign investments, obtaining from it the raw material, supplies and articles not produced here or obtained at better advantage from abroad; and, on the other hand, supply South

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America with its imports, for which its purchasing power, now large, will grow with the development resulting from this policy on our part?

The notable investments in South America will naturally be in railways; public utilities in cities; hydro-electric developments; properties whose products are consumed in the United States; and Government, state and municipal bonds; representing, according to past experience, approximately the order of safety.

For instance, the bonds of the Costa Rica Railway have for years been quoted at 95 per cent. to par, while the Costa Rica Government bonds were standing at 25 per cent. to 35 per cent., and the railway and Government securities of Guatemala show similar price relations. Even in great countries with stable Governments, like Argentine and Brazil, the national Governments were on a 5 per cent. basis at a considerable margin below par, while the gilt-edged railroads sold their bonds on a 4 per cent. basis at near par.

The individual states and municipalities, being without diplomatic relations, and for other more cogent reasons, have been compelled generally to issue their securities on a lower plane than the Federal Governments. Particularly has this been the case with municipalities, owing to a tendency to extravagance in public improvements and the difficulty usually experienced in the Western hemisphere of properly governing municipalities. This is mitigated in the United States by a limit of indebtedness to a small percentage on the total property values,—a limit difficult of application to South America, where there is no direct taxation on property values. The present long crisis, beginning with the Balkan War, in the autumn of 1912, has brought a salutary change in the scale of expenditure, private and governmental, resulting in balances of trade, increasing in Argentine from $59,777,000 in 1913 to $320,000,000 in 1915, and in Brazil from minus $11,279,000 in 1913 to about plus $108,000,000 in 1915; while governmental expenditure in Argentine decreased from $187,000,000 in 1913 to $165,000,000 in 1915, and in Brazil from $224,706,000 in 1913 to about $145,000,000 in 1915.

When the South American Governments shall have balanced their budgets under present conditions, their situation will be unusually sound and healthy, as the countries themselves are being strengthened by their large and increas-

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ingly favorable annual balances of trade and their business adjusted to less use of credit, while the outstanding commercial and industrial indebtedness is largely liquidated. State and municipal loans must, however, be scrutinized with especial care and each case judged on its own merits.

Railways in Latin America have the inestimable advantage of concession contracts with the Governments defining the respective rights and obligations. In the United States railways were built under general State laws without contracts, and as a consequence the Government's power of interference in all matters, including rates, is limited only by what the Courts may consider to be a reasonable return on the investment of the most favored railways, condemning those less favored to a lower return or none at all.

In the case of iron ore, Brazil has the largest known deposits in the world—70 per cent. practically free from phosphorus. The State of Minas Geraes alone is estimated to have 1,500,000,000 to 2,000,000,000 tons at about 300 to 400 miles from the sea-coast, and bodies of iron ore exist in other states of Brazil. Our Eastern mills, whose expansion should take on a new phase with our increasing export of steel and steel products, can use this ore to advantage as well as Europe, which needs it for mixture with its low-grade and high phosphorus ores.

Brazil, now the largest producer after India of manganese, sends almost her entire output to the United States, which is planning to increase greatly its consumption in order to replace shipments from India interfered with by the war.

The largest deposits of nitrate of soda in the world are in Chile,—in fact the only known large deposits. The demand of the Allies for ammunition now largely counterbalances in tonnage the loss of the German market, which before the war took 70 per cent. of the output of the Chilian nitrate fields. The United States, to insure its supply of nitrates in case of war, would be compelled to establish great water-power and other electric factories to make artificial nitrates from the air at a larger permanent cost of the product than the Chilian nitrates, were the trade route to Chile (including the Panama Canal) not certain to be kept open for us.

In time of peace as well as in time of war, our country is likely to be one of the world's largest consumers of nitrates. While we had large unoccupied areas of rich land,

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there was no necessity to tone up the production of the lands already under cultivation, but now we must turn to them for increase of our production. On the poor soil of the Eastern States, or the partly worn-out soil of the Central States of the United States, the effect of the use of nitrates is magical in the output per acre. It might be that our banking system would find a way to make advances to farmers for nitrate, to be repaid out of the greatly increased season's crop, as has been the custom of the banks in another country.

Our largest supply of tin, that of the Straits Settlements, already severely embarrassed through the present inadequate transportation and high freight rates, and likely to become more so with the closing of the Suez Canal to traffic, is also the object of Government control as a war measure. Is it not clearly to the interest of the United States to turn to Bolivia as the source of its tin, a country containing rich tin ores capable of supplying the world and now producing 18 per cent. of the total output? There are no tin smelters except in Europe, but the first ones in the United States are now being built.

American investment might find it to its advantage to turn to the large tracts of rubber-bearing land along the navigable rivers of the Amazon valley, expanding their output by greater development. At present rubber is gathered only from within two to three miles of the river banks, the hinterland being untouched, so that the production can be increased indefinitely. The Amazon valley can be made a certain source of supply of the best quality of rubber for all our present and future needs, with a short sea trip to the United States.

The cattle-breeding lands of the world, elsewhere than in Latin America, have so narrowed through the encroachments of agriculture that the world's consumption of meat, constantly increasing, has surpassed supplies from those sources. The reserves of wheat production—Canada and Siberia—are too cold for cattle breeding, and the unoccupied ranges of Australia and South Africa receive too little rainfall to make them good cattle ranches, so that they are likely to be called on for further production on a large scale only after South America's well-watered pastures are filled. The immense region of Southern Brazil, Eastern Bolivia, Paraguay and Northern Argentine is now the only large unoccu-

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pied territory eminently adapted for cattle breeding; Argentine—excepting the Northern portion—and Uruguay being well occupied with cattle ranches, so the development of cattle breeding and the substitution of ranches taken for agricultural purposes must fall chiefly on the area mentioned.

American cattle breeders who have had to go out of the cattle business through the rise in the price of their land and the encroachments of agriculture, are offered a profitable field for investment and for their activities in South America. Packing-houses have already been established by American interests at Buenos Aires, La Plata, Montevideo, and São Paulo (Brazil), and are in contemplation at other places. The United States has become an increasingly meat-importing nation, and there is no other place in the world beside South America which can give us the largely increased supplies of meat required.

Keeping the trade routes open, under all conditions, on both the East and West coasts of South America, including the Panama Canal, which is a condition sine qua non of the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, will prevent the shipping lines owned by the American Republics being disturbed in time of war, but it does not supply the present lack of shipping. Besides the handicap of our own Governmental regulations, the insuperable obstacle in the past to the establishment of American shipping lines has been the lack of sufficient tonnage of return cargo to the United States, as we ourselves have been exporters and not importers of wheat, corn, and, until lately, of the meat products, constituting the bulk of South American exports, as cocoa and rubber give a relatively small tonnage.

This situation will be entirely changed by bringing to the United States Brazilian iron ore, manganese, meat products; Argentine meat products, wool, flax, quebracho and extract of quebracho; Chilian nitrates and copper concentrates, and Bolivian tin concentrates for smelting in the United States. These will then furnish such a huge tonnage moving this way as to require not only the expected large increase of our exports of general merchandise to South America, but also a heavy tonnage of American coal to counterbalance it.

It may not be generally understood that it is the heavy tonnage of British coal exported, 97,719,000 tons in 1913,—

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about three-fifths of the tonnage of Britain's total exports, carried at times suiting the convenience of her steamship lines and affording them at the same time a sure and cheap supply of their own fuel,—which has been a determining factor in her preponderance in the ocean-carrying trade. The entry of America on a large scale into the coal trade of South America is likewise one of the main factors in the building up of a great American mercantile marine, and, until we have built it up, all calculations regarding raw materials and other supplies from South America as well as exports thereto are subject, as at present, to derangement at any time by happenings over which we have no control.

The mobilization of American securities by the British Government may furnish $1,250,000,000 to $1,500,000,000 of exchange, postponing for about nine months the necessity of finding further means of providing exchange to cover the balance of trade for munitions and supplies for herself and for her Allies. As long as the Dardanelles remain closed, Russia will be unable to export to advantage her grain and other products, so that her enormous requirements for munitions imported create a heavy adverse balance of trade which she can only meet through England's financial support. If the war should continue indefinitely, a further solution will be required for the exchange situation next autumn, and this can come about only through the sale of other properties which the only possible purchaser, the United States, might care to buy, pointing naturally to South American securities, of which England alone is estimated to own upwards of $3,000,000,000. In helping Europe to meet her needs in this way, we shall at the same time give to ourselves the most favourable form of investment to be made in South America in taking proven properties without the risk and delay usually attendant upon investments in new fields. Europe must realize that it is for her advantage that we consider this situation now; as otherwise, should a crisis arise requiring immediate action, our bankers and public might not be prepared with the necessary information on which to act.

PERCIVAL FARQUHAR.

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CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DISCONTENT

BY J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN

In these days when capital is being destroyed on an enormous scale in the European War, some fundamental ideas are gaining recognition by the mere logic of events which in the piping times of peace would have taken great pedagogical effort and much time to enforce. Unconsciously, the upheaval of industry in the belligerent countries is tied up in every one's mind with speculations as to the diminution in the supply of capital now and in the immediate future after the end of the war.

The fundamental problems for the laboring men, however, will not only remain, but their pressing importance will be intensified by all that is happening in the war.

In some way the belief has won a wide support that the empty-handed young workman is, and must remain, outside the sacred precincts of industrial success because he is denied the hope and possession of capital. Or, as it was expressed by an intelligent student: "What hope is there, under the present industrial system, for the disfranchised classes?" No doubt, the supposition that the laboring force is practically cut off from the possession and advantages of capital is the basis for the fundamental tenet of Socialism that the State should control all capitalistic instruments of production in the common interest.

The evolution of capitalistic forms has gone on since early times almost in geometrical progression until we have reached the amazing variety and efficiency of those of the present day. In a time of only rude forms of primitive capital the surplus left for savings was but small; and, in addition, the prevailing violence of the times gave little security to what was saved. But capital grew more rapidly as capitalistic forms increased. It is sometimes asserted

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that those of small incomes have no margin from which capital can be saved. The mere fact of the steady and marvelous growth of capital as the race has developed out of meagre, primitive resources is the final answer to any such claim. Capital has become an essential and powerful agent in production, separable from labor, exchangeable among men by loans, practically unlimited in supply, except as it may be limited by the saving propensities of mankind and by the materials (*e.g.*, wood and iron) out of which the concrete forms of capital may be made. Indeed, modern civilization, the everyday present well-being of the race, would be wholly impossible without the efficient aids which man has already created in the multifarious forms of capital.

Capital serves to discount long-continued processes of production. Since we can obtain more goods by the aid of capital than without, we move forward, by inventions touching specialized processes, to adopt methods absolutely impossible without more or less durable forms of capital. Thus satisfactions which meet varied wants become more abundant and cheaper only as industry is able to use more and more capital,—that is, only as production becomes more capitalistic. The only limit to this development, as has been said, is the self-control and ingenuity of the human mind. Hence, not only does capital change the relation of man to his environment and to his ability to satisfy increasing wants, but it enables him to create a system of industry involving an extensive quality of coöperation and division of labor (as against primitive individualism), which would be wholly impossible without it. This is the outcome of capitalism.

We thus come to see capitalism as a highly beneficent influence in the economic world. It has enlarged the comfort and range of consumption of the poorest toiler on the earth. That truth is unmistakable. Then why is it that in the labor literature of our day "capitalism" is used as a term of reproach, or objurgation? What really resides in the hopeless lament that the laboring classes are, in respect of capital, "disfranchised"?

Capitalism probably has the connotation in the minds of those who thus express themselves that it is responsible for the separation of mankind into employers and employees, into masters and servants. Why is it that in the world of industry some men are employers and some are employed?

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To some of those who have lately come from nations having privileged classes, where many are born to wealth without effort of their own, it may seem that all capital is unjustly owned by its possessors. But apart from inheritance, gifts by privilege, and robbery, the enormous mass of modern industrial capital has come into existence by a personal process of saving, by abstention from personal consumption in order to get it for productive uses. The origin of capital has both a psychic and a physical element. Given a strong desire to save, the amount of capital accumulated will vary with the margin from which savings can be made; or, given the margin, large or small, the amount saved will vary with the ability to realize the future. Anything, therefore, which will increase the power of the future over the present will, other things being equal, increase the amount of capital.

The creation and legitimate possession of capital, consequently, requires certain personal qualities,—willingness and imagination enough to weigh a future gain over against a present indulgence, self-control, patience, persistence, foresight, and prudence. Those who have these homely virtues become the possessors of capital, and hence employers of others; while those who have them not, and own no capital, must seek those who have capital; and hence are employed by others. The separation into the two great classes of the employers and the employed is thus due to differences in human qualities; differences, however, of a kind which can be removed by training, environment, and the development of character and civilization. Moreover, is it not a beneficent order of things by which material success—which appeals strongly to many who are deaf to ordinary moral and religious appeals—is set forth as a reward for the exercise of many of the simplest virtues? Indeed, one of the fundamental weaknesses of Socialism is that it promises to its votaries the possession of capital through the action of the State, without any personal sacrifice on their part and by removing the very stimulus to character and virtue laid upon them by the existing system of society—more or less faulty though that system may be in other ways.

We are logically forced to the conclusion, therefore, that there is no limit to the supply of this immensely powerful and necessary factor, capital, except the total increase of wealth over maintenance, and the willingness to save. There is, then, no possible monopoly in capital. By the spread of

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intelligence and science the total wealth from which savings can be made is increasing, precisely because new forms of capital are being constantly devised which are ever enlarging the productive forces of mankind. To this process there is no end. There is, also, no monopoly of the powers of men to labor or to postpone consumption. It is a matter to be decided only by the individual himself. He is not restrained or "disfranchised" by any power outside himself. If a young man with limited skill and intelligence ignorantly marries without having saved anything and immediately begets a large family of children, of course he finds it hard to save on a very small income; and hence he may regard the man who has already accumulated capital as a monopolist to whom he must go for employment. The situation, however, is one of the laborer's own creating; the fault is not in the existing system of society, nor in any limitation to capital, which can be saved by any one who is willing to comply with the rules of the game set by the character of human nature and our external environment. In short, the improvement of the position of the poorer laborer is largely dependent on internal ethical growth and self-control. The remedy is, in the main, not social, but personal.

Such being the essential reasons why some men are employers and others are employed, why some men have capital and others not, the very natural ambition of those who have meagre incomes to enlarge them has created what we have come to describe as "social discontent." It would be very unfortunate if those having little did not wish to have more of this world's goods, in order that they might be freed from the deadening effects of monotonous labor without the hope of a decent and cheerful environment. Therefore, "social discontent" is not a thing to be decried; but a thing which, if it did not exist, we should wish to create and stimulate as a means of establishing the very motive for progress in those who sometimes have no ambition and think they are "disfranchised" (in the industrial sense). Thus given the motive, how may we state the means to the given end? We are all agreed in wishing for larger incomes for those in the harder walks of the unskilled; but the really difficult thing is to come to an agreement upon the means of reaching the end desired by us all.

Perhaps the one instrumentality for increasing the shares of workingmen which has become sacrosanct in the

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labor world is the union. Is this a means likely to accomplish the desired end? Let us examine this means dispassionately, and solely with the aim of testing its probable efficacy for raising the standard of living, and for increasing the consumption, comfort, and enjoyment of the lower range of laborers.

The laborers are urged to regard "trade-unions as the means through which to work out their economic salvation."[1] Not only are unions to provide "just wages," but to bring about an equitable distribution of wealth:

> Trade-unionism stands for the constructive development of society, it seeks the more equitable distribution of wealth in order that all our people may develop to the extent of their highest and best possibilities.[2]

To such an extent has this type of mind gone in insisting on the union as the one agent at hand for bringing about a rise of wages and the progress upwards of the laboring classes that its vision is obscured for any other means—and this mainly on the ground that the union is the only practical means by which to reform an inequitable system of distribution. Tremendous energy has been put into the cause of Unionism in this behalf. That unions have an important place in our economic life no one doubts; but to suppose that the union is the solution of the problem of equitable distribution no one, in his economic senses, believes.

Elsewhere I have tried to emphasize the point—not new by any means—that unions are characterized by the basic principle of monopoly of labor. Their whole economic purpose is to try to raise wages at a given time and place by limiting the supply of labor obtainable by employers. To this it has been replied that "a labor-union is not a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade"; that no decision of the courts has declared that, under the anti-trust act, an organization of workmen "is an unlawful monopoly." Of course not; nor is any lawful organization. The real point at issue is: Does this or that particular combination of laborers commit acts in restraint of trade? If it does, it comes under the penalties of the act, as in the case of the Danbury Hatters.

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[1] John Mitchell: "The Economic Necessity of Trade-Unionism," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1914.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

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Moreover, in reply to the truism that unions are based on the principle of monopoly, a somewhat irrelevant reply[1] is given that a distinction should be made between organizations formed to control the prices of commodities such as the necessities of life (referring, of course, to the so-called trusts), and those "formed for the purpose of defending and promoting the interests of the wage-earners" (meaning, of course, labor-unions). This is obviously an appeal to the feeling of humanity which should not regard human beings as if they were inanimate goods. Of course labor stands in a different category from goods, and the conditions affecting their supply are entirely different: on that we are all agreed. But that distinction is irrelevant to the point at issue. There are organizations of men known as producers "for the purpose of defending and promoting their interests," and there are organizations of men, known as laborers "for the purpose of defending and promoting their interests." Both are organizations of men; and both are subject to the same law regulating the actions of men, if either should attempt to restrain trade. It is sophistical to speak as if one group were affected by law, and the other not.

This sophistical reasoning goes farther. It is claimed that the Anti-trust Act was never intended to apply to organizations having no capital stock, not dealing in products of labor, and not organized for a profit. It can make no more difference whether an organization violating the law has capital stock or not than whether a violator of the peace has blue eyes or brown eyes. It can make no difference what a combination ostensibly deals in, or whether its profits are large or small; the real issue must always be, has it violated the law of the land? Why then should any one be pained to find unions included under the provisions of the Anti-trust Act? They could not be included merely as organizations, no matter what their purpose, if they did nothing objectionable under the law. If the members of a union are proved to have restrained trade there is no reason why they should not be regarded as violators of the law as well as any other persons or organizations.

Since the formative principle of a union is a restriction of employment to its own members, the attitude of labor leaders to it is highly important. It bears on the large

[1] John Mitchell, *supra*, p. 164.

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question of the proper means by which the workingmen may better their position. This attitude is briefly summed up as follows:[1]

> If it eventually should be held that labor-unions as such are monopolies in restraint of trade and thus subject to dissolution by order of the court, no greater disaster to the orderly, rational and constructive development and progress of the wage-earning masses will have occurred.

Obviously no union whose acts are lawful is in danger of dissolution. "Trade-unions," it is claimed, "strive for peace based upon industrial righteousness."[2] The inference is that whatever, in the eyes of the Unionists, is "industrial righteousness," whether forbidden by law or not, should be allowed to unions without danger of dissolution. Who is to decide what it is? The union is to remain peaceful, provided there is allowed to it what it itself interprets to be "industrial righteousness."

Quite apart from the abuses of union organization (which are separable from the legitimate services of unions), the economic function of the union is what most concerns us. Taking it at its best, can it produce the results claimed for it?

As has been said, the essential principle of it is the monopoly of labor. It can accomplish its aim of raising the wages of its members only by the limitation of competitors. If the whole supply of labor were under control, then the union could produce a complete monopoly and fix price; but since this is, humanly speaking, impracticable, there can be attempts at fixing price only by artificial monopoly. The reason of this failure to function as a perfect monopoly is obvious. The supply of labor through births cannot be controlled by unions, as now conducted. If the supply of workers is certain to come forward for physiological reasons quite irrespective of union policy, it is useless to assume any power by unions to fix prices of labor through control of supply. And yet that is the central theory of Unionism.

Are unions indeed the only means at hand to accomplish "the orderly, rational and constructive development and progress of the wage-earning masses"? The statement

[1] John Mitchell, *supra*, p. 163.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 162.

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made in John Stuart Mill's day still remains true, that the extraordinary progress made in industrial output and efficiency of production for many decades has not been accompanied by a corresponding enlargement in the income and consumption of the wage-receiving classes; because numbers have increased as production has advanced, and a larger total dividend has been spread over more divisors, giving to each laborer a not much larger quotient than before. If this be true, the future progress of the laboring population depends upon something more than fractional advances in their wages. Is it not beginning to dawn upon the real friends of labor that betterment cannot be permanently or even sensibly advanced so long as men are merely receivers of wages? The union, however, assumes that all depends upon the matter of wages. And yet, looking back, can any sympathetic friend of labor be satisfied with the gains which the workers of our race have won through the mere receipt of wages?

The central reason why the union is not a means competent to solve the problem of an inequitable system of distribution is that it confines its attempts to control the price of labor to a means of controlling supply which is really illusory. Moreover, the price of anything is also affected by whatever touches the demand for it. The thing to be acquired must have such qualities as will excite in the demander a belief that it will satisfy his need. Granting the need, and the ability to pay, the price will be affected by the utility of the thing to be marketed. Other things being equal, the greater the efficiency or utility of labor the greater the demand for it. This is one reason why skilled labor may command higher wages than unskilled. Does the union aim to develop efficiency and utility in labor, in order to obtain higher wages? Not usually.

Another economic difficulty has been blinked by those who rest their hopes alone on wages, and try to connect the wages to be paid with the value of the product turned out. Even some respectable authorities fail to see that two separate processes of valuation are going on, each independent of the other, both in time and in conditions of demand and supply. The bargaining for wages to workmen goes on at a time before the goods on which they are working have been produced; and labor leaders are right who insist that the supply of labor and the demand for it are affected by all that

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characterizes human beings on the one hand as distinct from those that characterize inorganic matter on the other. The supply of labor comes forward as a result of the strongest instinct in human beings; and the demand for labor can come only from those who can pay for it (*i. e.*, with funds saved). On the other hand, the finished product is priced at a time after the bargaining for labor has been settled; and the supply of goods comes forward in answer to an offer of purchasing power, and under conditions influenced by efficiency of production, the condition of the arts, inventions, divisions of labor and the like. The price-making process, therefore, is clearly distinct in time and conditions for labor on the one hand, and goods on the other. The obvious conclusion from this admitted fact, then, is that methods of raising wages must be of a kind to affect the pricing of labor, and are more or less remote from those affecting the pricing of goods.

The upshot of the whole matter is clear in logic and in experience. Permanently to raise wages of any group of laborers, we must raise their productive power, or their utility, to the demander. To do that is to place them, by natural monopoly, in the class of the skilled, where their numbers are more or less limited relatively to the unskilled. In other words, supply is directly affected to the permanent advantage of those included. Thus the artificial monopoly of the union (which mistakenly aims at restriction of supply without an advance in quality) is avoided.

More than this, the mere receivers of wages, in bargaining for a definite wage before work is undertaken, thereby contract themselves out of risk. If the pricing of goods goes wrong and a loss to the employer results, the claim of the receiver of wages is unimpaired. But as the wage-getter is thus freed from all risk he is also cut off from all exceptional gains. The factor assuming industrial risk is the one that obtains all exceptional, or differential, gains or losses due to unexpected changes affecting the price of goods. In a young country like the United States a well-established business gains in volume by the mere growth of population and industry. Moreover, the resources and opportunities of such a country are but partly known, and are constantly opening to the enterprising man who can control capital. These new enterprises, since accompanied by more or less risk, if successful, bring in exceptional gains. In addition,

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the land of the new country rises in value as it is more densely settled; in fact, most farmers of the last generation have gained less by raising crops than by the rise in the price of land.

Consequently we are obliged not only by experience but by economic analysis to face the fact that the improvement of the wage-earning masses can be gained only by a policy quite different from the one accepted in the past, and which forms the essence of Unionism. To rise to a higher level the laborer must get some of the advantages possessed by the employer and the risk-taker, and thus obtain some of the inevitable differential gains characteristic of a new and growing country. In short, the true remedy for a healthy "social discontent" is more capitalism. Heterodox as this advice may seem, the more it is pondered the more practical, effective and successful it will prove.

The differences marking off the possessors of capital from those who have none are due, as already pointed out, to differences in training and in human qualities. There is no monopoly in existence to prevent any person from acquiring the power to weigh a future gain over against a present indulgence, to get self-control, patience, foresight, prudence, thrift, and good judgment. No one has been thus "disfranchised." If a person has these qualities, he inevitably becomes a possessor of savings, and is thus a capitalist. The qualities which come with the saving of capital will also work to restrict imprudent marriages and the birth of more children than can be properly fed and educated. In short, by directing attention to the development in the laborers of certain essential qualities, and calling upon all the educative forces of philanthropy and organized society to aid in that purpose, we shall answer "social discontent" by some permanent gains to industrial efficiency and wages, and bring to the support of the wage-earning masses the wide-reaching influences of capitalism.

J. Laurence Laughlin.

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IS PROHIBITION AMERICAN?

L. AMES BROWN

In a speech at the dedication of the Imperial Naval Academy at Murvik, in 1910, the Emperor of Germany said:

> The next war, the next naval encounter, will require of you sound nerves. These are undermined by alcohol, endangered from youth up by its use. . . . Then the word will be, strong nerves and cool heads. *The nation which drinks the least alcohol will be the winner.*

In August, 1915, after a year's devastation of the world war, "the next war," when America had learned of the Imperial *ukase* establishing prohibition in Russia, the prohibition of absinthe in France, and the stringent regulatory measures adopted in England, as means of increasing the efficiency of these nations, the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, gave an interview to an American newspaper correspondent, from which I quote the following:

> 'Is prohibition of the sale of liquor an active issue in the United States?'
>
> 'Yes, your Excellency, we have many States in which the sale of intoxicants is forbidden. Recently the question of adopting a constitutional amendment was brought up in Congress and received very considerable support.'
>
> 'Most interesting,' said the Chancellor. 'A movement of that sort would make no headway in Germany. The people would regard it as an absolutely unwarranted interference with their personal liberty.'

In this connection, let it be noted that, so far as the outside world has been informed, the chief measure affecting the consumption of alcohol adopted by Germany since the outbreak of the war is an order limiting the quantity of hops which may be used in the manufacture of beer. Practically all the German regulatory measures are solely for economic reasons.

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The foregoing exhibit of facts is put forward at the opening of this paper as indicating the attitude of the most efficient Government in the world toward prohibition as a means of promoting efficiency. It seems well worth while to emphasize the viewpoint of this high authority on efficiency in introducing a discussion of the chief new element in the American prohibition movement. I mean the efficiency propaganda. That is the element which, above all others, has produced the important motive power we observe in the American prohibition movement today, which has procured for it extensive support from the capitalistic portion of our people, and which, in a sense, is responsible for its differentiation from that earlier prohibition movement so completely repudiated by an intelligent group of States in the decade following 1860. While the propaganda of prohibition still is pre-eminently a moral one, and while it is still the moral side which is relied upon for support in many of the States, the conclusion is inescapable, from a study of this propaganda, that the extra-religious support which vitalizes it today has been gained through its attempted assimilation of the gospel of mental and physical efficiency which now stands so firmly embodied in our national character.

Study the propaganda as it is now being carried forward. Its new elements relate to the material benefits to be derived from prohibition—the percentage of workingmen's wages, percentages of increase of wealth, destruction of money spent for drink, decreases in industrial accidents, removal of the drain upon workingmen's compensation funds, and a general capacitation of the man who works. These have become the principal items in the prohibitionists' appeal to industrial capital. These are the things which may enable some of us to forget certain fundamentals of our Government—States' rights, individuals' rights, democracy—in asking the Federal Government to perform the parental function of insuring that we be led out of the way of temptation.

War places such premiums on efficiency! We have noted that here in America. We are striving hard to learn this lesson well. Few of us but have felt a new inspiration to cast aside the superfluous and make better use of the strength in us. Are we to be more prone than heretofore to ignore some of the fundamental lessons to be drawn from a consideration of the Hobson propaganda?

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Let us note that this movement for efficiency through prohibition impugns the efficiency of the form of government upon which we have relied since America embarked upon this great adventure, having the hopes of all liberty-aspiring peoples aligned with her. The control of alcohol must be centralized, the prohibitionist tells us; in this instance we must turn, unless our ambitions be thwarted, to a more efficient form of government control than is offered under the present balance of powers between the States and the National Government. The typical American will be slow, however, to forget the lessons of the growth of our liberty, nor will he be willing, for a purpose not well weighed, to abandon anything of the progress we have made. He is not likely to overlook the fact that, in asking the Federal Government to compel moral and physical well-being through prohibition, the country will be turning back to the older idea of government to which the democratic ideal offered its thrilling challenge some two centuries ago.

Beyond peradventure, Germany has applied this older idea of government more efficiently than has any other nation in modern times. She has at once the most efficient and at the same time the most centralized form of government which now exists. Unrestrained by ideals of democracy, she has been enabled to furnish an object lesson of the highly centralized government which has caused some among us to wonder if our essentially different form is capable of as great usefulness. But even Germany has held back from that centralization measure now advocated in the United States. Despite the estimate of abstinence as promotive of war efficiency, expressed in the Kaiser's Murvik speech, the German Chancellor tells us that his Government would not dare propose prohibition.

Undoubtedly, when the future student of the philosophy of government begins to make a critical analysis of political developments of our times, he will regard many of them as peculiar anomalies. He will wonder perhaps at the willingness with which the American people have accepted the extension of a system of government by commission. Doubtless, other governmental changes are in store for us which he will reduce to the same irreconcilable category. National prohibition, if it comes, however, will be regarded as preeminent in this category. It cannot fail to be regarded as a movement fostered in the electorate through the ignoring

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of one of the fundamentals of that plan of government to which all of our characteristic political commitments supposedly are reconciled.

The Constitution of the United States embodies the principle of governmental Americanism. It is not merely a set of laws providing how our statutes shall be drafted. It is a set of principles, or, more exactly, the principle of our Government, and as such must be an organic whole. It cannot be a patchwork. Its various parts must co-ordinate in order that it retain its vital character. It cannot retain this character, this unity, if there are to be written into it provisions for the nullification, as regards certain phases of our national life, of those older fundamentals embodied in it at a time when it composed a unit of thought.

Another point at which the prohibition movement of to-day diverges from democratic ideals of government is the commingling of the Church and politics which it has brought about. The separation of the Church from the State, the establishment of a civilization in which there should be not only religious independence, but also governmental freedom from the influence of religious institutions, was one of the main intentions of those who launched America upon her destiny. In no earlier period of our history have the American people tolerated an extensive, open effort of any church, or of any set of churchmen, to sway the course of our politics or the policies of our Government.

An able exposition of this principle was embodied in an editorial written by the present Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Josephus Daniels, several years ago, when a church organization in North Carolina projected a movement to minimize the annual appropriations of the State Legislature for the support of the State University. It was captioned, "No State Church—No Church State," and so ably did it present the danger of an extended series of activities similar to those this set of churchmen had directed against the State University, that the movement disintegrated.

As late as January 12, 1916, a peculiarly impressive instance of the participation of clergymen in the Anti-Saloon League's campaign in New York was furnished by the issuance of a call from the League's headquarters in New York City "to the clergymen of New York State," signed by some eighty New York clergymen and conveying this request:

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The passage of similar legislation (referring to the advocated State measure) has been greatly facilitated in other States by what is known as a 'concerted discussion' on this specific issue on one day, simultaneously, throughout the State. We, therefore, join in requesting that you unite with the churches generally throughout New York State in bringing this matter to the attention of your congregation on Sunday, January 30, 1916, to the end that they may write or petition their representatives in the legislature to grant this relief to the people of this and other cities in the Empire State.

The prohibition movement throughout the nation started as a semi-religious movement. The pulpit has been the prohibitionists' stump. The campaign in many States has been conducted largely from the churches. Most of the pre-eminent leaders in the national movement, as well as that in the States, have a "D. D." affixed to their names. One of the big instrumentalities in forcing members of Congress into line to vote for the Hobson resolution was not only the fear that they would be denounced from the accustomed sources of political anathema, but the certainty that they would be "preached against," that they would be denounced by clergymen as payees of the Whiskey Trust, and that this stigma, just or unjust, would be impressed upon their characters as understood by the mothers and other non-voting individuals in their Congressional Districts in a measure not open to any other sort of political castigation.

The philosophy of government is not the only vantage point from which interesting questions are discernible for the student of Americanism. Careful consideration of the American character, with its pre-eminent individualism, will disclose a new inconsistency in the development of prohibition. This relates to the form of the morality to be achieved. A doctrine of salvation through the removal of temptation, of righteousness made possible by lack of opportunity for sinning, such as the prohibition movement represents, never has been typical of the American character. Rather have we believed that the "robust tone" of our national character was achievable only through the resistance of those elements which assailed it. American character has no negative quality. Established superiority to hardship and temptation has been its most admired attribute. The philosophy of sinless isolation has had few protagonists among us.

One way to a sinless life lies through the cloister. Some close resemblance to this is borne by the prohibition of

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temptation. Both have the same idea of enabling human nature to escape temptation, and neither will produce character of that fibrous sort which Americanism has come to typify.

So practical are we become, however, that we give less thought to the means by which an admirable end is to be achieved than heretofore. Social service openly antagonizes the principle that the ability to overcome temptation is a necessary element of well-being. In our day there is a growing disposition to accept ideals of social service which will lead, through legislation as well as other instrumentalities, to the protection of the weaker ones by an enforced avoidance of the operation of the law of the survival of the fittest. The line of cleavage between prohibition of intoxicants as a character measure and the impulses which dominate us today is not as distinct, therefore, as in the earlier history of the nation.

The prohibitionist endeavors to reduce the philosophy I have stated to an absurd conclusion by asking whether one disapproves of the prohibition of narcotics. Frequently one hears a prohibition debater state that the prohibition of narcotics and that of alcoholic beverages differ in no essential points. It is to be observed, however, that the drug habit never has laid its hand upon a percentage of our people comparable to that which uses alcohol in some form, and that the odium which attaches to any sort of indulgence in narcotics never has been applied to the restrained use of intoxicants. The two temptations differ in this: that any sort of indulgence in the one results in disintegration of character and a measure of disgrace, while only the loss of self-control involves these results in the use of intoxicants.

Confidence in Americanism, in the ability of the composite mind of the nation to guide to a better destiny, demands progress in the matter of drink reform. The American people are turning steadily to the question of temperance and there is no doubt in my mind that the next few decades will see some startling advances made in this direction. It may be that the people will decide that nation-wide prohibition is not the remedy we should apply to intemperance, but will choose measures more consistent with our fundamental ideals and more responsive to the varying conditions of public sentiment in different localities. We have a compelling interest in mental and physical efficiency, and

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never was there a higher degree of resolve to promote this interest than exists in the nation today. It is to expected, for one thing, that important steps will be taken to brush aside the obstacles placed in the way of political and material progress by the saloons and saloon keepers. The city saloon as an institution has disclosed itself oftentimes to be an influence inimical to political well being. It has mingled too freely in politics and exerted a too-intimate control over the political affiliation of foreign-born citizens and others of the laboring classes. The wrongs which are by-products of saloon operation may be remedied, and inevitably will be remedied, through an awakening of the civic consciousness to their existence and their harmfulness. Temperance, too, will be achieved by education and by modifications of the regulatory measures already devised, or new ones may seem better to meet the needs of future conditions. Some of the newer prohibition States have recently given evidence of vigor in the enforcement of the State laws—although in the main by statutes partially limiting consumption—which may hold out a promise for future improvement. Progress may be made along this line. The one fact in which I have most confidence, however, is that the nation will not attempt the unnatural and impossible act of making a clean sweep of drinking by a single change in law. American temperance will be achieved, if at all, by a growth toward it, slow perhaps, but well ordered, and certain of no recession from the advantages gained. This will be true if we preserve our characteristic conservatism in dealing with big questions and our characteristic stubbornness in relinquishing the good which we achieve. Whatever be the course of the great temperance movement, of which the Hobson movement is but a single and, in comparison, an unimportant manifestation, I am sure that no intellectually honest citizen will feel that harm has been done in making an unbiased presentation of the faults in the Hobson movement, which are discernible in the light of the fundamental principles that always have guided our progress.

L. Ames Brown.

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LIFE THE TRAVELER

BY JOHN BURROUGHS

WHEN I was a boy and studied astronomy at school I thought of Kepler's *radius vector* as a real thing that played an important part in celestial mechanics. Later, in following Darwin's theory of animal evolution, I found the same tendency in myself and in others to objectify natural selection and regard it as a positive agent or principle that controlled and determined the origin of species.

Darwinians are prone to imply that Nature selects as man selects, by positive interference. Even so great a natural philosopher as Weismann speaks of natural selections as a positive force. He says in so many words that it "is the cause of a great part of the physical evolution of organisms on the earth—the guiding factor of evolution which creates what is new out of the transmissible variations, by ordering and arranging them, selecting them in relation to their number and size, *as the architect does his building stone, so that a particular style may result"!* (The italics are mine.) Natural selection, then, according to this ultra-Darwinian, is something that knows what it wants from the first, as the architect does when he begins his building, or as the breeder does, say, when he sets out to produce a pouter or a tumbler pigeon.

In his work on Heredity, Weismann proceeds further to illustrate his conception of the positive character of natural selection in originating new species, by comparing it to a traveler on a journey. His traveler proceeds from a certain point on foot by short stages at any given time and in any direction—the direction being determined by the lay of the land, and by its features of mountain, wood, and stream, and other obstacles. He will take the line of least resistance. But if he is a real traveler, and not a vagrant, an aimless

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wanderer in the wilderness, will he not be going somewhere, aiming at some predetermined goal? Some purpose, and not the lay of the land, set him traveling; he will keep, in a general way, a given direction. His course will be modified more or less by the obstacles he encounters, but these obstacles will not keep him going, nor determine his goal.

Will the organizing impulse, set aimlessly wandering in the wilderness of inert matter, and taking only the line of least resistance, finally attain to all the beautiful and wonderful living forms that people the earth? Will it evolve the fish, the bird, the mammal, and finally man? Do we find anything in the constitution of the primary elements that foreshadows these things? Or in organized matter itself? Could we infer the bird from the reptile? or man from the unreasoning brute?

Even if we accept Weismann's conception of natural selection as like unto a man on a journey in a pathless wilderness, do we not still want some explanation of why he has undertaken the journey and what his ultimate goal may be? A man lost in the woods or in the desert wanders blindly on in a circle and gets nowhere. Could evolution ever have arrived at man had not man, in some way beyond our power to grasp, been potential in the primal organizing impulse? And so of all other forms? But Weismann's traveler does not know where he is going, but he goes where "the most tortuous and winding route leads him." There is no intelligence in the matter, there is only blind groping. Then Weismann's traveler starts on his journey as one of the very low forms of life, and by sheer luck, and by blindly running the gauntlet of all the countless hazards of the long geologic ages, he ends as man. Other forms on the same journey, through the law of probability, end as reptiles, or birds, or butterflies, or quadrupeds. It is all a chance throw of the dice. A stream of water starting on the mountainside takes the easiest way and reaches the river or the lake or the sea. It is all a matter of physics. Whether it flow north or south or east or west depends upon the lay of the land. All its loopings and doublings are, in a measure, accidental. But it ends as it began, a stream of water and only that. But the stream of life begins in definite forms, and, as it flows on, changes perpetually and increasingly into higher and more complex forms. Its physics and chemistry are the same as that of the stream of non-living bodies, its elements are the

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same, but changes and transformations take place of which non-living forms know nothing. Of course the fortuitous plays a part in the course of the living as in that of the non-living, but it plays an entirely secondary part. The seeds that fall upon rocky or barren places do not sprout, and they fall where the chance winds or floods drop them.

We may never be able to make a logical statement about this something here hinted at, but that there is no controlling purpose in organic nature, that the eye, the heart, the brain of man, are mere molecular accidents, like a profile in the rocks, or a face in the clouds, is unthinkable. Natural selection does not work on dead things, and it does not beget life, and in the origin of species it can only play a secondary part. As has been said, it may, in a measure, account for the survival of the fittest, but not for the arrival of the fittest.

Natural selection is only a name for a weeding out or eliminating process, and were it not for the inherent tendency to development which organisms possess, coupled with the variations that result from environmental influences, natural selection would have nothing to go upon. It is the conflict between the push of life and the obstacles which it encounters that results in the survival of the fittest. The prime factor in the origin of species is this aboriginal push or organizing tendency, the modifying factor is the stress of the environment. Are we not compelled to look upon organic nature as a whole, and to say that it knows from the first what it wanted, and the means to obtain it? Could any struggle for life of the lower organisms have resulted in the higher forms had not these forms been in some way predicated in the lower? The German biologist and philosopher makes this struggle creative. It does not merely bring out inherent capabilities, it begets those capabilities *de novo*. Natural selection is all potent. "No leaves or flowers," he says, "no digestion or system, no lungs, legs, wings, bones, or muscles, were present in the primitive forms, and all these must have arisen from them according to the principle of natural selection." Natural selection invented and perfected the wonderful piece of mechanism we know as the human body. The kidneys, the liver, the lungs, the heart, the brain, the eye, the hand, the double circulation,—all the result of chance, or the hit-and-miss method of the blind irrational physical and chemical forces!

Why these forces left some forms so low down in the

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animal scale, and carried others so much higher up, does not appear. Natural selection has shown great partiality. Weismann admits that "these primitive forms were in a certain sense predestined to development." The traveler was predestined to get out of the woods and reach his goal, but only in case he had a goal, and knew in what direction it lay.

Does not the plasticity of living forms, this power of adaptation, their capacity to profit by fortuitous circumstances, imply something super-mechanical and super-chemical that natural selection could neither give nor take away?

Behold an army on a forced march; see the weak and incompetent fall out and drop by the wayside. That is natural selection—the survival of the fittest; only the strongest and the least handicapped reach the goal. The only positive things are the plans of the commanding general, and the impulse that sends the troops forward. Darwin himself never looked upon natural selection as a cause, or in any sense a directing agent, but as a name for a process—a sifting process that lead to the survival of the most fit. Darwinism makes no account of the evolutionary impulse—the constant push of life that lies back of, and makes possible, this drama of creation. Development implies an inward tendency to development—something that profits by development. The myriad of living forms could only arrive under the pressure of an organizing tendency in living matter. Natural selection may trim the tree, but it does not plant it, nor make it grow, nor prescribe one form to the pine and another to the oak. Do we not have to think of all these things as involved in the mystery of the evolutionary impulse itself? What that impulse is, in the terms of the rest of our knowledge, or whence it comes, and how it adheres to matter, is one of the fundamental mysteries.

More than any other man of our era, Charles Darwin is responsible for the tremendous growth which biological science has made in our time. No matter whether his theory of natural selection as an adequate explanation of the origin of species stands the test of time or not. It aroused men's minds to the feasibility of the subject for scientific investigation. The questions Darwin put to Nature were all fruitful and stimulating. Whether he got the right answers or not, he showed men how to question and cross-question her, and showed that she was not so dumb as we had thought. Dar-

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win loosed the whole animal world from its moorings in the theory of the fixity of species, and set it afloat on the sea of change. His solution of the origin of the various forms is bound to be greatly modified, maybe negatived altogether, but he did a mighty service to biological science in simply raising the question of their instability, and in calling attention to the natural grounds upon which their stereotyped characters may be questioned. Life is so fluid and elastic, so various and adaptive, that, on *a priori* grounds, one would say that species are not rigid and fixed. Darwin's proof that they are not is overwhelming, and his provisional explanation of how their origin was brought about is stimulating if not convincing.

Darwin made no attempt to grapple with the question of the nature and origin of life itself, but only with the evolution of the many forms of life. He was not a laboratory naturalist, but a student of the drama of animate nature as it is enacted on the earth's surface. He held to the special and miraculous creation-theory of his fathers, but limited it to one or more forms. Out of this beginning, he thought, through the fortuitous operation of natural selection, all the myriad forms of life have been evolved. This is Darwinism in its simplest terms—a miraculous beginning of life, but a natural unfolding.

Darwin formed his ideas of natural selection upon artificial selection, but the two are fundamentally unlike. There is an active agent involved in the one case, which has specific and limited ends to attain, and hence which thwarts the tendencies of nature. But what is the active agent corresponding to man, in the other? Natural selection is the name for a process set going and kept going by the push or evolutionary impulse. It is natural rejection as well. It is not an arbitrary interference with the course of Nature, like artificial selection. It is not the name of a force or of an active principle, as seems so often implied, but an explanation of the survival of the fittest, or the best equipped, for the natural competitions of life. Artificial selection is man at the helm guiding the vessel; natural selection, on Darwin's own theory of fortuitous variation, is like a fleet of vessels unequally equipped, all drifting with the wind and tide, and only the most staunch and sea-worthy ones by good luck reaching some port.

When Darwin declares that "if organic beings had not

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possessed an inherent tendency to vary, man could have done nothing" in modifying species or in developing new ones, he unwittingly takes the process of evolution out of the mechanical or automatic series, and places it in another and higher order; he recognizes the original push of life which is the central thought of Bergson's *Creative Evolution.* Variability is certainly a characteristic of living bodies to an extent and in a sense that it is not characteristic of non-living. Creative evolution is only the principle of growth illustrated by the whole biological series; there is the inherent tendency to grow, to develop, which is characteristic of all life. It may be true that the initial variation is caused by slight changes in the conditions of life, yet the variations could not be initiated in a non-growing, a non-vital, a non-developing body. Darwin had a vision of spontaneously varying organisms, the form their variations should take determined by outward conditions, or contingent upon them, but the inward push and plasticity of life is implied in his theories. He saw a world of living forms arise and people the earth under the action of natural selection, but natural selection working on an ever-growing, expanding, irrepressible self-renewing vital impulse. Natural selection can do nothing without variation, and variation springs from an inherent tendency to vary. Outward conditions determine in the same way the course and the form that water from a fountain shall assume, but it plays no part in the pushing and flowing properties of the water itself. Darwin took pains to say that "there is no innate or necessary tendency in each being to its own advancement in the scale of organization," but is not the innate tendency to vary the first step in this advancement?

If the unfit arrives, it is cut off by the stress of the struggle for life, but it is unfit only so far as it is malformed or feeble; the unfit in any other sense never arrives. I saw a two-headed trout recently in a collection of several hundred thousand fingerlings. It was a year old. It was unfit to survive, and in a state of nature would soon have perished, but it had been isolated and carefully looked after. Artificial selection had preserved it. How long it can thus be preserved against natural selection is a question. Pouter and fan-tailed pigeons are preserved by artificial selection against the working of natural selection. Nature's interest lies not in such extreme forms, but in forms nearer

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the mean—the rock dove, the wood pigeon, the fan-tailed pigeon, and the like. The myriad forms of fish in the water, of birds and insects in the air, of quadrupeds and bipeds on the land, are all equally fit to survive, and do survive, because each has its full measure of life, and finds its place in the total scheme of life. If the invertebrate gave rise to the vertebrate, or the reptile gave rise to the bird, or the lower mammals gave rise to the higher, it was not because the former were unfit to survive; they did survive, and still survive: but because the evolutionary impulse is inherent in the first forms of life, and was stimulated, rather than stamped out, by the vicissitudes of time. Is it thinkable that man could have arisen from the man-like apes by the mere clash and friction of an irrational environment alone? Is one man superior to another by reason of outward conditions, and the discipline of life alone? Is the secret of Plato or Paul or Shakespeare or Lincoln in the keeping of pans and pots? Man arose from his humbler ancestors because the manward impulse, in some way beyond our ken, was inherent in the evolutionary impulse. Man was potential in the monkey. He might never have arrived had the race of monkeys been cut off, say in Eocene times. But it was not cut off, and here we are, and rather ashamed of our forebears. One has to say that all other forms of life, down to the flea and the cockroach, were also potential in the life impulse—the enemies of man as well as his friends.

The three-toed woodpecker evidently gets on as well as the four-toed; the downy as well as his larger and more powerful brother, the hairy; the creepers and the nuthatches, with their slender beaks, as well as those with more powerful beaks; animals without legs, as snakes, as well as animals with legs; and the bipeds flourish as well as the quadrupeds; birds without the power of flight also flourish; animals with horns succeed no better than animals without horns. Natural selection works in each species, weeding out the weak and the imperfect, but the competition among species has only the effect of clinching and developing the species, not in originating new ones.

The key word of evolution is organic effort, the inherent impetus of life. No conjuring with merely mechanical forces can, in my opinion, account for the upward or aspiring tendency of organic nature. Life struggled out of the fish into the reptile, and out of the reptile into the bird, but left these

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forms still flourishing behind it. According to natural selection these unfit forms ought all to have gone out. The fish is as fit to survive as the reptile, and the reptile as fit as the bird and the mammal, and the mammal as fit as man; the invertebrate as fit as the vertebrate. The individuals of these species that do not survive are cut off by accident largely, then by reason of low vitality, or a scant measure of life. The competition with other living forms plays only a secondary part. I fancy that all the animals of any and every kind that are well born, that is, with a normal life endowment, thrive equally well and survive equally well, except so far as accident enters into the problem. If food is scarce, they go hungry together, until those enfeebled by age, and other things, are eliminated.

The variations which lead up to the formation of a new species are so insensible, they stretch over such a vast period of time, that their survival value from generation to generation is and must be very slight. Take the case of the horse, for instance:

The development of the horse seems to stretch over a period of at least three millions of years, or from the eohippus of Eocene times, an animal less than two feet high, and probably weighing less than one hundred pounds, to the horse of late Tertiary times, the pliohippus, much like the superb creature we know to-day, five feet high, and weighing ten or twelve hundred pounds. If this animal increased in height only one quarter of an inch in ten thousand years, he would be six feet high in less than two million years. So if we allow him 3,000,000 years to develop in, his increase in height must have been even less than one fourth of an inch in ten thousand years. Think of it! Our horse of today might be increasing or diminishing in size at that rate and the fact never be noticed during the whole period. In weight the same: one eighth of a pound in one hundred years, and he would weigh fourteen thousand pounds in less than two million years, a rate of increase that our scales would hardly detect in a century of time. The transformations of the other animals have probably been equally slow. Science would feel safe in saying that a flying fish never becomes a bird, but can we conceive how slight the change would have to be in every one thousand years to bring it about in geologic or biologic time?

Where does such an estimate leave natural selection?

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Of what survival advantage to the eohippus could the gain of an inch in height in forty thousand years, or of one pound of weight in four hundred years, amount to? Such an application of mathematics to the problem of evolution leaves us with the conviction that there is something else at work besides natural selection. Could natural selection work on a capital of a gain of the one one-hundredth of an inch in height in four hundred years? There must have been an inherent tendency to increase in size and to all the various modifications—a primal push, as Bergson urges. With man it has no doubt been the same. His evolution has been so infinitely slow, that the mechanical conception of it is utterly inadequate. It is very likely that his line of descent in Miocene times was through a small animal form probably no larger than a new-born baby.

Or take the case of the elephant: these forms changed and enlarged under the discipline of their environment—the augmenting force or impulse within always meeting and filling the changing needs from without. The size of the channel of the stream kept pace with the increasing size of the stream. The stream branches or divides when some obstacle intervenes; but the obstacle does not account for the new branch, but only for the form it takes and the direction it flows. The four-toed horse was evidently just as fit to survive as the one-toed, as is evinced by the fact that it did survive for millions of years, but it eventuated in a series of progressive forms because of the push of life meeting and utilizing the changing outward conditions.

Life got out of the sea upon the land and developed lungs instead of gills, and legs instead of fins, not because the competition in the sea drove it out, but because of this primal push and aspiration to new forms.

Life is so flexible and adaptive, the table which Nature spreads for her creatures is so varied and bountiful, that the most delicate and minute forms survive as well as the large and powerful, and finally outlast them. Size and strength count in the arena where they are the determining factors. If other things did not count, the vast army of lesser creatures, with man at their head, would not have been here. The early gigantic forms did not prevail. The savage and powerful carnivorous animals do not exterminate the weaker herbivorous. Professor Bailey well says that "The minor things and the weak things are the most numerous, and they

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have played the greatest part in the polity of Nature." "The whole contrivance of Nature is to protect the weak." Rather, I should say, Nature has a thousand contrivances to protect the weak and defenceless.

Henri Bergson's conception of the creative energy as struggling with matter, hampered and delayed, and often defeated by it, subject to what we call chance or contingency, like us mortals—taking half a loaf when it cannot get a whole one, seems to be a fruitful conception in explaining the condition of life as we see it, past and present, on this planet. There has been a steady struggle and progression toward higher forms from the first. The creative energy shows itself to be very human, very fallible, often vacillating and short-sighted. Indeed, man is the image of his maker in this respect. God has gone on with his work very much as man goes on with his, blundering, experimenting, but doing the best he could. I spent an hour in a medical museum recently and was nearly made sick by what I saw there, such failures, such monstrosities, such miscarriages of life, such deformities, such evidence of pain and agony —men no more exempt in this respect than pigs or monkeys, children impotent to be born, or brainless, or with only one eye—what did it all mean? It meant, if it meant anything, that the life impulse, or life energy, was subject to the accidents and uncertainties of time and chance, before birth as after, and that we are part of a system of things that seems struggling to a goal, but is delayed in reaching it, and, furthermore, that the goal is not an end in itself. The Eternal seems to indulge his creative energy just as an artist does for the sake of self-expression—the joy of creation. The cosmic energy seems to have no other end than this. It fills the world with life just to see it struggle and develop. The earth is a canvas of living pigments, or a page of living words, or a score of living chords, and the picture or the poem or the symphony is for the joy of self-activity. The picture is in high lights and low lights, it is shaded with suffering and pain and failure.

The Eternal made man in his own image: man is the same mixture of failure and success, the same groping, blundering, unrepentent creature, finite, but a mirror of creation.

JOHN BURROUGHS.

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THE SPIRIT OF A STATE

BY JOHN M. THOMAS
President of Middlebury College, Vermont

On the fourth of March, 1791, just one hundred and twenty-five years ago, the independent republic of Vermont was received into the American Union. This event marked the first addition to the original thirteen States, and the first token of the expansion of America to the West. For it is to be remembered that there was a time when Vermont was the Western frontier. All through the years of its foundation and settlement it was regarded as the far, forbidding West. The feel of the West—consciousness of the possession of immense spaces, of marvelous fertility, of unexampled economic opportunity—came over the early settlers of Vermont.

To realize the mind of any people as they settle a new country, one must consider its contrast with the region from which they came, not its qualities in relation to territory which has since been opened for settlement. The men who made Vermont came from Connecticut and Western Massachusetts, and largely from the hill towns in those regions. They felt themselves in God's new country of boundless wealth and promise—the same feeling that has come over the western pioneer in every stage of his march to the Pacific.

Vermont was the first Northwest, in the manner of its settlement and in the character of its population. It was opened for possession just when the American people began their rapid march toward the Pacific. It took nearly two hundred years of American settlement to reach and people the valleys of Vermont. Southward the progress had been fully as slow, and the ragged line of settlement hugged close to the summit of the Appalachians. After the revolution

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began the great migration—the outstanding fact in American history—which peopled the vast convex of the continent from the Western slopes of the Alleghenies to the foothills of the Rockies. From Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay to Southern Vermont the advance of settlement was scarcely a mile a year. The settlers were few; Indians held the country, and the soil was forbidding. The forests were clogged with vines and brush and it took a man a lifetime to clear thirty acres. On the prairies a strong plough and four horses changed virgin soil into fertile farm in one season. There the frontiersman's advance was twenty to thirty miles a year. It was this physical fact which enabled the nation to take possession of the vast mid-continent in a fourth of the time which had been required for the conquest of the Atlantic slope.

The territory of Vermont is not prairie, but it far surpasses lower New England in agricultural possibilities. In the Connecticut and Champlain countries and the innumerable narrow but fertile river-beds of Vermont, the New Englander first came in contact with the rich American soil. He managed to wrest a living from the sand dunes of Massachusetts for the love of God and the dislike of Episcopacy, but when he caught the breath of heavy laden fields, he thrilled with the possibilities of the wealth of a virgin continent, as first the West opened before him.

The pioneers of Vermont were the advance guard of the American army of the conquest of the West. They did not come for religious purposes. They were satisfied both with religious and political conditions in the older communities. But they wanted more land and richer fields. They were not pushed out: they were invited in. It was not undesirable conditions behind them, but attractive opportunities before them, which were the impulse of the movement. In all the settlements of the maritime Atlantic plain it was not so much the desirability of the new region which effected the change of home as the dissatisfaction of the immigrants with conditions, sometimes economic, sometimes religious, sometimes political, in the countries of the old world. But the opening of Vermont was the beginning of a new movement with a new motive. The vast continent had begun to beckon. Generations had come at last which could turn their backs definitely and forever on the old world and who felt their fortunes bound up solely with the new. Then was begun the

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real conquest of the continent, and in this conquest the men who made Vermont were in the forefront and opened the highway for the great horde which followed them, the vast army, larger than ever an emperor commanded, of the American Western pioneers.

The settlement of Vermont has its kinship, not with Jamestown and Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, but with the extension of American territory over the vast interior. The original Vermonter was not the weak successor of John Smith and John Alden, but the precursor of the Western frontiersman. Ethan Allen and Daniel Boone were brothers in spirit, brothers of a new race, the stalwart men who subdued the continent and wrought for America its home. It is a far cry from the Pilgrim fathers, with their Cambridge learning, their psalm singing, and their missionaries to the Indians, to the Green Mountain Boys, with their buckskin breeches, their rude, brusque speech, and their beech seal for Tories, but across all the miles of forest and prairie the Green Mountain settler is own brother to the cow-boy of the plains and the trapper and fur-trader of the Rockies.

The early Vermonters were pioneers of pioneers—the ambitious, discontented, radical element from a community rooted and nourished in radicalism. The American wilderness had already begun to do its work with them. Their clan had been trained for one hundred and fifty years in the conquest of the forest. They knew the manner of the god of the land. They knew its game and how to hunt and fish. There was no need for thousands of them to starve, as at Jamestown, while experiments were being made in trying to grow European crops in the European way. They had learned the new life necessary for the new world and they pressed into its heart with the eagerness of men who were creating a new civilization.

Such men are always democratic and lovers of freedom in the extreme. They had no other idea than that they were complete masters in all affairs in the lands they had bought and paid for, and which they had won from the wilderness by severest hardship and toil. They carried individual and community liberty to such a length that it impressed conservative and cultured observers from the seaboard region as the veriest anarchy and disorder. When Timothy D. Dwight, ex-President of Yale College, traveled in northern New England at various times from 1798 to 1810, he noted the radical

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and unconventional ideas of large portions of the inhabitants and characterized the Vermonters as "Arabian troops," "lovers of disorder." Their tendency to go into politics he especially deprecated. His judgment of the inhabitants of the new region doubtless represents fairly the opinion of the more cultured communities. He thought the people of Vermont restless, ambitious, cunning, talkative, skilled in land-jobbing. The noise of the men in the taverns talking politics until late at night disturbed his rest, and he lit his candle to record in his note-book that "first settlers are usually those who have met with difficulties at home."

Undoubtedly from his point of view President Dwight was a fair and impartial observer. But as a seaboard man he could not understand nor portray sympathetically the new style of manhood which the American wilderness was creating, just as later the East could not understand Abraham Lincoln. It was the seaboard man again who remarked, in the person of Benedict Arnold, that Ethan Allen was "a proper man to lead his own wild people, but entirely unacquainted with military service."

The Hudson and Champlain valleys, the sea-level highway from the Atlantic to the St. Lawrence, seems to form a natural unity of all American territory to the east and to include Vermont with New England. Vermonters are blood relatives of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hamshire, and filial homage binds us to their fellowship. A thousand ties, in culture and thought, in religion and education, in commerce and industry, unite us with the parent States, and we glory in our New England heritage and proudly claim our part in New England eminence and worth.

Nevertheless Vermont is not duly appreciated nor rightly understood until she is accorded her place both as to the last-born child of New England and the first bold emigrant to the West. It was the West in Vermont which President Dwight failed to appreciate. Our people were too rough for him and there was too much of the frontier about them. But it was the "wild people" of Ethan Allen who represented the New America, the America which was to become the American nation, rather than the cultured theologian or the gentleman soldier of the older communities. Two years after the Declaration of Independence, Massachusetts banished sixty graduates of Harvard College among some three hundred Tories, and the roster of the English sympathizers

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is declared to read like "the beadroll of the oldest and noblest families concerned in the founding and upbuilding of New England civilization." The "wild people" never sold out their country. They made her what she is, subduing the continent for her home, and in conquering forest and prairie they created the type of man who was to stand before the world as the representative of the new continent—tall, sinewy, strong, keen in wit, droll in speech, piercing to the heart of a matter with shrewd, discerning instinct, quick to pick a quarrel where his rights were concerned and never ready to lay it down till the last ball had left his rifle, generous in service for the common good, believing in the Declaration of Independence as his very gospel and not as a bit of French philosophy for a political purpose, his face to the empire in the West, whither his restless spirit led him on until he had stamped his institutions and his character on the nation whose home he had won.

In the history of America the East has always been a fixed term. It has denoted, and still denotes, the Atlantic seaboard, Europe facing and Europe thinking, conservative, commercial, manufacturing, tending to quiet, ordered ways, guardian of old-world culture, nursery of American literature, American learning and American thought. So long as America was confined to the fringe of colonies on the Atlantic, the nation remained economically dependent, European in thought and culture. The nation was made by its expansion toward the West. Its real independence—intellectual, spiritual, and personal—was achieved in the conquest of the wide spaces of the mid-continent. The American genius was wrought on the ever-receding frontier.

The first stage of the march in the conquest of the continent was accomplished by the men who made Vermont. Her glory is not alone in Plymouth Rock: it is far more on the prairies and beneath the Rockies, where the spirit that awoke first in the Green Mountain valleys has made America great. Vermont, first inland State, first proved the power of expansion in the American people. She was the first State which was never a colony, never in bondage to any man. Her closest kinship is with the free American pioneers, not with the old-world colonists. The men of Vermont started for the West, and if they did not get far, they got far enough to catch its spirit.

JOHN M. THOMAS.

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THE WORKMANSHIP OF "THE MERCHANT OF VENICE"

BY SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH

SINCE in the end it taught me a good deal, and since the reader too may find it serviceable, let me start by shortly rehearsing my own experience with *The Merchant of Venice.*

I came first to it as a schoolboy, and though I got it by heart I could not love the play. I came to it (as I remember) straight from the woodland enchantments of *As You Like It,* and somehow this was not at all as I liked it. No fairly imaginative youngster could miss seeing that it was picturesque or, on the face of it, romantic enough for anyone, as on the face of it no adventure should have been more delightful than to come out of the green Forest of Arden into sudden view of Venice, spread in the wide sunshine, with all Vanity Fair, all the *Carnival de Venise,* in full swing on her quays; severe merchants trafficking, porters sweating with bales, pitcher-bearers, flower-girls, gallants; vessels lading, discharging, repairing; and up the narrower waterways black gondolas shooting under high guarded windows, any gondola you please hooding a secret—of love, or assassination, or both—as any shutter in the line may open demurely, discreetly, giving just room enough, just time enough, for a hand to drop a rose; Venice again at night—lanterns on the water, masqued revellers taking charge of the quays with drums, hautboys, wry-necked fifes, general tipsiness; withdrawn from this riot into deep intricacies of shadow, the undertone of lutes complaining their love; and out beyond all this fever, far to southward, the stars swinging, keeping their circle—as Queen Elizabeth once danced—" high and disposedly " over Belmont, where on a turfed bank—

> Peace ho! the moon sleeps with Endymion,
> And would not be awaked,

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though the birds have already started to twitter in Portia's garden. Have we not here the very atmosphere of romance?

Well, no. . . . We have a perfect *setting* for romance; but setting and atmosphere are two very different things. I fear we all suffer temptation in later life to sophisticate the thoughts we had as children, often to make thoughts of them when they were scarcely thoughts at all. But fetching back as honestly as I can to the child's mind, I seem to see that he found the whole thing heartless, or (to be more accurate) that he failed to find any heart in it and was chilled: not understanding quite what he missed, but chilled, disappointed none the less.

Barring the Merchant himself, a merely static figure, and Shylock, who is meant to be cruel, every one of the Venetian *dramatis personæ* is either a "waster" or a "rotter" or both, and cold-hearted at that. There is no need to expend ink upon such parasites as surround Antonio—upon Salarino and Salanio. Be it granted that in the hour of his extremity they have no means to save him. Yet they see it coming; they discuss it sympathetically, but always on the assumption that it is *his* affair—

> Let good Antonio look he keep his day,
> Or he shall pay for this.

and they take not so much trouble as to send Bassanio word of his friend's plight, though they know that for Bassanio's sake his deadly peril has been incurred! It is left to Antonio himself to tell the news in that very noble letter of farewell and release:

> Sweet Bassanio: My ships have all miscarried, my creditors grow cruel, my estate is very low, my bond to the Jew is forfeit; and since in paying it it is impossible I should live, all debts are cleared between you and I, if I might but see you at my death. Notwithstanding, use your pleasure: if your love do not persuade you to come, let not my letter.

—a letter which, in good truth, Bassanio does not too extravagantly describe as "a few of the unpleasant'st words that ever blotted paper." Let us compare it with Salarino's account of how the friends had parted:

> I saw Bassanio and Antonio part:
> Bassanio told him he would make some speed
> Of his return: he answered "Do not so;

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Slubber not business for my sake, Bassanio.
But stay the very riping of the time;
And for the Jew's bond which he hath of me,
Let it not enter in your mind of love:
Be merry; and employ your cheerful thoughts
To courtship, and such fair ostents of love
As shall conveniently become you there":
And even there,[1] his eye being big with tears,
Turning his face, he put his hand behind him,
And with affection wondrous sensible
He wrung Bassanio's hand: and so they parted.

But let us consider this conquering hero, Bassanio. When we first meet him he is in debt, a condition on which—having to confess it because he wants to borrow more money—he expends some very choice diction.

'Tis not unknown to you, Antonio,

(No, it certainly was not!)

How much I have disabled mine estate
By something showing a more swelling port
Than my faint means would grant continuance.

That may be a mighty fine way of saying that you have chosen to live beyond your income; but, Shakespeare or no Shakespeare, if Shakespeare means us to hold Bassanio for an honest fellow, it is mighty poor poetry. For poetry, like honest men, looks things in the face, and does not ransack its wardrobe to clothe what is naturally unpoetical. Bassanio, to do him justice, is not trying to wheedle Antonio by this sort of talk; he knows his friend too deeply for that. But he is deceiving *himself*, or rather is reproducing some of the trash with which he has already deceived himself.

He goes on to say that he is not repining; his chief anxiety is to pay everybody, and

To you Antonio,
I owe the most, in money and in love;

and thereupon counts on more love to extract more money, starting (and upon an experienced man of business, be it observed) with some windy nonsense about shooting a second arrow after a lost one.

You know me well; and herein spend but time
To wind about my love with circumstance;

[1] Let the reader note this "there," so subtly repeated that we see the man turning on the spot and on the word together.

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says Antonio; and, indeed, his gentle impatience throughout this scene is well worth noting. He is friend enough already to give all; but to be preached at, and on a subject—money—of which he has forgotten, or chooses to forget, ten times more than Bassanio will ever learn, is a little beyond bearing. And what is Bassanio's project? To borrow three thousand ducats to equip himself to go off and hunt an heiress in Belmont. He has seen her; she is fair; and

> Sometimes from her eyes
> I did receive fair speechless messages. . . .
> Nor is the wide world ignorant of her worth;
> For the four winds blow in from every coast
> Renowned suitors; and her sunny locks
> Hang on her temples like a golden fleece;
> Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strand,
> And many Jasons come in quest of her.
> O my Antonio, had I but the means
> To hold a rival place with one of them,
> I have a mind presages me such thrift
> That I should questionless be fortunate!

Now this is bad workmanship and dishonoring to Bassanio. It suggests the obvious question, Why should he build anything on Portia's encouraging glances, as why should he "questionless be fortunate," seeing that, as he knows perfectly well, but does not choose to confide to the friend whose money he is borrowing, Portia's glances, encouraging or not, are nothing to the purpose, since all depends on his choosing the right one of three caskets—a two to one chance against him?

But he gets the money, of course, equips himself lavishly, arrives at Belmont; and here comes in worse workmanship. For I suppose that, while character weighs in drama, if one thing be more certain than another it is that a predatory young gentleman such as Bassanio would *not* have chosen the leaden casket. I do not know how his soliloquy while choosing affects the reader:

> The world is still deceived with ornament,
> In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt,
> But, being seasoned with a gracious voice,
> Obscures the show of evil? In religion,
> What damned error, but some sober brow
> Will bless it, and approve it with a text.

—but *I* feel moved to interrupt: "Yes, yes—and what

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about yourself, my little fellow? What has altered you that you, of all men, start talking as though you addressed a Young Men's Christian Association?"

And this flaw in characterization goes right down through the workmanship of the play. For the evil opposed against these curious Christians is specific; it is Cruelty; and, yet again specifically, the peculiar cruelty of a Jew. Then, as I see it, an artist at the top of his art would have opposed to this cruelty mansuetude, clemency, charity, and, specifically, Christian charity. Shakespeare misses more than half the point when he makes the intended victims, as a class and by habit, just as heartless as Shylock without any of Shylock's passionate excuse. It is all very well for Portia to strike an attitude and tell the court and the world that

> The quality of mercy is not strained:
> It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven. . . .

But these high-professing words are words and no more to us, who find that, when it comes to her turn and the court's turn, Shylock gets the money by being allowed (1) to pay half his estate in fine, (2) to settle the other half on

> the gentleman
> That lately stole his daughter,

and (3) that

> He presently become a Christian.

(Being such Christians as the whole gang were, they might have spared him *that* ignominy!). Moreover, with such an issue set out squarely in open court, I do not think that any of us can be *satisfied* with Portia's victory, won by legal quibbles as fantastic as anything in *Alice in Wonderland*; since, after all, prosecution and defence have both been presented to us as in deadly earnest. And I have before now let fancy play on the learned Bellario's emotions when report reached him of what his impulsive niece had done with the law, and the garments, he had lent to her. Indeed, a learned Doctor of another University than Padua scornfully summed up this famous scene to me, the other day, as a set-to between a Jew and a Suffragette.

Why are these Venetians so empty-hearted? I should like to believe—and the reader may believe it if he will—that Shakespeare was purposely making his Venice a picture of the hard, shallow side of the Renaissance, even as in *Richard*

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III. he gives us a finished portrait of a Renaissance scoundrel (" I am determined to be a villain ") ; of the Italianate Englishman who was proverbially a devil incarnate. He certainly knew all about it; and in that other Venetian play, *Othello,* he gives us a real tragedy of two passionate, honest hearts entrapped in that same *milieu* of cold, practised, subtle malignity. I should like to believe, further, that against this Venice he consciously and deliberately opposed Belmont (the Hill Beautiful) as the residence of that better part of the Renaissance, its " humanities," its adoration of beauty, its wistful dream of a golden age. It is, at any rate, observable in the play that—whether under spell of Portia or from some other cause—nobody arrives at Belmont who is not instantly and marvellously the better for it; and this is no less true of Bassanio than of Lorenzo and Jessica and Gratiano. All the suitors, be it remarked—Morocco and Aragon no less than Bassanio—address themselves nobly to the trial and take their fate nobly. If this be what Shakespeare meant by Belmont, we can read a great deal into Portia's first words to Nerissa in Act V. as, reaching home again, she emerges on the edge of the dark shrubbery—

> That light we see is burning in my hall.
> How far that little candle throws his beams!
> So shines a good deed in a naughty world.

—a *naughty* world: a world that is naught, having no heart.

It were pleasant (I say) to suppose this naughtiness, this moral emptiness of Venice, deliberately intended. But another consideration comes in.

Any school manual will recite for us the " sources " of *The Merchant of Venice.* Briefly, we all know that it intertwists three plots of intrigues; and we need not vex ourselves here with their origins, because they are nothing to our purpose. We have:

Plot I. The story of the Jew and the pound of flesh.

Plot II. The story of the caskets.

Plot III. The intrigue of the exchanged rings.

To this summary I but append two remarks: The one, obvious to anybody, that Plots I. and II., the pound of flesh and the caskets, are monstrous and incredible; the pound of flesh business starkly inhuman, the casket business scarcely more plausible when we examine it. Be it granted

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that, as Nerissa says, "holy men at their death have good inspirations" (sometimes!). Yet this profound reason scarcely covers Portia's father, since in point of fact his device gave his daughter to a lucky fortune-hunter. Ulrici, like Portia's father, had a good inspiration; *he* divined that Shakespeare "showed consummate art in introducing one improbability, that of the caskets, to balance and, as it were, excuse the other improbability, that of the pound of flesh"! The third intrigue—that of the exchanged rings—is mere light comedy.

For my other remark: In Stephen Gosson's *Schoole of Abuse,* an invective against stage plays by a playwright turned Puritan, published in 1579—when Shakespeare was a boy of fifteen and before he had written a line—there occurs an allusion to a play called *The Jew,* and described as "representing the greediness of worldly chosers and bloody mind of usurers." These coincident phrases—"The Jew," "The greediness of worldly chosers," "the bloody mind of usurers,"—indicate a play on the very lines of *The Merchant of Venice,* and tell us, as well as such casual evidence can, (1) that Shakespeare was refurbishing an old play, (2) that the two themes of the pound of flesh and the caskets had already been combined in that play before Shakespeare ever took it in hand to improve it.

Reading this into Gosson's allusion, we see Shakespeare tackling, as a workman, an old piece of work which already included two monstrous, incredible stories. Even if we rule out Gosson, we see Shakespeare about to combine in one play these two monstrous, incredible stories, *plus* a third which is an intrigue of light comedy separate from both.

It does not matter to which alternative we incline. With either of them Shakespeare's first task as an artist (as any artist will tell us) was *to distract attention from the monstrosities and absurdities in the plot.* I shall return to this.

For the moment I postpone it, to consider another necessity. Every artist knows, and every critic from Aristotle down, that the more you complicate your plot—the more threads you tie together in your *nexus*—the less room you leave yourself for invention and play of character. That is A.B.C.; and it is almost A.B.C. that with three entanglements in hand—one inhuman, two incredible, one fantastic—and three hours to do your trick in—you almost exclude your chance of working seriously upon character.

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Shakespeare had two outlets only, and he took full advantage of both. I rule out Antonio, who, as I said, is merely static. He is made, and rightly, the pivot of the action (and drama is by its very name dynamic). But the pivot is inert; he himself scarcely lifts a hand.

There remain Shylock and Portia, who do the work.

I am going to say very little upon Shylock, who, to my thinking, has been over-philosophised and yet more drearily over-sentimentalised. Charles Kean or Macklin began it. Irving completed (I hope) what they began. Heine, himself a Jew, tells how in a box at Drury Lane he sat next to "a pale, fair Briton who at the end of the Fourth Act fell a-weeping passionately, several times exclaiming, 'the poor man is wronged'"; and Heine goes on to return the compliment in better coin, with talk about "a ripple of tears that were never wept by eyes . . . a sob that could come only from a breast that held in it the martyrdom endured for eighteen centuries by a whole tortured people."

That is all very well. Few of us doubt that Shakespeare often wrote greater than he knew; that he is what we can read into him. But the point is that he started out to make Shylock such a cruel, crafty, villainous Hebrew as would appeal to an audience of Elizabethan Christians. The very structure of the plot shows *that*.

But every author knows how a character of his invention will sometimes take charge of him; as every reader must recognize and own in Shakespeare an imagination so warm, so large, so human, so catholic, that it could not, creating even a Caliban, help sympathising with Caliban's point of view. So it is with Falstaff; and so with Shylock. As I see him, he takes charge of his creator, fenced in by intricacies of plot and finding outlets for his genius where he can. Shakespeare so far sympathises that, even in detail, the language of Shylock is perfect. I think it was Hazlitt who noted the fine Hebraism of his phrase when he hears that his runaway daughter has given in Genoa a ring to purchase a monkey:

> Thou torturest me, Tubal! It was my turquoise: I had it of Leah when I was a bachelor: I would not have given it for *a wilderness of monkeys.*

Let us open our Bible for comparison, say, at the first chapter of Isaiah:

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And the daughter of Zion is left as a cottage in a vineyard, as a lodge in a garden of cucumbers, as a besieged city.

Supposing ourselves lodged in a garden of cucumbers, what could we more appropriately overlook, beyond its fence, than a wilderness of monkeys?

It is curious to reflect that Shakespeare most likely had never seen a Jew in his life.

Let us turn to Portia, the only other character on which the bleached fence of the plot permits Shakespeare to display his strength in characterising. Hazlitt says, "Portia is not a very great favourite with us. . . . Portia has a certain degree of affectation and pedantry about her, which is very unusual in Shakespeare's women." Pedantry, or a touch of it, she *must* have in the trial scene. It is a part of the plot. But—"affectation"? Let us for a moment dismiss that importunate trial scene from our minds and listen to these lovely lines, in which she gives herself, utterly, without low bargaining, as Shakespeare's adorable women always do, out of confessed weakness springing to invincibility:

> You see me, Lord Bassanio, where I stand,
> Such as I am: though for myself alone
> I would not be ambitious in my wish,
> To wish myself much better; yet, for you,
> I would be trebled twenty times myself;
> A thousand times more fair, ten thousand times
> More rich;
> That only to stand high in your account,
> I might in virtues, beauties, livings, friends,
> Exceed account; but the full sum to me
> Is sum of something: which, to term in gross,
> Is an unlesson'd girl, unschool'd, unpractised;
> Happy in this, she is not yet so old
> But she may learn: happier than this,
> She is not bred so dull but she can learn;
> Happiest of all is that her gentle spirit
> Commits itself to yours to be directed
> As from her lord, her governor, her king.
> My self and what is mine to you and yours
> Is now converted: but now I was the lord
> Of this fair mansion, master of my servants,
> Queen o'er myself: and even now, but now,
> This house, these servants, and this same myself
> Are yours, my lord; I give them with this ring—

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This, by the way, is the first we hear of the ring; and we may observe how cunningly Shakespeare foists on us this new card, a moment after he has finished with the caskets. For though he runs three plots in *The Merchant of Venice,* he runs but two at a time. Indeed, he does not actually get to work on this plot of the ring (or, rather, of the rings) until Act IV., Scene i., line 426, at the very moment again when the pound of flesh plot is played out and done with. But *here* we are prepared for it:

> I give them with this ring:
> Which when you part from, lose, or give away,
> Let it presage the ruin of your love,
> And be my vantage to exclaim on you.

"A girl's fancy?—a caprice?" we ask ourselves, noting a thought too much of emphasis laid on this trifle. Yet, after all, if Portia choose to make it a token of the much she is giving, why should she not? So we let it pass, to remember it later on.

But when we consider the body of this speech of Portia's (far more beautiful, with the reader's leave, than her more famous one on the quality of mercy, line by line flowing straight from a clean heart) and compare it with Bassanio's trash about his debts, surely our instinct discriminates between things that poetic language can, and things it cannot, dignify.

I regret to add that William Collins, author of the *Ode to Evening* (a poem which I worship "on this side idolatry"), uttered, comparing him with Fletcher, the most fatuous observation pronounced upon Shakespeare by any critic, living or dead or German. In his Epistle to Sir Thomas Hanmer he actually wrote:

> Of softer mould the gentle Fletcher came,
> The next in order as the next in name.
> With pleas'd attention 'midst his scenes we find
> Each glowing thought that warms the female mind;
> Each melting sigh, and every tended tear,
> The lover's wishes and the virgin's fear,
> His every strain the Smiles and Graces own:
> *But stronger Shakespeare felt for men alone.*

A man who has said that deserves, on either side of the grave, the worst he can get, which is to have it repeated. Portia, indeed, is the earliest portrait in Shakespeare's long gallery of incomparable women. We can feel her charm at

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the full only if we get the Trial Scene back to its right focus. We then see what was amiss with Hazlitt, for instance, when he grumbled over "a certain degree of affectation and pedantry about her . . . which perhaps was a proper qualification for the office of a civil doctor." He had the Trial Scene in his eye. Now all star actors and actresses tend to exaggerate the significance of this scene, because it gives them an unrivalled occasion to exploit, as Portia or as Shylock, their personalities, their picturesqueness, their declamatory powers—Shylock, whetting his knife on his boot, Portia publicly outmanning man, yet in garments decorously ample. Worse, far worse!—it has become the happiest hunting-ground of the amateur.

There ought to be a close time for this scene. I grant it to be the crisis of the action. But it has been sentimentalised and sophisticated until we can scarcely see the rest of the play; and I, for one, long hated the rest of the play for its sake.

Here I take up and continue the personal confession. Some four or five years ago I had to stage-manage *The Merchant of Venice*. This meant that for two good months I lived in it and thought about little else. Having once achieved the difficult but necessary feat of getting the Trial Scene back into focus, I found a sense of the workmanship growing in me, and increasing to something like amazement: in the midst of which certain things new to me emerged and became clear.

Of these I beg to offer my report.

(1) To begin with, for purpose of the report—though in fact and in time it came about last of my little discoveries—Shakespeare was working upon that old play alluded to by Gosson, which combined the two incredible stories of the pound of flesh and the caskets. He started with his hands tied.

(2) He started, as in such hap every artist must, with one paramount object—*to distract our attention from the monstrous absurdity of the story.* Now let us mark with what ingenuity he does it. All artists know it for an axiom that *if you are setting out to tell the incredible, nothing will serve you so well as to open with absolute realism.* Then, with this axiom in mind, let us consider the first scene of this play. There is nothing about any pound of flesh in it! Still more astonishing, while the adventure to win Portia

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is propounded and discussed, there is not a word about caskets! By the end of the scene Shakespeare has impressed on our minds:—

(*a*) that we are dealing with people as real as our selves;

(*b*) that Antonio, a rich merchant, has so deep an affection for young Bassanio that he will forget all business caution to help him;

and (*c*)—first and cunningest of all, *when later we look back,* that this man of affairs, rather deeply involved, gets very anxious without knowing quite why. The reader goes on to note how it increases Antonio's hold on us when he shakes off all his own melancholy at the first hint of helping his friend.

As for the pound of flesh, we next observe how Shylock in Scene iii. slides it in under cover of a jest. By this time Shakespeare has us at his mercy; all the characters are so real to us that we have no choice but to accept all the incredibilities to come. And meanwhile and moreover all the stage for those incredibilities has been set, though we can hardly believe that the trick has been done in four lines—the first and the three last of the Act; in Antonio's opening confession:

> In sooth I know not why I am so sad,

and in Bassanio's other premonition, as with a start of fear—

> I like not fair terms and a villain's mind.

"Come on," Antonio reassures him heartily—*he* is the cheerful one now, forgetful of self and his own premonitions—

> Come on! in this there can be no dismay:
> My ships come home a month before the day.

(3) Launcelot Gobbo is patently own brother and twin to Launce of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* and I think him no improvement on Launce. But if we follow back that hint and turn the pages of the earlier play, we soon begin to rub our eyes. Inured as we are to Shakespeare's habit of economising his material, of turning old plots, tricks, situations to new uses, his "rifacciamenting" (if I may coin the word) of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* in *The Merchant of Venice* is audacious. For a sample, compare the two early

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scenes in which the two heroines discuss their lovers; while, as for the main device of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*—the heroine in mannish disguise—in *The Merchant of Venice* there are but three female characters, and they *all* don man's clothes!

(4) "This is a play," wrote Hazlitt, "that in spite of the change of manners still holds undisputed possession of the stage." It does yet; and yet on the stage, sophisticated by actors, it had always vexed me, until, coming to live with an acting version, I came to track the marvellous stage-cleverness of it all, when, in revulsion, I grew impatient with all judgments of Shakespeare passed on the mere reading of him. This had happened to me before with *The Taming of the Shrew*—a play noisier in the study than on the stage; strident, setting the teeth on edge; odious, until acted; when it straightway becomes not only tolerable, but pleasant, and not only pleasant, but straightforwardly effective. In particular, I had to own of *The Merchant of Venice* that the lines which really told on the stage were lines the reader passes by casually, not pausing to take their impression. It fairly surprised me, for an example, that Lorenzo's famous speech in the last Act—about the music and the moonlight and the stars—though well delivered, carried less weight than four little words of Portia's.

(5) And this brings me to the last Act, so often discussed. It became plain to me that Shakespeare had made at least one attempt at it before satisfying himself; as plain as that, if we resolutely hold the Trial Scene back to focus, this finish becomes the most delightful Act in the play.

That Shakespeare tried other ways is made evident by one line. Upon Lorenzo's and Jessica's lovely duet there breaks a footfall. Lorenzo, startled by it, demands—

> Who comes so fast in the silence of the night?
> A friend [says the voice].
> A friend? What friend? Your name, I pray you,
> Friend?
> Stephano is my name; and I bring word
> My mistress will before the break of day
> Be here at Belmont; she doth stray about
> By holy crosses, where she kneels and prays
> For happy wedlock hours.
> Who comes with her?
> None but a holy hermit, and her maid. . . .

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Nothing loose in literature—in play or in poem—ever caught Dr. Johnson napping. "I do not perceive," says Johnson, in his unfaltering accent, "the use of this hermit, of whom nothing is seen or heard afterwards. The Poet had first planned his fable some other way; and inadvertently, when he changed his scheme, retained something of the original design."

But the Fifth Act, as Shakespeare finally gives it to us, is lovely past compare, even after professionals have done their worst on the Trial Scene. Nay, whatever they did or omitted, the atmosphere of the Doge's court was thunderous, heavily charged; after all, a good man's life was at stake, and we have hung on the lips of the pleaders. We have to be won back to a saner, happier acceptance of life; and so we are, by gracious, most playful comedy. It is all absurd, if we please. The unsealing of a letter telling Antonio, to make joy complete, that

> Three of your argosies
> Are richly come to harbour suddenly,

is unbelievable.

"You shall not know," Portia adds—

> You shall not know by what strange accident
> I chanced on this letter.

No; nor anyone else! It is absurd as the conclusion of *The Vicar of Wakefield.* Yet it is not more absurd than the ending of most fairy-tales.

And while all this has been passing, the moon has sunk and every thicket around Belmont has begun to thrill and sing of dawn. Portia lifts a hand.

> It is almost morning. . . .
> Let us go in—

ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH.

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DRAMA AND MUSIC

A War Play by Mr. Hall Caine.—"Goyescas," a Spanish Opera by a Spaniard.

BY LAWRENCE GILMAN

One knows, of course, that England is ultimately to win the war; but we, for our part, did not know until the other day why it is that she has not already won. The reason is this: the council chamber at Downing Street is too near the nursery. How is the Cabinet to deal effectively with the momentous problems of the great conflict if little Peggy's nightmares are allowed to disturb the deliberations of her father, the Prime Minister—not to speak of their necessarily distracting effect upon the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the other equally august members of the Cabinet who foregather there? And besides, if you are waiting at midnight for The Enemy's answer to your ultimatum, it must be unsettling to have to consult with Peggy's aunt—in the very council chamber itself—about the question of engaging a governess for Peggy. It is idle to talk invidiously of American laxness and amateurishness in the conduct of affairs of State when such things can go on in the very heart of the British Government.

If you have any doubt that they really do go on, just as we have described, all you have to do is to visit the New Amsterdam Theater any night or matinée and observe the disclosure of them in Mr. Hall Caine's new war play, *Margaret Schiller*. Mr. Caine might reply, of course, that, like the famous mongoose of the classic fable, this is only an "imaginary" Downing Street. But our perturbations are not to be so easily set at rest: do we not know, all of us, how unfaltering a realist is Mr. Caine, how delicately precise

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and sedulous an observer, how unseducible a transcriber of the actual? Surely these things, as they reveal themselves to us in his play, must be; and other things, too, equally disquieting.

What, you ask yourself, is wrong with England? Here is Sir Robert Temple, Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, harboring in his household, as governess for his little daughter, a girl whom he knows to be not only an "enemy alien," but an adept at treachery and a mistress of deception, who has obtained a place in his family for the sworn purpose of doing him injury. But Mr. Caine would no doubt remind us that even a Prime Minister may have a heart; so, when Margaret Schiller falls on her knees before Sir Robert, overcome by his magnanimity, and exclaims, with impassioned earnestness, "Your sweet child shall be as sacred to me as my heart's blood," you are wholly and willingly convinced—as who would not be, hearing these noble words uttered in the melting and tear-drenched tones of the beautiful Miss Elsie Ferguson?

So Margaret stayed on at Downing Street, and improved the occasion by falling in love with Sir Robert (who was, we hasten to say, a widower), while conspiracies thickened about them.

Was it the Prime Minister's fault, or was it the fault of the Secretary of State for War, or the fault of the gentle Commissioner of Police, that, while the street entrance to the Government's official residence was carefully guarded, the garden at the rear was open to invasion by an "enemy alien" (Mr. Caine is scrupulously tactful in his references)? Whoever was to blame, you note that an "enemy alien," in the person of Margaret's fiery young brother, is able, with her assistance, to invade Downing Street from the rear, with murderous designs upon the Prime Minister. But Margaret, persuaded of the need for sacrifice, stops with her own body the bullet that is intended for her hero, Sir Robert; and, it being Christmas Eve, you hear the "waits" singing carols in the distance as the curtain falls. So, after all, it is Tragedy that Mr. Caine has given us—Tragedy that, you might say, has its roots partly in the nursery and the need for governesses, and partly in British tolerance, British softness.

It is all very illuminating and very sad; and through the

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sadness and the gloom and the murky convolutions of it moves the enamoring apparition of Miss Ferguson, like a sorrowful dryad in a London fog—very lonely and appealing and ill at ease, you fancy, at finding herself in such strange and unaccustomed surroundings; for the pseudo-sentiment of a Hall Caine melodrama is not for her and her distinguished and lovely art. You would as soon expect to walk into Carnegie Hall and discover Mr. Kreisler fiddling "My Mother Was a Lady."

To write an opera upside-down might justly be regarded as a considerable artistic feat; yet Enrique Granados and his librettist, Fernando Periquet, who in their Spanish lyric-drama, *Goyescas,* accomplished this exciting performance, have received less credit for it than is their due. Richard Wagner, it will be remembered, wrote the *Ring* poems backward, and then proceeded, in his humdrum way, to set them to music. Mr. Granados and his colleague were content with no such pedestrian essay. Their method was incomparably more adventurous. To begin with, Mr. Granados composed some piano pieces suggested to his fancy by contemplating the paintings of Goya; but thereafter the history of his creation becomes, to our wayfaring intelligence, so cloudy and extraordinary that, to guard against the dissemination of error, we shall let his co-worker, Mr. Periquet, recount the brief but remarkable story (the italics shall be ours, for attention).

"Granados," Mr. Periquet tells us, "had seen Goya's paintings and sketches at the Prado, and they inspired in him music [for the piano]. One day we talked of taking these ravishing melodies to the stage. We lacked a plot. This was my task, in the fulfillment of which I put all my soul. . . . Goya, as an epoch, means sentiment, loves and passions, and, socially, a strange melting of all classes, something like a presage of democracy. . . . The question resolved itself, therefore, into presenting this social mixture as an environment to tragic love affairs. . . . As soon as the plot took shape in my mind I unfolded it to Granados, who received it as his own. Then I wrote the book, using the meters of the Spanish romance and seguidilla, *not intending that the musician should set my verse to music,* but that Granados might let his fancy roam over the scenes and stories I had built of my rhymes. So

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was his charming score composed, *without words,* in the most absolute freedom, while seeing in his imagination a gorgeous pageant of Goyaesque figures. . . . When the last note of his music was set down, there fell on me a hard but unshirkable task, a painful tour de force. . . . I had to make new words for the music! . . . What I wrote for Granados' music were not, could not be, verses. The speeches of the characters had to follow, note by note, the maestro's fantasy. . . . At times, given a group of notes, it seemed impossible to express the musician's thought in an equal number of syllables—he wanting to keep to his original idea, I despairing of finding its expression within the counted number of syllables." Is it any wonder that, as Mr. Periquet confesses, they used to quarrel over it like schoolboys?

Only those who know Spanish better than we do (and we do not know it at all) are entitled to estimate the difficulties overcome by the much-tried Mr. Periquet in fitting his syllables to Mr. Granados' notes; our own privilege in the matter is exhausted when we say that the music of this opera is singularly undramatic, singularly lacking in variety of accent: in that precise and intimate relationship between the dramatic moment and its musical projection which is attainable when the music is born of the text, but which is not attainable when words have been fitted to tones by so abnormal and procrustean an operation as that undertaken by the authors of *Goyescas.* That, in the case of this opera, drama and music go hand-in-hand even as amiably as they do is sufficiently wonderful; but it is not possible to doubt that their union would have been infinitely more felicitous had they come together in the ordinary hallowed way; and so we shall not soon cease to regret that Mr. Granados did not wait before composing this score until he had Mr. Periquet's text before him in its final form.

A musician of inspiration might have made us forget the unfortunate effect of this operatic maladjustment; but Mr. Granados is not that. He has spoken disparagingly of an earlier and more famous opera than his own, which, though not written by a Spaniard, is concerned with Spanish scenes, characters, and emotions: in other words, the *Carmen* of Bizet. The music of *Carmen,* in Mr. Granados' view, is not characteristically Spanish—we gather, indeed, that he regards it rather lightly. Well, we shall

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not contend that *Carmen* is irreproachable; but, since Mr. Granados himself has seen fit to drag it in, we may venture to use it as a touchstone for his own production. Let us remark, then, that *Carmen* has certain traits which *Goyescas* should have, but has not. *Carmen,* despite its occasional musical vulgarity and its more than occasional sentimentalism, exhibits almost continuously a complete and impressive fusion of speech and song: in its musico-dramatic utterance it is precise, pointed, and veracious. *Goyescas* exhibits nothing of the kind. Bizet wrote with his eye on the object at every moment. Mr. Granados did not. Wherever his eye was, it was not on his text, for the elementary reason that the text was not there. Mr. Granados might have made up to us for the defective articulation of his lyrico-dramatic structure had he been able to endue it with at least an exterior loveliness and distinction; but this he could not do: for his is a fifth-rate musical mind dealing commonplacely with its material. He is essentially a writer of vivacious and characteristic dance-music, with enough skill and routine as a composer to enable him to produce a score that is by no means contemptible. But when he has to deal with drama and emotion at their highest—when, in other words, there comes a searching test of his capacity for expressive musical speech—he can produce nothing better than the kind of thing we get in the passage between Rosario and the nightingale, the love-duet at the window, and the final moments of death and lamentation: that is to say, a superior order of salon-music, gracefully sentimental in melody, and prettily harmonized in the fashion of the day before yesterday: a kind of tonal rose-water sprayed over the dramatic situation.

We have no intention of denying a certain excellence to this unimpeachably high-minded creation of Mr. Granados and his librettist: it is earnest, it is refined, it has engaging moments, and no doubt it is veritably and impeccably Spanish. But we cannot help wishing—if Mr. Granados will forgive us—that it had a few of the shortcomings which he seems to have detected in *Carmen.*

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

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THE BOOK OF THE MONTH

APOLLO ON TOUR[1]

BY LAWRENCE GILMAN

It is clear that Rupert Brooke has become a tradition—a tradition touched with the bright glamour that so soon envelops those who (in his own abiding phrase) go "rose-crowned into the darkness." Less than a year has passed since the dead poet was carried to the summit of the island of Scyros and there placed—records his friend Henry James—"in such earth and amid such beauty of light and shade and embracing prospect, that the fondest reading of his young lifetime could have suggested nothing better." That was no longer ago than April, 1915; yet for those who know only the projection of his extraordinary personality in his own pages, no less than for those who knew him in the flesh, it is singularly difficult to write of Rupert Brooke in a vein quite free from an elegiacal lyricism.

You may have been, for a time, indisposed and deterred (no doubt ungenerously) by the tide of rhapsodic commemoration that has poured upon us in an unceasing flood since that torchlight burial by the Aegean; you may have wearied a little of the threnodic chorus with its strange medley of lamenting singers, from the Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill to Professor Gilbert Murray and Mr. Henry James. You may have churlishly persuaded yourself that the sentimental stops were being somewhat too lavishly drawn: that these memorial quirings were over-rich in emotion. You fancied that Brooke himself, reading them in

Some low sweet alley between wind and wind,

no longer an "exile of immortality," would have said rebukingly, as he once remarked of the exuberance of Ameri-

[1] *Letters from America.* By Rupert Brooke. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916.

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can mortuary advertising, that they "made death impossible for a refined man." And yet, in the end, one capitulates, like all the rest. It is not possible to read the poems, to see the pictured face (surely, as Scott said of the face of Byron, "a countenance to dream of"), and now to read the notes, just published, of his wander-year in America and the South Seas, without succumbing, uncompromisingly and gladly, to the spell of this fabulous being.

Observe Apollo on tour: did ever poet travel and report with so rich and sensitive a gayety, so humorous an ardor, so blithe and ironic an alertness, so winning, so disarming, a susceptibility, naïvely unaware though at times it is? He is perhaps least resistible when he is most engagingly strabismic. What one amongst us would have been willing to suggest to this radiant creature, with however gentle a deprecation, that the elderly Harvard graduate who thought Matthew Arnold was still alive is not completely typical of our university alumni, or even of the no doubt sufficiently vulnerable sons of Harvard?

Our itinerant Apollo made other notable and rewarding discoveries in this much-discovered land. His friends had given him a none too encouraging report of it. "*El Cuspidorado,*" was the excellent phrase devised for it by an Oxford friend. "It's Hell, but it's fine," an artist had told him; while the unvarying comment of "ordinary English friends" was even more eloquently compact when he told them of his intended visit to us: "My God!" Mr. Bartholdi's torch-bearing goddess in our Upper Bay was an agreeable surprise to him; for, "standing nobly," despite her "clumsiness," she was better than his hopes. It did not take him long to perceive our prime excellences. They are five. Our females? Our hotels? Our atmosphere? These are not among them. Our jokes and our drinks ("which curiously resemble each other"): these are the best. The others are our fish, our architecture, and our children's clothes. As for American women, Apollo was unconquered: their faces are "not very feminine"; and, while many are handsome, beautiful and pretty ones are rare.

In the matter of the national visage, indeed, our poet is positive and clarifying. We have developed two classes, and only two: the "upper-middle" and the "lower-middle." The "upper-class head" is long, often fine about the fore-

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head and eyes, and very clearly outlined. The eyes have an odd, tired pathos in them, as if of a perpetual, never quite successful effort to understand something (for example—let us suggest—the type of Colonel Roosevelt). This type of head has, as its most characteristic feature, a small, tight mouth, closed downwards at the corner, and a lower lip very slightly protruding. It has little expression about it, and no curves—" there the Puritan comes out." No other nation, it seems, has a mouth like this. Let us turn, now, to our other type, that of the " lower-middle " class. Here we find a mouth wider and more expressive; but the forehead is meaner, the eyes hard; the whole face, however, is " rather more adaptive and in touch with life." And here there floats before our vision a composite of this type—the blended and harmonious visages of the Great Commoner, Mr. Edwin Markham, the Rev. Mr. Sunday, and Mr. Percy Mackaye—prophets and lyrists of The People, every one. But of all our faces, there is " one unfailing characteristic "—*smoothness:* " Why do American faces never wrinkle? Is it the absence of a soul?" It is, dear Poet, it is. But (let Boston, bereft by Mr. Brooke of the tradition of Harvard culture, take heart of grace) " this is less true of the Bostonian than of the ordinary business American," in whose life " exhilaration and depression take the place of joy and suffering."

Our poet came upon still further surprises. In our American tram-cars (as inspected in New York) there is, at the end of the day, no English spoken; all is polyglot. To the exercise involved in negotiating our open cars, by the way, Mr. Brooke attributes our vital energy and good health—to this, and to our habit of drinking, between meals, water. Further, we Americans walk better than the English—and here our poet celebrates a condition of sartorial enfranchisement which, we confess, had stolen upon us unaware: this is " the land of belts." The suspender of homely and robust tradition is now among memory's misty wraiths: hence we walk more freely, with " a taking swing," and " almost with grace."

Finally, we are given a symbolic image of ourselves, as a sculptor, seeking to figure this Republic in stone, might carve it for the ages. Here it is: " A young man in shirt-sleeves, open-faced, pleasant, and rather vulgar, straw hat on the back of his head, his trousers full and sloppy, his coat over his arm. The motto written beneath will be, of course,

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This is some country"—an image at which even our late compatriot, Mr. James, blinks a little uncomfortably in his Preface to the Letters: "We long," says Mr. James, "to take him by the hand and show him finer things."

At a Harvard-Yale baseball game, our poet, having noted that "the Boston crowd" is curiously English, suddenly felt, as he watched the players and the "rooters" and the cheer-leader and the shouting crowd, "very alien and very, very old." Yet his subsequent reactions to Montreal and Quebec and Ontario and Niagara and the Canadian Northwest, and, lastly, to the South Sea islands, quite obviously cured him of his sense of ancientness. Here he is at his lovable best, with all his forces in delectable play—his jocund sweetness, his flashing swiftness of view, his invincible buoyancy, his high spiritual valor, his wit, his perpetual and subduing charm. Here the self-consciousness, the rawness and slightness, of the earlier chapters are gladly forgotten, and we face the golden and conquering lad of the Tradition, "proud, clear-eyed and laughing": we perceive, beyond dubiety or suspicion, that he must indeed, as the devoted Mr. James can say of him, "have reaped at every turn the harmonizing benefit that his presence conferred." And always, as you would know, the touch of the poet is unmistakable and necromantic. How rare in its loveliness and emotion is his final lament, in this land without memories or ghosts, for the haunted soil of England! We and the Canadians have no ghosts, is his accusation: our forests, our wild places, are "wind-swept and empty." "You may lie awake all night and never feel the passing of printless feet . . . Americans, so active in this life, rest quiet afterwards. . . . The dead do not return."

Do they not? Are we a land without ghosts? Perhaps it is so. . . . Yet, in a New England that one recalls, in a South that one remembers, we know old houses, and ruined gardens, and deserted forgotten places of orchard and wood and hillside, once loved and cherished, where now are only stillness and a brooding memorial beauty; and these are not empty, nor forgotten of the dead.

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

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NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

THE MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Frederic Louis Huidekoper. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

It is doubtless difficult for an advocate of military preparedness in these days to express his convictions with impeccable moderation. To be sure, if those who urge upon us the need of a larger and better equipped army and navy sometimes represent the American people as more profoundly immersed in a fatuous sense of security than is actually the case, they are not wholly to blame: the peace advocates "have gie'd them fair excuse." Nevertheless there is something repellent in any discourse that savors of *ex parte* pleadings. "As a child," writes Mr. Frederic Louis Huidekoper in his book, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States,* "he [the American citizen] is taught from school books the authors of which have extolled to the skies the prowess of our 'citizen soldiery' and have painted in glowing colors the brilliancy of American military successes, while they have glossed over or suppressed with studied care the blunders and fearful cost in life and money which have characterized our past wars." This is hardly fair to the authors of modern text-books of history. In such books there is little "extolling" or "painting in glowing colors," and surely there is no deliberate suppression of truth. Not many voters, it may be presumed, have suffered in youth an impairment of judgment consequent upon a diet of history over-sugared with patriotism.

On the whole Mr. Huidekoper's treatise would be rather more persuasive if it did not now and then make the reader feel that he must be rather stupid to warrant his being belabored with arguments so weighty, so emphatic, and so often reiterated. It would be a pity, however, if Mr. Huidekoper's treatise should fail to secure wide popularity either because of its argumentative manner or on account of its somewhat formidable length and detail. The book contains much sound argument as well as many pertinent facts that are not elsewhere accessible to the majority of readers. No other work dealing with military preparedness in the United States is more informing in regard to the status and history of the army than this of Mr. Huidekoper's; no book designed for non-military

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readers discusses the broad questions of military policy so comprehensively and intelligibly.

In two essential respects Mr. Huidekoper's point of view is entirely justified. The first of these is the less obvious and of the less immediate consequence. Nevertheless, it is a real and important consideration. There is undoubtedly room for a treatise, suitable for lay readers, dealing with the military history of the United States. Without such a treatise, a part—though not perhaps the most important part—of our national history—remains obscure to all but the expert. For it is scarcely feasible for the general historian to write adequately of our wars as military events, or to discuss at length the pros and cons of military policy. The historian, indeed, must presuppose in his readers an elementary knowledge of civil government, international law, and economics. These subjects are somewhat carefully taught, in connection with history or apart from it. In regard to military matters, however, the knowledge which most persons bring to the reading of history is not even elementary—it is made up largely of childish conceptions. Again, Mr. Huidekoper is certainly right in insisting upon the need at the present hour of a clearly defined plan of preparation. It is precisely because the need of such a plan is felt that his book will be widely read. The fact is not that Americans are now so apathetic upon the subject of national self-defense as to require rhetorical arousing, but rather that they are already aroused to the point of desiring extensive and sanely presented information on military questions.

In matter, if not always in manner, Mr. Huidekoper's book hits the mark. As a history, supplying an analytical view of every important military event from the colonial period to the close of the Philippine war, it possesses a value that will endure long after the issue of preparedness now before the country has been definitely and—it may be hoped, thoroughly—settled. The light which the author throws upon the conduct of our past wars will be appreciated by every reader of history who is not content with superficialities. Nor are Mr. Huidekoper's careful discussions of military matters too technical for readers gifted with intellectual curiosity and a moderate degree of patience. The whole subject of military policy and administration is easily understood in outline and in illustration; it resolves itself into questions of common sense and of arithmetic.

The lessons which Mr. Huidekoper draws from the experience of the United States in former wars are mainly those which have been more or less expatiated upon of late, with varying degrees of insistence upon particular points, by writers who treat of preparedness from the expert point of view. The Regular Army, it seems evident, has invariably been too small to assure success in any considerable military operations. Never once has the Army been prop-

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erly organized, or so constituted that when war approached it would be automatically expanded to the requisite strength. No proper reserves have ever existed, and in consequence the Army has almost invariably been compelled to accept such recruits as offered themselves. Moreover, in no case have measures been taken to increase the Regular Army until the eve, and frequently after the beginning, of hostilities. As a natural consequence, far too much dependence has always been placed upon raw troops, and until the Philippine war no proper standard was set either for militia or for volunteers. Mistakes even more deeply rooted in ignorance, or in unwillingness to face facts, are, in the author's opinion, the persistent failure of Congress to realize that where a choice is offered men invariably prefer to enlist in that organization in which discipline is most lax; and the "total inability of Congress and the American people" to perceive that the Army of the United States must be placed unreservedly under the control of the Federal Government. To these fundamental errors must be added the uniform neglect to provide *beforehand* for the requisite equipment of the number of troops likely to be called into service during the war. Finally, the lesson of the past, the one which the author reiterates and most heavily emphasizes, is the fact that "the policy of the length of enlistments has uniformly been the very incarnation of folly." More than once, as a result of the failure to prescribe that all enlistments shall be *for the war*, dependable forces have had to be discharged; generals in the field have been forced to act in opposition to military judgment; and the safety of the country has been jeopardized by the depletion of armies at just the time when troops were imperatively needed. These contentions are backed by a presentation of historic facts that seems not only conclusive but fairly exhaustive.

But in addition to the lessons of history, there are the lessons of common sense. The Act of May 27, 1908, specifically prescribed that "the Organized Militia shall be called into the service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise." This is the rock of offense that seems to loom largest in the eyes of most military experts. Mr. Huidekoper denounces it as "one of the most flagrant pieces of folly ever injected into the military legislation of our country," and adds that "so long as it remains on the statute books there need be no hope of our possessing a sound military organization suitable to the stress of war." Reason requires, thinks Mr. Huidekoper, that the militia should either be nationalized or, if it is to remain under State control, that it should be "appraised at its true value" and relegated to the last line of defense.

In Mr. Huidekoper's opinion, however, it is not enough to correct legislative mistakes of this nature or to make wise supplementary laws for the administration of the army. The author is

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a thorough-going advocate of preparedness. The plan which he proposes calls for four lines of defense, consisting of an enlarged Regular Army, a body of reserves, a body of United States volunteers, and the Organized Militia or National Guard. In this way, it is thought, a force of at least 1,200,000 men, of whom 670,000 would have had training in the Regular Army, would be provided. This plan, it is true, involves a relatively short term of active service with the colors for each member of the Regular Army and a relatively long term of service in the reserves—a feature sometimes objected to by military writers on the ground that it tends to impair the efficiency of the Army by making it a school for recruits. This, however, is a point for discussion among experts. For the general reader the interest of the discussion will lie in the apparent feasibility of Mr. Huidekoper's plan in its broad outline, and in the author's conservative estimate of the number of troops necessary to defend the country.

Mr. Huidekoper's volume is a cyclopaedia and source book for the advocate of preparedness; but it is far more than this. It is, as has been said, a valuable military history—a record and critique, moreover, of military legislation in the United States from the War of the Revolution to the present day. As an exposition of military needs it probably expresses better than any other single work the consensus of opinion among military men regarding the land-forces of the United States.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: AN INTERPRETATION. By Albert Bushnell Hart. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1916.

No political idea is more deeply impressed upon the minds of most Americans than that which is represented by the words "Monroe Doctrine," and yet this familiar idea, when an attempt is made to analyze it, usually turns out to be what the psychologist Weininger called a "henid," or pseudo-idea. The truth, as expressed by Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, is simply that "the Monroe Doctrine is not an utterance or a series of utterances, but a frame of mind, the nature of which is from time to time described in the generalizations of those who are in a position to know the facts and also to gauge the temper of the country. . . . The number of Doctrines since 1849 is about the same as the number of Secretaries of State."

Professor Hart's treatise upon the Monroe Doctrine is a clarifying discourse; it will reveal to many readers their own actual belief, transforming what has been a mere "henid" into a true conception. The book shows, indeed, what the country as a whole has always believed, separating the essential from the accidental. In effect, then, Professor Hart does two things: he traces the trans-

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formation of the Monroe Doctrine through forms that are better described, in some cases, as "Monroeless," or "Monroevoid," and he states the residual truth that exists more or less disguised in them all.

As a keen and subtle exposition, Professor Hart's volume will prove fascinating to students of history—to all, in fact, who enjoy the feeling of easy intellectual mastery over a complex subject. Something, to be sure, must be allowed for a certain tediousness inherent in an exhaustive inquiry, scientific in method; yet it may be said that few books constructed on the analytic plan are more readable than this of Professor Hart's. Terseness and vigor of phrase, with a certain homely directness of speech, enliven the discourse and serve to bring abstractions home to the mind.

The original Monroe Doctrine, first announced in 1823, served a temporary purpose. By 1826 the immediate danger was over, and the Doctrine might have been retired but for the fact that the conditions out of which that danger came continued. There was obviously still a need—as there is today—of a principle regulating the conduct of European Powers in America. In the succeeding period the Doctrine underwent changes scarcely consistent with a strict interpretation of its language or its spirit. By 1853 it became proper to speak of a doctrine of American Supremacy. "The spirit of the country was honestly for expansion, and against recognizing too many rights of weaker neighbors." At the end of Buchanan's Administration the original Monroe Doctrine was "out of service." It had been weakened by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which both recognized England as a partner in the Isthmian Canal project and admitted the principle that all European Powers were entitled to share in the use and protection of the canal. On the other hand, the radical and aggressive policy of Pierce and Buchanan, of Cass and Douglas, amounted to a travesty of the Monroe Doctrine. These men "meant to drive out the existing and acknowledged colonies of European Powers; then they hoped gradually to annex the weak and disturbed Latin-American States." The Doctrine of Secretary Seward led to the same conclusion as that of Secretary Cass—annexation as the penalty for anarchy and misrule. The chief difference appears to lie in the fact that Seward's Doctrine was frankly "Monroeless." From 1869 onward strong and definite lines of policy in foreign affairs have been struck out by American statesmen, and to these policies the original Monroe Doctrine has been usually attached merely as a sort of pendant. The Cleveland-Olney Doctrine, asserted in connection with the dispute between the United States and England over the Venezuela boundary question, strikingly shows the futility of the attempt to justify the action of 1895 by the principle of 1823. "One is tempted to apply to Secretary Olney's argument," writes Professor Hart, "the Oxford undergraduate's account of a football game: 'It would have been just as good

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a fight without the ball; the ball was only in the way.'" Later instances add force and clearness to the contention that American principles have readily altered their form in response to changing world conditions. The doctrine of the Two Spheres, for example, has become an anachronism since the conquest of the Philippines.

Professor Hart's chapters upon "The Roosevelt Doctrine and Its Successors," upon "The Latin-American Doctrine," "The German Doctrine," "The Pacific and Asiatic Doctrines" reveal the extent to which the United States is necessarily involved in world politics, and point out the difficulty of stating the American position in a manner that conforms to present facts and affords safe guidance for the future. When the views of Latin America, and of European nations are taken into consideration, when the foreign responsibilities which the United States has undertaken and may still undertake are freely viewed, nothing appears more certain than that the Monroe Doctrine does not in any smooth and satisfactory fashion fit into the general situation. In the Monroe Doctrine we possess no convenient solvent for the difficulties incident to our foreign relations. On the other hand, it is equally evident that the doctrine still associated with the name of Monroe expresses a frame of mind to which Americans are extremely likely to adhere.

Conservatively to define this frame of mind becomes, then, the important task. In his "doctrine of permanent interest" Professor Hart offers a kind of minimum Monroe Doctrine which seems true to the historic and actual facts and reasonably representative of American intentions for the future. This doctrine asserts the principles of self-government in America and of the territorial completeness of the two Americas. It declares American protectorates allowable. It commits the United States to the responsibility of preventing "certain causes of trouble between Latin American and European and Asiatic States," and without forbidding attack for just cause, reserves to the United States the right to determine in every case the justice of the quarrel. It also prohibits the building up of colonies upon American soil. Finally, the doctrine of permanent interest announces the intention of the United States to consult the strongest and stablest Latin American States, without, however, entering into any arrangement by which the decisions of the United States could be overruled by votes or combinations of other Powers.

By a process of reasoning as delicate and incisive as the work of a sculptor, Professor Hart frees the American doctrine from its obscurities and irrelevancies and causes it to stand out in its bare essentials. The whole treatise is a task of definition carried out with surpassing skill. The conclusion seems irresistible: either the United States must adopt and defend the doctrine substantially as defined, or it must give up the traditional American doctrine altogether.

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VISION OF WAR. By Lincoln Colcord. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

It is at least a debatable question whether any man ought ever to seek to rival the poetic effects attained by Walt Whitman. Mr. Colcord's experiments in this direction do not incline one to maintain the affirmative. Writes Mr. Colcord, for example:

I went out into the night of quiet stars;
I looked up at the wheeling heavens, at the mysterious firmament;
I thought of the awful distances out there, of the incredible magnitudes of space and silence and eternity;
I thought of man, his life, his love, his dreams;
I thought of his body, how it is born and grows, and of his spirit that cannot be explained.

Now this is not merely like Walt Whitman's verse in that it is unrhymed and unmetrical; it is imitative. In choice of epithet, in the attempt at bigness and elemental impressiveness, and (elsewhere) in colloquial mannerisms, Mr. Colcord's poetry impresses one for the most part as derivative.

Unmetrical, unrhymed verse is a splendid vehicle for ardor and vision; it is also a fatally accommodating vessel for mere rhetoric. The latter predominates in Mr. Colcord's prose rhapsodies. At times there is in these poems a vein of gleaming imagination or a strain of lyric intensity, but, in general, rhetoric flourishes at the expense of inspiration, and the affectation of plain prosiness jars where there is little real contrast between poetic beauty and mere baldness.

It is, of course, unfair to compare Mr. Colcord's work with the poetry of the Old Testament, yet his Biblical earnestness makes the comparison hard to avoid:

Ye who think yourselves wise, shall perish through ignorance.
Ye who think yourselves benevolent, shall perish through greed.
Ye who think yourselves strong, shall perish through weakness.
Ye who think yourselves virtuous shall perish through sin.

Since such passages as this inevitably remind one of really lofty and eloquent Biblical admonitions, it is not surprising that the reaction is perhaps not altogether what Mr. Colcord intended.

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CONTEMPORARY ECHOES

LORD ABERDEEN ON COLONEL HARVEY

(*From the New York Tribune*)

SIR,—If Colonel George Harvey wanted to "start something" when he wrote "England Today" for THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, he must be congratulating himself on his success. Wherever men do congregate to discuss the position of the United States, present and future, in the affairs of the world, the mention of some point or other in Colonel Harvey's article seems to have become inevitable.

Unfortunately, the voice of competent Englishmen is not enough heard in confirmation or refutation of the colonel. A week ago, however, one of the morning papers printed a letter from an Englishman whose opinion differed greatly from that of Colonel Harvey, and who expressed himself with a reasoned calmness that carried conviction and must have delighted many of us who consider good will between America and England essential for the good of both countries.

A few days ago I had occasion to hear the views of Lord Aberdeen, former viceroy of Ireland, on Anglo-American relations. A sentence from the much discussed article had been quoted:

"No outcome of this war could be more calamitous to civilization than a possible estrangement through misunderstanding of the two great English-speaking peoples."

The words are put into the mouth of a Tory editor and are supposedly spoken at a British dinner table. Lord Aberdeen was asked whether he agreed. May I venture to quote his answer and his arguments as faithfully as my memory permits:

"I have read and admired Colonel Harvey's able article, but I think it should be read with knowledge and insight, to escape possible misinterpretations.

"Conversations such as the one there recorded take place every day in England. They are friendly conversations, held in a friendly spirit, among people who belong to the same race, Americans and Britishers. If they reach the pitch of a heated discussion they are nevertheless no more and no less than a family disagreement, without any sinister meaning whatever.

"Fundamentally, Americans and Britishers are blood relations, and what is more, they are friends. That very precious fact should never be forgotten here or in England, and I am glad to find that it very rarely is. From time to time side issues have clouded our fundamental friendship in the eyes of the casual observer, but such moments have been isolated and of a superficial character. For our common good they should not now be permitted to assume any more serious proportions."

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It was suggested that perhaps Colonel Harvey's impressions of the feeling in England toward America were not conclusive, as his visit abroad was a short one.

One gentleman, who felt particularly strongly on the matter, said that even if Colonel Harvey's impressions were correct, it was unfair to relate them as he did. He likened the belligerent countries to sick-rooms, where naturally there is a high nervous tension, and he asserted that to report the words of belligerents without fully explaining the mental conditions under which they were spoken was as mischievous as to carry a sick man's fevered talk about his neighbor to the house across the street.

But Lord Aberdeen remained gentle toward the author under attack:

"As I remember Colonel Harvey's article, it seems to me that the author has a very clear understanding of the feeling in England toward America. Perhaps he did not express himself plainly enough, if indeed he created the notion that we in England do not feel friendship for you. Perhaps, if you do not know our dinner table conversations of these months, you cannot detect the warmth of the spirit behind the printed word. That is most regrettable, for the writings of a man like Colonel Harvey have equal weight to work harm or good, and none would regret more than the colonel himself if they were to work harm in this particular instance.

"Is it not patent, however, that if conversations like those synthesized by Colonel Harvey—conversations occurring actually by the thousand—take place among British subjects and American visitors, the first, unavoidable condition is an atmosphere of friendly understanding? If hosts and guests were not conscious of mutual good will and a sort of racial family bond, elementary courtesy would forbid the topic.

"Then, will you consider a moment: is it likely that we should invite Americans to our homes if there were no ties of friendship between us?

"Then again, take the man in the street, in England. He reads the newspapers. He reads that American producers and manufacturers are making fortunes out of their war trade with the Allies. But is he likely to forget that both France and England would now be in a sorry way if it were not for this war trade with America? And can he avoid paying a tribute of gratitude to the American people when he reads of the generous, unceasing help they are lending, without hope of recompense, to all the sufferers among all the allied nations?

"No, the English people are not and cannot be other than friendly toward the American people.

"Colonel Harvey draws a distinction between the people and the Administration of the United States. On this point I may have no opinion, of course, while I am receiving the cordial courtesies of the country. I am telling you merely what I know to be true in England and have found to be true here. Let me repeat: fundamentally, there is nothing but friendship between the two peoples, even if there is a little grumbling on both sides. Temporary dissensions, a trifle of hot-headedness or an air of indifference, are usual and human occurrences between brothers. They are ripples on the surface.

"Traveling through the States from coast to coast, I have met among all classes with the most comforting response to the friendship we Britishers bear you. I noticed this with particular satisfaction among the Westerners, whom we had been led to look upon as rather pro-German. It was a very

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gratifying experience for one who believes as firmly as I do that the interests of America and Great Britain are bound together. Naturally I cannot go into details in a few spoken words, but I beg you to trust that my belief on this point is based on solid argument.

"I cannot give you a definition of what is meant nowadays by 'the freedom of the seas.' But I can assure you most solemnly that not a man in Great Britain, high or low, has the least wish to encroach on the rights of neutrals. Our navalism is no kin to militarism. I know the two have been likened by some among the American people. All I can ask now is that they postpone their judgment until all the facts are clearly unravelled out of the great tangle.

"I will not assert that in some instances we have not erred, but whenever in the past we have made mistakes, we have not been slow to make due amends. The case of the *Alabama*, during the Civil War, proves that when England stands convicted of error she pays the penalty manfully. But of this I am certain, and I say it proudly: whatever England may be found guilty of when the day of reckoning comes with peace restored, hers will not have been irreparable offences—she will not be called upon to pay one farthing of wehrgeld!"

Whether it be our knowledge that no "military necessity" could make the Allies shed the blood of non-combatants, women and children, or whether it be simply our blood relationship with the people of Great Britain that compels our sympathy for the Allies in their fight against Prussianism, is of no immediate moment. The fact is essential. And I am happy to see that my own desire for friendly relations between Great Britain and America is by no means a lone one in America, since one of our most popular publications prints on its front page, and fears not for its circulation:

"John Bullikins, my jo, John,
We've known each other long.
I've sometimes thought you right, John,
And often thought you wrong.
We've had our little tiffs, John;
Yet, whether friend or foe,
I've nursed a high regard for you,
John Bullikins, my jo."

F. C. Fay.

New York, Jan. 28, 1916.

SECOND TERMS AND TREATIES

(*From the Philadelphia Inquirer*)

The current number of The North American Review contains an article from the pen of Colonel George Harvey, its editor, in which that gentleman demonstrates, at least to his own satisfaction, that Mr. Woodrow Wilson is under no obligation, legal, moral or sentimental, to refrain from seeking a renomination because he was elected on a platform which declared for a single Presidential term and which committed its candidate to the acceptance of that principle.

Under all the circumstances and recalling his own contumelious treatment

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by the man of whose special qualifications for the Presidency he was the original discoverer, it was very kind and even handsomel magnanimous for Colonel Harvey to undertake the somewhat difficult task he has essayed, especially as he has no assurance that his well-meant efforts will be appreciated, no assurance that he is not inviting some such repudiation and rebuke as upon a previous memorable occasion he received.

Colonel and Editor Harvey in the warmth of his zeal and the goodness of his heart has taken the risk of that, and he has elaborated an ingeniously plausible argument which goes to show that the platform of his party is not, at least in this particular, binding upon the man who implicitly accepted it, and who, when it suited his convenience, has professed to feel under a solemn obligation, as when the suffragists wanted him to espouse their cause, to be guided and controlled by its contents.

One cannot help thinking, however, that so far as the second term is concerned it was hardly worth while for the Colonel to rush to the rescue in his chivalric, impetuous way and to engage in a discussion which has merely an academic interest. Platform or no platform, Mr. Wilson is going to be renominated, for the simple reason that there is no one else in sight and that the Democratic party cannot afford by rejecting him to confess the failure of an administration with which it is indissolubly identified.

But if Colonel Harvey wants to help his former protégé, if he really wants to exculpate him from a charge of platform violation much more serious than a disregard of the single-term plank involves, there is something he might do. He might show to the satisfaction of the American people, if that be possible, how Mr. Wilson was justified in ignoring that plank of his party's platform which defined the attitude of the Democracy toward the Panama Canal. This is something which others have tried, but which none has thus far accomplished.

In their Baltimore platform the Democrats say: "We favor the exemption from tolls of American ships engaged in coastwise trade passing through the Panama Canal." And yet Mr. Wilson forced a bill through Congress by which this exemption was denied them. Suppose Colonel Harvey tackles the tough job of vindicating this platform violation and of reconciling this contradiction. It would be more to the point.

President Wilson repudiated that shameful pledge because it contravened a solemn treaty and violated the good faith of the United States. It is the best and bravest thing he has done since he became President.—EDITOR.

PLANKS NOT PLEDGES

(*From the Baltimore Sun*)

The only persons who really care anything about the single-term plank in the Democratic national platform of 1912 are the backward Republican lookers, who fear Wilson as an opposing candidate, and two or three Democratic statesmen who would like to have "a try" at the Presidency. These are the critics who have seized upon the single-term plank as a club with which to drive Mr. Wilson from the field. Nothing could more conclusively demonstrate Mr. Wilson's personal and official strength than the resort of

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his opponents to such an issue. It is a virtual admission that they have a very poor case against him in matters of substance, and that they must substitute sneers for logic. So far as the vast majority of Democrats are concerned, and so far as the vast majority of the plain people of the country are concerned, the discussion that has been going on over the question is mere piffle, a fool debate by intellectual hair-splitters and moral dyspeptics over a thing that has no real standing in the forum of healthy and reasonable minds. The whole matter resolves itself into an attempt to impeach Mr. Wilson's sincerity and honesty, and to hold him up as a man who is ready to violate his plighted faith for the sake of his ambition.

Such a charge is its own answer. He may or he may not be anxious to serve a second term, but there are few people in the country silly enough to think that his failure to regard the Democratic declaration of 1912 as binding would constitute a breach of ethics. Even his old critic, Colonel George Harvey, who is accustomed to straining at gnats, if not to swallowing camels, cannot see how Mr. Wilson can be held to have committed any offense against the most rigid code of morals in expressing strong disagreement with the single-term plank in his letter to Representative Palmer, or in manifesting a willingness to accept a second term. Colonel Harvey in the current number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW points out that in the convention of 1912, "for the first time in history, consideration of the platform was deferred until after the naming of the candidate. This was done at the instance of Mr. Bryan for some actual reason known only to himself. That this specific plank did not harmonize with Mr. Wilson's judgment was brought to the attention of Mr. Bryan by his personal representative, Mr. William F. McCombs." Moreover, in his speech of acceptance Mr. Wilson took occasion "to make the fact clear that he did not accept the platform literally in all its parts as a definite 'program.'"

Such a declaration as the single-term plank could not in the nature of things be accepted as a permanent Democratic doctrine. It was virtually an expression of opinion by one man, and one man who was very much interested in Democratic nominations, and was accepted as such by those members of the convention who perceived the presence of the "little joker."

Mr. Wilson considered it of no importance then, as the people consider it of no importance now. When he was requested later by Representative Palmer to express his views regard to it, he did so with great frankness and logic, and he gave the proposition its quietus in a very effective manner.

Why should there be any moral obligation on the part of a nominee to take up every plank in a platform, like a child reciting the answers in his catechism, and avow his belief or disbelief in each one of them? There are few political platforms which have not contained some fool remark, or some ridiculous proposition which its best friends cannot indorse and to which they feel it would be unkind to direct attention.

This single-term plank never has received the indorsement of the sober second thought of the Democratic party, and it was slipped into the platform of 1912 without serious consideration. If it had been regarded as a serious party pledge, it would not have been thrown into the discard at the very beginning of Mr. Wilson's term. If it was intended as a snare to catch some particular game, it has still less claim to any standing at the bar of political morality.

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AN HONEST REPUBLICAN'S OPINION

(*From the Bloomington Pantagraph*)

Colonel George Harvey, who raised Woodrow Wilson from comparative obscurity and made him a Presidential candidate, has a convincing editorial in the February number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW on the single-term plank of the Democratic platform of 1912. Since his former protégé became President, Colonel Harvey has not always been in accord with the policies and acts of the Wilson administration and at times he has not hesitated to criticize unsparingly. On the single-term plank, however, Colonel Harvey is whole-heartedly on the side of President Wilson.

According to Colonel Harvey, President Wilson stands accused upon two points: First, that by his silence he tacitly indorsed the Baltimore declaration and so appealed to the voters under a false pretense, and, secondly, that after having been safely elected, he surreptitiously smothered the resolution putting that declaration into effect, in the interest of his own personal ambition.

On the first point Colonel Harvey recalls that, for the first time in history, consideration of the platform was deferred until after the naming of the candidate. The platform was dictated by William J. Bryan, and the fact that this specific plank did not meet with the approval of Mr. Wilson was brought to the attention of Mr. Bryan and other members of the committee. This being so, after Mr. Wilson was nominated the obligation of removing the disparity rested, not upon the candidate, but upon the committee.

On the second point, involving the smothering of the resolution limiting the Presidential tenure to one term, Colonel Harvey says it would be absurd to accuse the President of "lobbying" in his own behalf. He had become the leader of the Democratic party and it was his duty to express both his opinion and the reasons underlying it, which he did in the letter to Mr. Palmer. Moreover, if the resolution had been adopted it would have left President Wilson eligible to a term of six years instead of four years, thus opening the way for the possible distinction of being the first and only citizen having served as President for ten consecutive years. Concluding, Colonel Harvey says:

"There is no issue in the single term and none can be made by the Republican party, by Mr. Roosevelt, by Mr. Bryan, or by anybody else. Regardless of futile attacks, regardless even of his own inclinations, Woodrow Wilson must be the next Democratic candidate for President."

This is a reasonable statement based upon solid premises. Certainly no fair-minded Republican will attempt to take issue with President Wilson in standing for a second term. The Progressives, with a perpetual candidate, who is seeking a third term, would place themselves in a ludicrous position by attempting to criticize an aspirant for a second term. As for Mr. Bryan, it can be said that the American people, regardless of party, have never been in sympathy with his effort to limit the term of an office which he can never hold himself. Go to it, Mr. President; may the best man win and may he be a Republican.

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(*From the Sioux City Tribune*)

A lot of newspapers are very much riled up over Colonel George Harvey's article in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW setting forth the statement that the United States is cordially detested in England. There is no reason to get angry at Harvey. He is merely serving in the capacity of a reporter, and what he reports tallies with what nearly every other American newspaper or magazine reporter who has been abroad says. It tallies with the sentiment reflected in cartoons in Dutch, British, Swedish, French and Italian publications.

Not only England, but France and Italy and the neutral nations of Europe think the United States has blustered a lot about the rights of humanity and done nothing to defend them or even so much as protested in their support. An idea as to the sentiment prevailing in Europe may be gleaned from the quip that is being repeated on the streets in every country and by the soldiers in the trenches, "The next war will be between the two yellow races—Americans and Chinese."

This sentiment undoubtedly exists. It is injuring the United States. It is going to injure it more. It is going to show up in the fight for world markets after the war, costing this country an incalculable loss in exports. It is going to show up in poorly concealed contempt for the wishes and rights of this nation, making our foreign relations full of friction and keeping this country always on the bit. Colonel Roosevelt has stated it strikingly when he says a nation which is too proud to stand up and make a fight (not necessarily a physical one), for right and humanity and civilization is just proud enough to be kicked. We are inviting the boots of Europe.

It isn't going to do any good or help matters for American politicians and American newspapers to rail at European sentiment and talk about the American people not caring what Europe thinks of us. It isn't smart to earn the ill will of all the neighbors and then say one doesn't care. There is no profit, peace or wisdom in being at outs with the world.

Of course, due allowance must be made for the intense, supersensitive emotions in Europe just now, but after making such allowance, it still remains that the United States has lost caste and respect because of her attitude. The wise thing to do is to look within and see where we have made mistakes and then set about forthwith to correct them. To have peace declared among European nations with all of them retaining a contempt or a hatred for this country would be not only foolish, but it would be dangerous.

(*From the Hartford Courant*)

The editor's discourse [in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW] on "Wilson and a Second Term" has for its text the following sentence from the Democratic platform of 1912:

> We favor a single presidential term, and to that end urge the adoption of an amendment to the constitution making the President of the United States ineligible for re-election, and we pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle.

Without attempting to follow the tortuous argument by which Colonel Harvey reaches his conclusions, or to dwell upon the difficulty he finds in

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reconciling Mr. Wilson's open declaration that the Democratic platform "says what it means and means what it says" with his secret and "oddly long delayed" letter to Mr. Palmer designed to smother the Democratic resolution, it suffices to say that Colonel Harvey emerges from all the difficulties and declares there is no issue in the Single Term and that Mr. Wilson must be the next Democratic candidate for President. Colonel Harvey is a brilliant preacher, but this is a case of "wresting the scriptures!" In a further discourse he asks whether we—United States—are "Peacemakers or Laodiceans?" and somewhat lightly concludes we are the latter, in exalting neutrality above what he calls "principle," as if there were no principle in national neutrality!

(*From the New York Sun*)

Our esteemed contemporary, THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, in the person of its editor, hastens to the defence of President Wilson's political and moral right to a second term. With both ability and plausibility Colonel George Harvey argues, in substance, that although the President was elected to office on a single term platform he may ignore that platform and run again without justly incurring the reprobation of even the most fastidious moralist.

History presents few more touching spectacles of magnanimity than this appearance of Colonel Harvey in behalf of the august (if ungrateful) child of his early discernment.

We do not quite agree with our distinguished contemporary as to the ethical principles involved. There are many other good Americans who are eagerly with THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW Colonel in hoping for the repudiation of the single term plank of the Baltimore platform. It has surprised us, and we are sure it would astonish Colonel Harvey, to learn from the letters on the subject arriving at this office from various parts of the land how many of the most ardent promoters of a second nomination for Woodrow Wilson are those who are least desirous of his second election.

We wonder why this is. Can it be in every case the result of a large-minded generosity, as it is in Colonel Harvey's case?

(*From the Bookseller*)

THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, with its truly worth-while reading matter, deserves a prominent place on every news counter catering to cultured people, and dealers who push the sale will be well rewarded. Every issue contains not only literary articles of the highest merits, excellent dramatic and musical criticisms and book reviews, but also most interesting letters from its readers and the most significant utterances of the press at home and abroad. Of the editor, Colonel George Harvey, a prominent magazine recently stated that he is "probably the most powerful single political force in the country."

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

THE GREATER PERIL

SIR,—The interesting exposition of the state of public feeling in England toward America and Americans contained in your January number, whets one's appetite for a psychological study of both peoples in this crisis of civilization. Perhaps we can look forward to such a paper in one of your ensuing issues.

The English attitude, that the Allies are fighting our battle while we are fattening on the conflict, can readily be attributed to the intense egoism of people engaged in an undertaking which absorbs the supreme measure of thought and energy of which they are capable. England and her Allies did not embark on this struggle from any altruistic motive, and it is safe to say that until they were committed to the war no thought of its effect on America ever entered their minds. Later, however, appalled by the magnitude of the sacrifices which they were called upon to make and realizing that a country which stood for the same ideals remained unscathed, they, in protest against the seeming injustice of it, cried out, "Why not you, too? Our cause is also the cause of civilization and democracy; why, then, should you stand aloof?"

In claiming our active participation in the war at that time England was clearly unreasonable. Our population contains a strong leaven of Teutonic blood, and our Government is a representative one. Germany had given us no cause for quarrel; and that we should take sides against her without direct provocation was morally impossible. "But what of the violation of Belgium?" it is urged. Even in this we were not officially concerned, for no convention or treaty to which America was a party had been broken, although gross and shameful wrong had certainly been done, and we knew it. Public opinion in this country resented the act, and while our Government still had no excuse for hostilities, good cause existed for a distinct bias toward the Allies, which might have taken the form of a technical neutrality with thinly disguised sympathy for the Powers that were fighting for Belgian deliverance. This position was not taken, however, and England was reasonable in her disappointment and criticism.

This leads us to the psychological study of the individual. Why was this attitude not assumed by our Government? At that time it was a safe one politically, and could have been made popular. The policy of the Administration was entirely directed by the President. Mr. Wilson, therefore, may be held individually responsible for what ensued. Can the reason for his attitude be found in a narrow conception of his duty to the nation of which he was the Chief Executive, or may it be looked for in an ambition to avoid war during a period in the world's history when war was almost universal?

Whatever the President's motive, the Teutonic Powers had begun to take

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his measure, and when outrages were later committed against the lives and property of American citizens at sea, it was on the fair chance that such outrages would not be actively resented by this Government. That presumption has been amply justified, and further activities were inaugurated. The German-American population of this country was incited to subordinate its American citizenship to an allegiance claimed by the land of its birth, conspiracies against industrial properties were instigated by the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Teutonic Allies, and a flagrant pro-German propaganda was developed among us. Truly a miscarriage of England's just hope of gaining at least our *moral* support!

What was the attitude of our people through all this—not of the foreigners recently admitted to citizenship, but of the American people? Aghast, at first, at the magnitude of the calamity, immediately concerned for their own financial and commercial stability, horrified at the great Germanic crime with which the war was ushered in; and then, what? Influenced somewhat by willingness to follow lines of least resistance and somewhat by an orderly desire to support the Government in any course it might pursue, we were indignant but inactive. The newspapers promised us, at each outrage, that Germany would be held to a "strict accountability," and that each fulmination of the Administration, if unheeded, would be followed by portentous doings of some kind. We waited, but nothing followed except some insolently evasive reply by the Power to which our protest was, for the moment, addressed.

Meantime we were becoming accustomed to outrages; they did not seem to interfere with business—which was becoming good again—and very few of us knew personally any of the victims. The more we read of the conduct of modern war, the more undesirable war seemed to be; we had never fought Germany, and therefore had no traditional antagonism toward her. She was not "in sight" on land or sea, and seemed rather intangible as a possible enemy. There was no obvious way of attacking her, and there was nothing in the idea to stir the blood. Beside, the Administration was constantly receiving assurances that the outrages complained of would not be repeated. We gradually became callous and indifferent, our ethical standards were rapidly lowered by familiarity with unpunished crimes, and our moral sense became blunted. A sorry condition, indeed, and one that justifies England's present opinion of us. She is disappointed, and justly so, and our own people abroad, who through their individual activities are upholding the traditions of American manhood and womanhood, are bitterly ashamed. This is bad enough, God knows, but is worse to come?

England and her Allies control the seas, and, in the prosecution of the war, enforce certain trade restrictions against neutral commerce with her enemies. Contrary to *our* views of what she ought to do under the circumstances, she has, for instance, declared cotton contraband of war. This touches our pockets, as we would like to sell cotton to Germany; so we protest. We encounter other restrictions and inconveniences, and we protest again. We have a subconscious feeling that we have been bullied by Germany and we do not propose to be bullied by England (who, by the way, shows no disposition to bully us), and the language of our protest is rather harsher than that employed in notes to Germany over the murder of our citizens. A commercial grievance we can understand, and, properly handled, it would be a good vote-getter; so it is ventilated in Congress, and certain

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sections of the country are lashed into greater indignation by the fiery eloquence of their representatives. England, so far, has replied to our protests with unfailing courtesy and patience, but should she for a moment lose her self-control over the relatively grotesque situation and send this Government a sharp reply, it would be perfectly possible for the altercation to grow into a dispute the consequences of which would be difficult to foresee. Antagonism to England is traditional with us; we are taught it in the public schools; in the period of our national life our only real and persistent enemy has been England, whom we have always conquered. This, at least, is the schoolboy's creed, and a shadowy belief in the truth of it lingers in the man's mind. Is it possible for this antagonism again to burst forth? Unthinkable as it may seem, I believe it is, although with equal conviction I believe that no provocation short of an attack would induce England to fight us. Still we may easily go so far as definitely to lose her friendship; and to her friendship we already owe much. Does our only hope of avoiding such a calamity lie in a change of Administration?

H. C. GROOME.

WARRENTON, VA.

FROM A DISHEARTENED PATRIOT

SIR,—I read with the deepest interest your article, "England Today," in the January number of the REVIEW. It must have attracted thoughtful attention everywhere, and I happen to know of one case in which the reading of it, by a friend of mine, led to the buying of a dozen copies of the REVIEW in less than a day. Living summers, as we do, in Canada, where the feelings excited by the war are like those in England, and almost as strong, we can understand and appreciate your article better than any one can who has lived all the time within our own boundaries. We, too, have felt as the Americans in England do, while we have watched the course of our Government; and in a letter that I wrote from Canada to a friend in New York, after the President made his "too proud to fight" speech, I said that if the Administration continued to follow the course that it was then pursuing, I thought I should renounce my American birthright and become a naturalized citizen of the country where I was already living more than half of every year. I haven't done it yet, but it still remains a possibility. Meanwhile, by lecturing in Canada for the benefit of every patriotic object, from the Patriotic Fund and the Red Cross to the purchase of machine guns, I suppose I have joined the ranks of the "residents abroad who, although born and bred in the United States, have so far forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States."

But I would say to President Wilson, as a very distinguished American said in the Virginia Convention, a century and a half ago, "If this be treason, make the most of it."

I am more afraid, just now, that we shall incur the enmity of England, by nagging her on the subject of interference with our trade, than I am that we shall get into trouble with Germany. The creation of a hostile and bitter feeling toward us in England and Canada would be a greater calamity than a rupture of diplomatic relations with the Central European Powers could ever be.

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I don't regard the Administration with as much confidence as I should like to feel, and I long ago ceased to expect from Congress enlightened statesmanship or wise action on any great question that affects the personal interests of a majority of its members.

I hope you are going to write more on the European situation.

GEORGE KENNAN.

NEW YORK CITY.

OUR PURPOSE LAID BARE

SIR,—I have read your article in the January NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, relating your impressions abroad,—how Woodrow Wilson is regarded in England and France. Your motive cannot be misconstrued. The obvious purpose was to discredit the President at home because in some countries abroad, for the moment, he is not favorably regarded.

Among the manifold duties of the Chief Magistrate of this country it has always been regarded as one of the principal duties to maintain the honor and prestige of the nation—this is an obligation imposed upon him by public sentiment, by the general opinion of the country. Has Woodrow Wilson not met that requirement ably and fully? Have not diplomatic means attained the same result that oceans of blood—to say nothing of treasure—could not do more to accomplish?

It has been the design and purpose of all the warring nations in Europe to embroil us in their present conflict. Jealous of our prosperity and power they can see no reason why we should stand aloof and pursue the even tenor of our way, fulfilling our chosen destiny.

They are at one in a mad endeavor to draw us into the vortex, and—I blush to say it—there are those of us here who would render all possible assistance to accomplish the same thing, and yet they call themselves patriots and good citizens! The test of the popularity and accomplishments of an Administration is to be based upon the judgment pronounced upon it at home, by those whom it immediately serves and who are responsible for its existence; not upon a pronounced judgment of expatriates (who perhaps left their country for their country's good) and interested combatants.

Woodrow Wilson is today so firmly entrenched in the hearts of his countrymen that they will not yield him for another. They are assured of safety and honor under his guidance. You will find this to be the verdict in November.

W. M. GREEN.

LIMA, OHIO.

CHAOS AND ANARCHY IN MEXICO

SIR,—I am writing to find out if you can help us through your splendid magazine, by telling the truth to the people about the conditions down here in Mexico? I have taken THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for years.

What we Americans read in most of the papers about conditions here is absolutely false. Instead of growing better, things are getting worse. This city is full of Americans and foreigners, waiting to be able to return to their homes in the interior, but they are not able to go for lack of trains, or unsafe conditions in the country. Our Government is being laughed at, and no matter what order comes from Washington, it is not obeyed

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and not followed up by our Government. Americans are being thrown in jail without trial. The representatives sent down here are either in with one set of Mexicans or the other, being paid to send what news they wish printed. Mr. Wilson has so often broken faith with these Mexicans, that now they no longer fear him.

The trains to Mexico City run perhaps once or twice a week. The journey is perilous owing to there being bandits scattered along the way who attack and rob the trains if they so choose. There are but few coaches, and so few engines that it is hard to operate. No freight is carried and so business is at a standstill. Carranza has stolen and shipped out of the country everything salable, even the supplies sent down by the Red Cross. A reporter, Mr. Francis, got photographs of the bags, etc., and informed Mr. Silliman, Mr. Wilson's special representative. Instead of notifying Washington, Mr. Silliman notified Carranza, and in a short time Mr. Francis was thrown into jail "incommunicado."

The Administration in Washington knows what terrible conditions exist down here. Our men are being killed on the border by the very ammunition and firearms brought from the United States to be turned against Americans, and by the soldiers of Carranza, whom Mr. Wilson is consulting and has recognized—he whom every Mexican, even his own men, hates. He can never be President, for the people won't stand for him. He has looted Mexico from the border down, and how can he make good? I beg of you to find out the truth and tell the people of our great country so that they may come to know what we are suffering, and help us.

AMERICAN.

VERA CRUZ, MEXICO.

A GOOD WORD FOR SAUL OF TARSUS

SIR,—I have been a reader of the REVIEW for many years, and have always considered it reliable. One of the most satisfying features of it to me is the fact that dependence could be put in the knowledge and the ability of the writers of its contributed articles. Consequently I received a rude shock when I read the article on Saul of Tarsus by Ellwood Hendrick; for I happen to know a little about Saul myself. For flippancy of treatment and for ignorance of the facts involved, I have never seen, in any self-respecting periodical, the equal of this output. Hereafter, how am I to know that other writers in the REVIEW, treating of subjects concerning which I am not well informed, are not as incompetent as the author under consideration?

I have not time to speak of all this man's errors now. I wish, however, to refer to two or three by way of illustration. For instance, he tells us that Paul was the inventor of the doctrine of hell-fire. The fact of the matter is that Paul never mentions hell-fire at all in any of his epistles or reported sayings. He also alleges that Paul was the author of the dogma of the Virgin Birth; but the truth is that Paul never refers to the Virgin Birth. So far as the records go, there is no evidence that he knew anything about it. Moreover, he further alleges that Paul greatly emphasized baptism, and made it necessary to salvation. Now anyone who knows a little about Paul knows that the exact contrary is the truth, as is proved by many passages, and especially by I Corinthians, 1:13-14. Finally, to say, as he does, that Paul was without love, and that he taught that women

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generally were a temptation and a danger, is to betray an ignorance of his subject so colossal as to merit nothing short of contempt.

F. D. McRae.

St. Paul, Minn.

MR. HENDRICK'S REPLY

Sir,—The mechanism of the mind is a curious thing, very complex, and the wonder is that we mortals can agree as well as we do. We seem to be constructed with a view to fighting each other, and if it were not for the gift of sympathy the world would be a sorrier place than it is even in these days.

I agree with Mr. McRae in regard to my ignorance and incompetence, and I suppose he is right in calling me flippant. I can not take orthodoxy seriously. I can not focus it in my mind as that arrangement of all the facts which is the truth. Call it bedevilment if you will, my vision of orthodoxy is always as of something grotesque.

Now the pages of The North American Review are not long enough to permit contributors of Letters to the Editor to quote the Scriptures to prove their contentions, because the sayings of Holy Writ are many and divers. But on re-reading my essay I think it possible to support nearly every statement by texts,—which would neither prove anything nor make it perfect.

Indeed, I should be the last to call it perfect. Its faults, however, appear to me to be more clearly pointed out by a clergyman who addressed me from another State than by Mr. McRae. He said that, on the whole, he agreed with me, but thought I missed one quality of Paul, and that my failure to mention it colored my whole essay to its hurt. This was that Paul was a mystic. I think he is right, and that I am at fault in this respect. But mysticism seems to be one of my blind spots, and here again Mr. McRae is right in regard to my incompetence. The same gentleman also says that I am not quite fair to Paul. This, too, may be just criticism. I have heard Paul quoted in defense of so much meanness in this world that I may be, in a measure, angry at the thought of him. And anger blinds. It is idle to put confidence in what anyone of us says in his wrath. Anger is the mother of error.

In a personal letter which Mr. McRae was good enough to send me he tells me that "One of the best established laws of psychology is that we select our beliefs. One can very easily make himself believe or disbelieve a thing if he wants to; the wish is father to the thought." This statement is singularly free from heresy except perhaps for a touch of Pelagianism. Many an institution of orthodoxy has been built upon it, including the Holy Inquisition. I once made an earnest plea for the doctrine that we have within us the capacity to select our own ideals, and despite any seeming contradiction I still hold to it. But as for this ability to believe or disbelieve in concrete things at will, I am afraid the rule is not universal. Some of us are so organized that we can not bring ourselves to believe what, according to the testimony of all of our faculties, offends against the truth.

My postulate is that the Christology of Jesus and the Christology of Paul are not the same, and that they are in sore conflict. There are those of us who are not so gifted with the faculty of volitional belief that they can hold Paul in reverence. Why then may we not look beyond Paul to the

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simpler doctrine of Jesus? The light of its loveliness may encourage us to turn our faces to the morning and to hope for a brighter day.

ELLWOOD HENDRICK.

NEW YORK CITY.

ONE OF THE THINGS THAT MAKE US GREAT

SIR,—It must rejoice the heart of every real lover of peace to read Henry Rutgers Marshall's article in the February number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, "War and Human Nature." I wish this article could be printed in pamphlet form and placed on the library table of every man who reads and thinks throughout these United States. To my mind one of the things that makes THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW such a great magazine is the variety of subjects discussed. It is a magazine for the man who loves to read and think. Some of these days I hope we may be favored with an article in this great magazine from the pen of some able man on the subject: "Unmistakable Signs of the Coming Kingdom of Righteousness and Peace." Only some man with prophetic vision can see these "signs" amid the darkness and confusion of these days of war; but the "kingdom is coming."

JESSE F. BENTON.

GARY, W. VA.

A WELCOME TRIBUTE

SIR,—Your letter addressed to my father, inquiring about a renewal of his subscription to THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, has been read. It may be of interest to you to know that until within a few weeks of his death last year, at almost 92 years of age, THE REVIEW interested him greatly. He looked forward to each number as long as he was able to read, and after that he asked for articles to be read to him. He was a man who passed a lifetime of unusual physical and mental activity as a Philadelphia merchant and later as a Chester County farmer, and he considered that THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW furnished him with the best expressions of opinion on world—and national—affairs, both political and literary.

We, members of his family, thank you for the information and pleasure your publication gave him for many years.

GERTRUDE RHOADS.

WESTTOWN, PA.

"JUDICIAL AND HELPFUL"

SIR,—Permit me, as a Canadian, to express my appreciation of your deft, sympathetic, judicial, and helpful interpretation of the English attitude in your article, "England Today," in the January issue. You can do more helpful work for public enlightenment in America by just such a balanced treatment of international problems than could be accomplished by any jingoistic methods. You have caught to nicety the underlying spirit of the struggle as it is seen in the somewhat phlegmatic English nature;

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and you have not, by implication or direct statement, departed from your original standpoint of interested and unprejudiced observation. It was admirably done.

M. F. TURNER.

TORONTO, CANADA.

DISCUSSION OF IMMIGRATION WANTED

SIR,—A recent issue of your magazine contained a most excellent article on the German attitude. Your readers would surely appreciate just such a clear, fair, and sanely patriotic article, or series of articles, on the immigration and naturalization questions; surely there are a few who are far-sighted enough to picture to us the pitiful plight our country will be in unless immigration is restricted to exclude undesirable elements, and naturalization laws made effective enough to insure some degree of attempt at citizenship. We shall hope to see our best newspapers and magazines in the lead in questions of such vital importance.

C. I. R.

DOVER, N. J.

OUR HEATHENISH PROPAGANDA

SIR,—The profanity in your editorial department in the January number is entirely condemnable. I had been accustomed to passing your magazine on to a young man in whose prospects I am interested, but I draw the line at this January issue.

Why is it that whenever you print anything of a religious nature it is either off-color or avowedly infidel? To "The Man Jesus" you have now added "Saul of Tarsus." Are you giving us a series? How much fun do you get out of printing such stuff? That is, I suppose, you must get some fun out of them—I haven't sense enough to see any other reasons why you should engage in such heathenish propaganda.

JAMES W. MARSHALL.

JUNCTION CITY, ARK.

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

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

MORRISON I. SWIFT
is a resident of Boston, where he has engaged in social reform of an advanced character, devoting much attention to the problem of the unemployed and kindred public questions. For several years he has conducted the Humanist Forum in that city. He has written for various magazines and has published a number of books in the sociological field, of which *Human Submission* has been the most widely circulated.

PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN,
Professor of International Law at Princeton University, was instructor in the same subject at Harvard College. Mr. Brown since his graduation from Williams College has been in the diplomatic service, having been Secretary of the American Legation at Constantinople, also at Guatemala and Honduras, and from 1908-1910 he was Minister to the latter Republic.

SYDNEY BROOKS,
now making one of his frequent visits to America, is one of the best known of English journalists. His contributions to important reviews and magazines on both sides of the Atlantic have won him an international reputation as an observer and publicist.

WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY
has been professor of Political Economy at Harvard University since 1901. He is the author of numerous volumes relating to the basic principles of railway problems which include *Railroads: Rates and Regulations* and *Railroads: Finance and Organization.*

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HENRY HERBERT CHILDERS
is a native of Texas. He was at one time Assistant Corporation Counsel of New York, and is now conducting an important investigation for the Secretary of the Interior. During the 1912 campaign he was special representative for Governor Wilson under Chairman McCombs.

L. AMES BROWN
is a journalist of Washington, D. C., and a correspondent for a number of the important dailies. The University of North Carolina conferred the degree of Master of Arts upon him in recognition of his work.

JOSEPH CONRAD
the distinguished author, whose novel *Under Western Eyes* appeared serially in the REVIEW, is of Polish origin, but now lives in England. The list of his published works indicates great industry and includes the following familiar titles: *Lord Jim, The Mirror of the Sea, The Secret Agent, A Set of Six, Chance,* and *Victory.*

EDITH WYATT
is a graduate of Bryn Mawr College and is now living in Chicago. She is a frequent contributor to the magazines and is the author of *Every One His Own Way, True Love,* and *Making Both Ends Meet.*

JOSEPH S. AUERBACH
is a member of the well-known law firm of Davies, Auerbach & Cornell, of this city. Two volumes of his *Essays and Miscellanies,* to which Mr. Joseph H. Choate wrote the introduction, met with much commendation from the more important critics.

SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH
has held the King Edward VII. Professorship of English Literature at Cambridge University since 1912. A prolific writer, there being some thirty and more volumes to his credit, his notable work as an anthologist is indicated by *The Oxford Book of English Verse, The Oxford Book of Ballads,* and *The Oxford Book of Victorian Verse.* THE REVIEW hopes to publish other Shakespeare papers by Sir Arthur in this year of the Shakespeare Tercentenary.

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

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Henry James.

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